











DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
 











Settore Concorsuale: 14/B2 - STORIA DELLE RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, DELLE SOCIETA' 
E DELLE ISTITUZIONI EXTRAEUROPEE 
 






TRANSITIONS IN THE MONETARY HISTORY OF ERITREA. COLONIAL 


















































This thesis focuses on the building of a colonial monetary system in Eritrea under the rule of Italian 
colonialism, as well as its impact on local societies and the reasons for the failure of Italian monetary 
policies. In answering the principal research questions, the “monetary angle” will allow an 
investigation into other aspects of Italian colonialism in Eritrea, such as the construction of a “colonial 
knowledge”, the introduction of military wage labour, and the establishment of new financial 
institutions. Framed against the background of the literature on African monetary history, the thesis 
is thematically organised into three chapters, each having its own periodisation. The first chapter 
deals with the construction of a “colonial knowledge” regarding the Eritrean monetary system, and 
the reasons behind the failure of the Italian attempts to introduce a colonial currency. The second 
chapter analyses the introduction of military wage labour and the strategies employed by the 
indigenous veterans to store their wealth. The third chapter discusses the role of banking in Eritrea in 
supporting Italian attempts to control the monetary system during the First World War currency crisis. 
At the same time, this chapter sheds light on the manner in which different local actors were affected 
by these policies, suffered their consequences, or took advantage of the situation. Finally, the third 
chapter also clarifies the positioning of Eritrea in the regional trade network and the important role 
of the Maria Theresa thaler in its multiple currency system. The central argument of the study is that 
the introduction of colonial currencies and the employment of monetary policies did not produce a 
swift change in local trade networks and economic practices. In fact, the changes were non-linear and 
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Figure 1. The Italian colony of Eritrea in the Red Sea region. Political and administrative borders are 




















Figure 2. Map of the Italian Colony of Eritrea, 1913. Reproduction of the map contained in Ministero delle 
Colonie, Allegati alla Relazione sulla Colonia Eritrea del R. Commissario Civile Deputato Ferdinando 
Martini per gli esercizi 1902-1907, vol. 4 (Roma: Tip della Camera dei Deputati, 1913). 
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Chronological table outlining the major events and currency changes in the Italian colony 
of Eritrea, with a reference to the most important monetary reforms in the other Italian 
African territories and in Ethiopia (1885-1941) 
5 February 1885 Italians land in Massawa 
19 February 1885 A Ministry of Treasury’s decree officially recognises the circulation of the 
MTT and its use in official payments (1 MTT = 4.50 lire), in Massawa. 
8 July 1886 The parallel circulation of the Italian lira and the Egyptian piastre is 
allowed (1 lira = 0.25 piastre), up to a maximum amount of 5 lire value. 
Copper 20 and 10 piastres coins can circulate too, up to a maximum amount 
of 0.25 lire.  (Order of the day of General Carlo Gené, n.213, 8 July 1886, 
by Decree of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, 13 May 1886).  
12 May 1887 A decree of the Supreme Commander Tancredi Saletta bans the Egyptian 
Piastres (temporary ban of the MTT, readmitted on 4 September 1888). 
1 October 1889 Art. 4 of the Additional Convention of the Treaty of Wichalē, signed in 
Naples, establishes a monetary agreement with Ethiopia. 
1 January 1890 The constitution of the Italian colony of Eritrea is officially proclaimed by 
the King of Italy (Regio Decreto n.6592, third series, 1 January 1890).   
10 August 1890 Issuing of the tallero eritreo (1 tallero eritreo = 5 lire) and its divisional 
silver coins (4/10=2 lire; 2/10= lire; 1/10=0.50 lire; Regio decreto no. 7049, 
10 August 1890). 
10 February 1893 Emperor Mənilək II announces the issuing of a new coin (Ethiopian bərr, 
or dollar), on the model of the MTT. The coin started circulating in 1894, 
with ½ dollar, ¼ and 1/8 dollar silver coins (later substituted by a 1/20-1/16 
silver coin and a 1/100 copper coin).  
1 March 1896 Italian defeat in ‘Adwa. 
26 October 1896 Italo-Ethiopian peace treaty signed. The Treaty of Wichalē is terminated.  
11 february 1905 Official payments of fines and wages to be executed in lira or divisional 
coins of the tallero eritreo. (Bullettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, 4 
February 1905). 
8 May 1905 25 bese coin introduced in the Italian colony of Benadir (1/6 MT), together 
with 1 cent Italian lire coin (1 cent=1 besa; Decreto Commissariale n.6, 8 
May 1905).  
6 October 1909 Italian bese (1,2,4 bronze bese coins. 100 bese=1MTT) introduced in 
Italian Somalia colony constituted on 5 April 1905. (Decreto governatoriale 
n.397, 6 September 1909). 
1 July 1911 Italian rupee is issued in Somalia (1 rupee=100 bese=1 indian rupee=1.68 
lire). Lower denominations silver coins are issued too (½ besa and ¼ besa; 
approved with Regio Decreto n. 847, 8 December 1910).  
29 September 1911 Italy starts the invasion of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
23 May 1912 The Italian Government issues a law (n.546, 23 May 1912) to regulate the 
monetary system of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
2 February 1914 First branch of the Bank of Italy opens to the public in Asmara. 
5 September 1914 Ban on the exports of MTT from Eritrea in order to stop the outflow of 
silver started with the outbreak of the WW1 (Decreto governatoriale n. 
2049, 5 September 1915). 
1 July 1916 Negotiations in the markets in MTT are banned in Eritrea. (Decreto 
governatoriale n. 2589, 1 July 1916). 
24 October 1916 Payments in MTT are forbidden in Eritrea. Exchange rate of the MTT for 
the payments of fees fixed at 2.50 lire, for official payments and 
transportation services at 2.65 lire. Monopoly of the money changing 
activity to the Bank of Italy (Gestione Talleri). Establishing of a 
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Commission for the fixing of the quotation of the MTT on the market. 
Payments in MTT only allowed in caravan and overseas trade, Regional 
authorisation needed for each transaction in MTT (Decreto governatoriale 
n. 2653, 24 October 1916).   
31 May 1918 The tallero d’Italia is issued at par with the MTT. The same rules for the 
MTT apply to the tallero d’Italia starting from 25 August 1919.  
5 October 1918 Negotiations and payments in MTT allowed again in Eritrean markets 
(Decreto governatoriale n. 3198, 5 October 1918).  
19 September 1919  Fixed exchange rate of the Italian rupee with Italian lire suspended in 
Somalia (Decreto governatoriale n. 2329, 19 September 1919). 
31 December 1921 The Gestione Talleri office is closed in Eritrea. 
20 July 1922 The monetary system of the Kingdom of Italy (together with its 
regulations) is officially extended to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (Regio 
Decreto n.1131, 20 July 1922). 
18 June 1925 Italian monetary system extended to Somalia (Regio Decreto n. 1143, 18 
June 1925). 
1 May 1932 Emperor Haylä Śǝllase issues 5, 10, 50, 100, 500 dollar notes in Ethiopia. 
In 1933 a 2 dollar note was added. 
12 July 1933 Emperor Haylä Śǝllase issues nickel coins of 50, 25 and 10 cents of a dollar 
and bronze 5 and 1 cent of a dollar in Ethiopia.  
9 July 1935 Austria concedes Italy the right to issue MTT. 
9 May 1936 The Italian East Africa (AOI) is constituted after the invasion of Ethiopia 
(Regio Decreto Legge n. 754, 9 May 1936 ). 
2 July 1936 The Italian monetary system is extended to the colonies (Regio Decreto 
Legge, n.1371, 2 July 1936). 
31 December 1936 Ethiopian thalers are demonetised in AOI. Exchange rate of MTT is fixed 
at 5 lire per MTT.  
28 December 1936 The General Governor of AOI can regulate the monetary circulation by 
fixing the exchange rate of the MTT to the lira. (Regio Decreto Legge 
n.2373, 28 December 1936). 
5 January 1938 A decree by the Ministry of Finance detaches the exchange rate of the lira 
and of the MTT, leaving the MTT free to float.  A price for the selling of 
the MTT is fixed according to the international price of silver. 
6 April 1941 The British take Addis Ababa. After the battle of Gondär in November 
1941, the Italians are finally defeated. The Italian lira cease to be legal 
tender in East Africa on 7 April 1941. MTT, Egyptian pound and the East 
African Shelling became legal tender. 
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In February 1885, when the Italians landed in Massawa, they arrived in one of the most 
cosmopolitan and active ports on the Red Sea coast. The port town was a node of multiple trade 
networks connecting larger and smaller commercial centres. Cotton from Muscat and Bombay 
supplied the caravan trade towards the inland areas, and hides and skins, honey and wax, coffee and 
spices were shipped to the opposite shore of the Red Sea. Rice, sugar, and gunpowder were imported, 
while pearls and mother-of-pearl, fished in these very waters, were shipped to Trieste or Bombay - 
Indian merchants being the most important middlemen of this trade. Glass beads from Venice passed 
through Cairo and were employed as currency in Massawa and some inland locations. Together with 
beads, salt bars were an important means of exchange for the caravan trade.1 Alongside these 
commodity currencies, in the ports along the coast could also be found Indian rupees, Egyptian 
piastres and Maria Theresa thalers (MTT).2 The Italians were well aware of the importance of the 
Maria Teresa thaler in the area. Before the expedition, they accepted contracts from the Crédit 
Lyonnais – a French bank with agencies in Egypt and in the Red Sea – who acted as agents for the 
procurement of “any amount and kind of silver and golden coins” circulating in the Red Sea region.3 
However, the Italians were less aware of the intricacies regarding the functioning of the Red Sea 
region’s multiple currency system. With the establishment of formal colonial control, they soon had 
to deal with it in the management of the budget. The budget had to be administrated by converting 
into lire the expenses in piastres and in Maria Theresa thalers. At the same time, the aim of the Italians 
was to promote trade by allowing the circulation of different currencies. This monetary situation was 
at the base of their first attempts to establish a colonial monetary system.  
This thesis is the result of a research I undertook as part of the broader project titled “Monetary 
Transitions: The Introduction of Colonial Currencies in East Africa and their Impact on Indigenous 
 
1  Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935, 1st edition (Addis Ababa: Haile Sellassie University 
Press, 1968), 357–91. 
2  Ibid., 460–75. 
3  Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), Archivio Storico del Ministero 
dell’Africa Italiana (ASMAI) III, busta 71, ‘Offerta del “Crédit Lyonnais” per somministrazione di fondi alle navi ed alle 
truppe regie nel Mar Rosso’. Alexandria, 30 January 1885. 
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Societies and Economies”, funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation.4 That project’s general aim was 
to assess the impact of the introduction of colonial currencies in East Africa on local societies, an area 
where, as we will see, research on this matter has only recently developed. In the scope of this project, 
my research aimed at investigating the motivations that led the Italians to attempt the building of a 
new monetary system in Eritrea, as well as its impact on local societies and the reasons for the failure 
of Italian monetary policies. The analytical framework that guided the research was inspired by the 
idea that the transformations brought on by the introduction of colonial currencies in Africa did not 
produce a “monetary revolution”. Colonial monetary systems were not simply imposed on local 
exchange systems, swiftly disrupting economic patterns, accumulation strategies, and the cultural 
aspects related to economic production and exchange. These transformations are better described as 
“transitions”, a definition that was first systematised by the archaeologist Natalie Swanepoel with 
regard to the currency substitutions occurring in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (modern 
day northern Ghana) during British domination.5 Employing archaeological evidence dating back to 
the colonial period, Swanepoel showed that the “transition” was slower than the image of a “monetary 
revolution” conveys. According to her, in order to understand these “transitions”, it is necessary to 
look at the “network effect” of different contextual factors and historical variables that concur in the 
(often conflictual) encounter of different “regimes of value”.6 As we will see in the course of the 
thesis, it is the “non-development of a positive network effect” that determined the failure of monetary 
policies.7 In other words, a network effect that could not be produced by the colonial currencies 
themselves. As it is stated by Keith Hart and Horacio Ortiz, money “is a constitutive part of our 
 
4  Gerda Henkel Stiftung, ‘Monetary Transitions: The Introduction of Colonial Currencies in East Africa and their 
Impact on Indigenous Societies and Economies’, (AZ 37/F/16). Principal investigator: Karin Pallaver.  
5  Natalie Swanepoel, ‘Small Change: Cowries, Coins and the Currency Transition in the Northern Territories of 
Colonial Ghana’, ed. François G. Richard, Materializing Colonial Encounters: Archaeologies of African Experience 
(2015), 41–69. 
6  Ibid., 43. In Arjun Appadurai’s words, a regime of value can be defined as “the cultural framework that defines the 
commodity candidacy of things. [It] does not imply that every act of commodity exchange presupposes a complete cultural 
sharing of assumptions, but rather that the degree of value coherence may be highly variable from situation to situation, 
and from commodity to commodity. […] Such regimes of value account for the constant transcendence of cultural 
boundaries by the flow of commodities, where culture is understood as a bounded and localized system of meanings”. 
See Arjun Appadurai, ‘Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value’, in The Social Life of Things: Commodities 
in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 14–15.  
7  Swanepoel, ‘Small Change’, 45. 
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multilayered identities, from the most intimate relations to communities of exchange on a vast scale”.8 
For this reason, money can also be used as a lens through which to investigate different aspects of 
Italian colonialism in Eritrea. In this thesis, I will adopt a thematic rather than chronological 
organisation, dedicating each chapter to the analysis of some of the elements (e.g., colonial studies, 
wages, monetary policies) that were involved in the colonial transition of the Eritrean monetary 
system. By adopting a “monetary angle”, the thesis will not only address questions pertaining the 
monetary history of the region, but it will also include an account of the building of “colonial 
knowledge”, the introduction of wage labour, and the opening of new financial institutions that would 
go on to help the colonial government mitigate the impact of the First World War on the colony.  
The main research questions of the thesis are: 
• How did the Italians build their “colonial knowledge” about monetary systems in the 
Red Sea? What were the changing ideas that motivated their analyses and their policies? 
• What were the motivations that pushed the Eritreans to enrol in the Italian colonial 
army, and what the instruments employed by the Italians to encourage their recruitment? 
How did local regimes of value adapt to the introduction of wage labour? And what were 
the strategies employed by Eritreans to store wealth? 
• What were the financial tools employed by both indigenous and European traders in 
Eritrea before the opening of the first bank branch? What was the impact of the 
establishment of bank branches in Eritrea on Italian currency policies from the outbreak of 
the First World War? What were the strategies employed by the different actors to face the 
currency crisis provoked by the War? And what can that event tell us about the degree of 
integration of Eritrea’s economy in the broader economy of the Red Sea region? 
The case studies I will present in this dissertation will show that the introduction of colonial 
currencies did not produce a swift passage to a new monetary and social order. Instead, it was rather 
a slow transition, with frequent setbacks and deviations, whose final destination was not at all 
 
8  Keith Hart and Horacio Ortiz, ‘The Anthropology of Money and Finance: Between Ethnography and World History’, 
Annual Review of Anthropology 43, no. 1 (2014): 478. 
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obvious. As we will see, it is not possible to understand this transition without looking at the other 
factors that accompanied the introduction of colonial money (such as the introduction of wage 
labour), the role of local regimes of value, and the positioning of Eritrean economy in a broader 
regional perspective.  
In this introductory chapter, I will first look at the works that contributed to the production of an 
analytical framework useful for the study of African monetary systems in colonial contexts. Then I 
will briefly illustrate the state of the art of the monetary and economic history of Eritrea during the 
Italian colonial period. As will be shown, the monetary history of Eritrea has been a neglected field; 
therefore, this thesis fills a gap in the literature. This is because it is the first contribution on this topic 
that employs the analytical framework of African monetary history. After an outline of the spatial 
and temporal coordinates of my work, I will introduce the theoretical framework that inspired the 
thematic organisation of my thesis. Finally, I will describe the dissertation in its various parts, and 
the nature of the sources I consulted to complete it.   
 
A brief overview of African monetary history literature 
The understanding of monetary systems in Africa was of primary importance for colonial 
administrators. Colonial currencies were a tool to integrate local economies into colonial ones and to 
divert commodities to new trade networks controlled by European firms. The importance of these 
facts was already acknowledged in the pioneering work by Allan McPhee on the economic history of 
British West Africa in 1926.9 However, it was only in the 1950s that scholarly attention was brought 
to the impact of European colonialism on African monetary systems. Paul Bohannan was the first 
anthropologist to use an on-the-ground approach to explain the impact of the introduction of British 
currencies on the local exchange system of the Tiv people of Nigeria. His work was inspired by the 
urgency to collect information about a system of values that was, according to the author, “among the 
hardest hit of all [Tiv’s] ideas by impact of Western ideology and by colonial economy and social 
 
9  Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa (2016), 237–328. 
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organisation”.10 According to Bohannan’s interpretation, economic exchanges among the Tiv people 
occurred within three main categories of items, which he calls “spheres of exchange”, hierarchically 
organised. In the first category were locally produced foodstuffs, chickens and goats, household 
utensils and the raw materials for producing them. In the second category were slaves (even if slavery 
was abolished at that time), cattle, white cloth (called tugudu) and brass rods. In the third category, 
which was the most important, there were rights in handling human beings, especially women.11  An 
exchange of items belonging to the same “category” was not problematic, while exchanges of items 
belonging to different categories were always somehow morally charged. For example, it was 
considered appropriate to exchange cattle for cloth or iron bars, while exchanging the “right in 
people” (such as in marriage exchanges) for an item of a different category produced negative moral 
judgements. According to Bohannan, the introduction of European “money” was threatening for the 
maintenance of the status quo of African societies, as it had “provided a common denominator among 
the categories which was previously lacking”.12 This idea of what could be seen as defenceless 
exposure of African social systems to the introduction of European currencies was reinforced through 
Karl Polanyi’s influence on the studies of African economic systems, in particular of his definitions 
of “general-purpose” and “special-purpose” money.13 The first is a kind of money which holds all the 
functions of money (as a means of exchange, method of payment, standard of value, store of wealth 
and unit of account), while the latter serves one or two of these functions.14These definitions were 
employed by those scholars that formed the “substantivist school”, that called for the development of 
 
10  Paul Bohannan, ‘Some Principles of Exchange and Investment among the Tiv’, American Anthropologist 57, no. 1 
(1955): 66. 
11  Ibid., 62–63. 
12  Ibid., 67. 
13 “Early money is, as we saw, special-purpose money. Different kinds of objects are employed in the different money 
uses”. Karl Polanyi, ‘The Economy as Instituted Process’, in Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in 
History and Theory, ed. K. Polanyi, R. Conrad Arensberg and W. Harry Pearson (Chicago: Gateway, 1957), 243–69. See 
also Polanyi, ‘The Semantics of Money-Uses’, in Primitive Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi, ed. 
George Dalton (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1968), 175–203. 
14  Bill Maurer, ‘The Anthropology of Money’, Annual Review of Anthropology 35, no. 1 (October 2006): 20. 
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different analytical tools for the study of the economies where “market principles” did not apply.15 
Using these categories, Bohannan further developed his analysis of the Tiv’s exchange system: 
European general-purpose money was standardising “the exchangeability value of every item to a 
common scale” thus producing a “monetary revolution”.16 Since then, the concept of a currency or 
monetary “revolution” provoked by the introduction of colonial currencies became a resilient 
framework of analysis in African economic history.17 In 1966, Antony G. Hopkins used the term 
“currency revolution” to describe the consequences of the devaluation of cowrie shells,18 and the 
demonetisation of the Spanish silver dollar implemented by the British in Nigeria at the end of the 
nineteenth century.19 However, in his later and most complete synthesis of the economic history of 
West Africa, this concept does not appear. In his book, An Economic History of West Africa, Hopkins 
acknowledged the existence of broad commercial networks in pre-colonial Africa, facilitated by the 
exchange of multiple monetary devices.20 Hopkins also questioned the validity of the definition of 
 
15  “The substantive meaning of economic [sic] derives from man’s dependence for his living upon nature and his 
fellows. It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far as this results in supplying him with 
the means of material want satisfaction. The formal meaning of economic [sic] derives from the logical character of the 
means-ends relationship, as apparent in such words as “economical” or “economizing.” It refers to a definite situation of 
choice, namely, that between the different uses of means induced by an insufficiency of those means”. Polanyi, ‘The 
Economy as Instituted Process’, 243. George Dalton, a student of Polanyi, wrote that the introduction of a “general-
purpose” currency in these societies had “inevitable repercussions on traditional social organization and cultural 
practices”; Dalton, ‘Primitive Money’, American Anthropologist 61, no. 1 (1965): 61. 
16  Paul Bohannan, ‘The Impact of Money on an African Subsistence Economy’, The Journal of Economic History 19, 
no. 4 (1959): 500. 
17  See for example Walter I. Ofonagoro, ‘From Traditional to British Currency in Southern Nigeria: Analysis of a 
Currency Revolution, 1880-1948’, The Journal of Economic History 39, no. 3 (1979): 623–54. 
18 Cowrie shells (Cypraea moneta and Cypraea annulus) were fished in the Indian Ocean and imported into West Africa, 
where they circulated as currencies along with other means of exchange since at least 18th century. The most authoritative 
work on cowrie shells at that time was that of Marion Johnson: ‘The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa. Part I’, The 
Journal of African History 11, no. 1 (1970): 17–49; and ‘The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa. Part II’, The Journal of 
African History 11, no. 3 (1970): 331–53. The matter was further analysed in Jan S. Hogendorn and Marion Johnson, The 
Shell Money of the Slave Trade (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).   
19 Antony G. Hopkins, ‘The Currency Revolution in South-West Nigeria’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 3, 
no. 3 (1966): 471–83. 
20  Antony G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London: Longman, 1973), 67. A second edition of this 




“special purpose money” for African currencies, as these currencies were used “to extend trade, not 
to obstruct it”.21  
The first convincing arguments against the “substantivist” concept of a “currency revolution” in 
African monetary systems were developed in the 1980s. Economics as a discipline had never 
considered African currencies as “modern” money, largely due to the European bias that tends to not 
consider non-metallic means of exchange as “real” money. James L.A. Webb attempted a synthesis 
between the two approaches. He applied some tools of the neoclassical economics (such as the 
concept of “degree of flexibility in currency substitutions”) to west African currencies to show that 
these tools are inadequate, without a deep understanding of local and regional dynamics, in assessing 
the impact of colonial monetary policies.22  Later on, Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry stated that 
the introduction of colonial currencies was not enough to justify the changes in local economies and 
trade patterns. It was necessary to look at “the complexities of the causal factors at work in the 
transformations”.23 The role that each society attributed to money could not be understood without 
considering other “historical forces” shaping it.24 The milestone in this respect is represented by a 
collection of case studies, focusing on specific areas of western and equatorial Africa, edited by Jane 
Guyer in 1995. According to Guyer, although the concept of a “monetary revolution” was stimulating 
for the development of previous research in African monetary history, it implied the idea of a total 
replacement of a state of being with another (like the supplanting of “primitive” special purpose 
money with “modern” general purpose money).25 However, this was not the case when pre-colonial 
 
21  In Hopkins, the term “transitional” also appears, but with a slightly different meaning than that provided by 
Swanepoel. It is applied to define those currencies that lie between “pure barter” and “the monetary systems of advanced 
industrial societies”. See Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, 1973, 68, 70. It is worth noting that the term 
applies also at those “imported” currencies that Jane Guyer would later define as “interface currencies” (those currencies 
that were used by Europeans in Africa for trading but could not be converted into “European assets”). See Jane I. Guyer, 
‘Introduction. The Currency Interface and Its Dynamics’, in Money Matters: Instability, Values, and Social Payments in 
the Modern History of West African Communities, ed. Jane I. Guyer (London: Currey, 1999), 8. Another aspect of novelty 
in Hopkins is the acknowledgement that this “transition” occurred “way before colonial rule”. Reduced shipping costs 
allowed European firms to flood west African markets with “transitional money”, which started devaluating, and the 
circulation of “modern” money increased. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, 149. 
22  James L. A. Webb, ‘Toward the Comparative Study of Money: A Reconsideration of West African Currencies and 
Neoclassical Monetary Concepts’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 15, no. 3 (1982): 455–66. 
23  Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry, ‘Introduction: Money and the Morality of Exchange’, ed. M. Bloch and J. Parry, 
Money and the Morality of Exchange (1989): 12. 
24  Ibid., 30. 
25  Guyer, ‘Introduction. The Currency Interface and Its Dynamics’, 1. 
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currencies participated in transregional trade and could be employed for more “purposes” than the 
newly-introduced “colonial currencies”, that were mainly employed by Africans to pay government 
taxes. In another seminal book, Marginal Gains (published in 2004), Guyer shows once again the 
advantages of a historically deep and geographically broad analysis in the study of African monetary 
history. One of the elements that led the colonisers to define African currencies as “primitive” was 
the instability of their value from time to time and place to place. Looking more closely at the 
specificity of respective African societies, Guyer showed that this instability, and the subsequent 
asymmetry in the transactions between different groups, was actually the means facilitating exchange 
through conversion. Analysing the regional dimension of Tiv’s trade, Guyer approaches Bohannan 
case study by showing that the “spheres of exchange” were “not barriers but institutions that 
facilitated asymmetrical exchanges across value registers”.26 The regional dimension allows Guyer 
to see the spheres as a directional organisation of different means of exchange towards different trade 
routes. Later works have been inspired by Guyer’s attention to specificities in a historical perspective, 
adding substantial complexity to African monetary history. Mahir Saul, for example, shows how local 
merchant women were able to maintain their economic independence by refusing the use of colonial 
currencies, which in rural areas of West Upper Volta, were accepted and used by the indigenous 
people only for the payment of taxes.27 In 2009, building on the work by Guyer, the volume Money 
in Africa was published with the intent of starting work towards the production of a more flexible 
definition of money for African contexts through an interdisciplinary approach, while also stressing 
the importance of the materiality of money in Africa.28 More recently, a collection dedicated to Jane 
Guyer has been published where the authors directly engage with some of the analytical concepts 
introduced by her.29 In this volume, new aspects pertaining the introduction of colonial currencies in 
 
26 Jane I. Guyer, Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 28. 
27  Mahir Saul, ‘Money in Colonial Transition: Cowries and Francs in West Africa’, American Anthropologist 106, no. 
1 (2004): 71–84. 
28 Catherine Eagleton, Harcourt Fuller, and John Perkins, Money in Africa (London: The British Museum, 2009). 
29 Wale Adebanwi and James Ferguson, The Political Economy of Everyday Life in Africa: Beyond the Margins (2017).  
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Africa have been investigated, such as the persistence of local regimes of value;30 once again, a 
multidisciplinary approach was attempted applying the tools of economics to the themes usually 
analysed by economic historians of Africa.31   
Scholarly contributions to African monetary history have mostly focused on West Africa. 
However, more recently, a growing body of scholarship has been published about East African 
colonial contexts too.32 Using an approach more attentive to historical processes and local practices, 
these studies shed light on new spaces of negotiation for local actors affected by colonial monetary 
policies.33  The analysis of money as an object “to see” stresses the role that currency has had to drive 
political meanings in Africa. On the one hand, the colonisers used the representations on the 
banknotes and the coins to convey the role they designed for the colony in their economic system. On 
the other hand, banknotes could be used to drive messages of political contestation, as in the case of 
the Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya, described by Wambui Mwangi.34  
Contributions from other disciplines, such as economic history, also bring a valuable input and 
useful analytical tools for the study of the rationale behind colonial monetary policies. In his study 
regarding the historical nature of national currencies, Eric Helleiner devotes a chapter to the 
explanation of the reasons behind colonial powers’ attempts to introduce their own currencies into 
the colonies, and to build currency zones. Reduction of internal and external transaction costs, 
 
30  Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, ‘Beasts, Banknotes and the Colour of Money in Colonial South Africa’, 
Archaeological Dialogues 12, no. 2 (2005): 107–32; Célestine Monga, ‘The Macroeconomics of Marginal Gains: Africa’s 
Lessons to Social Theorists’, in The Political Economy of Everyday Life in Africa: Beyond the Margins, ed. Wale 
Adebanwi (Boydell & Brewer, 2017), 115–31. 
31  Monga, ‘The Macroeconomics of Marginal Gains. Africa’s Lessons to Social Theorists’. 
32  For a recent overview of the literature on African monetary history, see Jane Guyer and Karin Pallaver, ‘Oxford 
Research Encyclopaedia of African History’, in Money and Currency in African History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018).   
33  Wambui Mwangi, ‘Of Coins and Conquest: The East African Currency Board, the Rupee Crisis, and the Problem of 
Colonialism and the East African Protectorate’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 4, no. 4 (2001): 763–87; 
Karin Pallaver, ‘“The African Native Has No Pocket”: Monetary Practices and Currency Transitions in Early Colonial 
Uganda’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 48, no. 3 (September 2015): 471–99; Pallaver, ‘Paying in 
Cents, Paying in Rupees’, in Colonialism, Institutional Change and Shifts in Global Labour Relations, ed. Karin 
Hofmeester and Pim de Zwart (Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 295–326; Pallaver, ‘A Currency Muddle: Resistance, 
Materialities and the Local Use of Money during the East African Rupee Crisis (1919–1923)’, Journal of Eastern African 
Studies (2019): 1–19. 
34  Wambui Mwangi, ‘The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant: Political Imagery and the Ambiguous Art of Currency 
Design in Colonial Kenya’, Geopolitics 7, no. 1 (2002): 31–62. 
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macroeconomic factors, the profits coming from seigniorage, and the political value of money were 
all aspects that determined the design of new monetary policies, and, sometimes, their failure.35   
Akinobu Kuroda recently proposed a new analytical framework for the study of the global history 
of money.36 His work partly sprouts from his previous analysis of the concept of the complementarity 
of money in a multiple currency system.37 This concept was developed while also looking at the 
incredible resilience of the Maria Theresa thaler to the numerous attempts made by different colonial 
powers to substitute it or control its circulation.38 My thesis follows the path illuminated by this work, 
and by the studies discussed above, to untangle the intricacies of Eritrea’s monetary system in the 
regional context of the Red Sea, during the period of Italian occupation.  
 
Economic and financial history of Italian colonialism in Eritrea 
The first historical studies about Italian colonialism were produced by colonial officers and 
administrators. Their approach looked at local societies from the point of view of the colonisers, very 
often detaching “their” society from that of the colonial subjects. That was mainly an institutional, 
political and diplomatic history, with the intention of celebrating “successes” or justifying the failures 
of Italian colonialism in Africa.39 This historiography found its impetus after the Italian defeat at 
‘Adwa. The dismay provoked by that event called for the production of memories and chronicles, 
analysing the errors that brought about the defeat, justifying any particular author’s actions, or even 
simply testifying to the experiences of the war and subsequent captivity.40 Even considering their 
 
35  Eric Helleiner, ‘The Monetary Dimensions of Colonialism: Why Did Imperial Powers Create Currency Blocks?’, 
Geopolitics 7, no. 1 (2002): 5–30; Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical 
Perspective, 2003, 163–85. 
36  Akinobu Kuroda, A Global History of Money (London: Routledge, 2020). 
37  Akinobu Kuroda, ‘What Is the Complementarity among Monies? An Introductory Note’, Financial History Review 
15, no. 1 (2008): 7–15. 
38  Akinobu Kuroda, ‘The Maria Theresa Dollar in the Early Twentieth-Century Red Sea Region: A Complementary 
Interface between Multiple Markets’, Financial History Review 14, no. 1 (2007): 89–110. 
39  See for example Beniamino Melli, L’Eritrea dalle sue origini a tutto l’anno 1901: appunti cronistorici, con ... un’ 
appendice di note geografiche e statistiche e di cenni sul Benadir e sui viaggi d’esplorazione (Milan: Hoepli, 1902); and 
Emilio Bellavita, La battaglia di Adua: i precedenti - la battaglia - le conseguenze (1881-1931) (Genoa: I Dioscuri, 1988). 
40  An example of a self-justifying work is Oreste Baratieri, Memorie d’Africa: (1892-1896) (Genoa: I Dioscuri, 1988). 
Some examples of published diaries are Alessandro Sapelli, Memorie d’Affrica (1883-1906) (Nicola Zanichelli Editore, 
1935); Giovanni Tedone, Angerà. I Ricordi Di Un Prigioniero Di Menelik (Milan: Giordano Editore, 1964); Carlo Diotti, 
Prigioniero d’Africa. La battaglia di Adua e l’impresa coloniale del 1895-96 nel diario di un caporale italiano (Como: 
Nodo libri, 2006). 
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obvious limitations related to their biased descriptions and the flattering representation of colonial 
society, these studies constituted (and still constitute) a rich source of information.41 For example, 
such studies provide data about the state of trade and the economy of the colonies, or make explicit 
the discourses and ideas that led to the realisation of Italian policies.42 This is relevant for the present 
study because it is not always easy to find consistent economic data in the archives, and because these 
studies can give another perspective in understanding the reasons that led the Italians to employ their 
monetary policies.   
A first approach to the study of colonial documents came with the constitution of the Committee 
for the Documentation of the Italian Activities in Africa (“Comitato per la documentazione dell’opera 
dell’Italia in Africa”). However, more than putting Italian colonialism in historical perspective, the 
aim of the Committee was to produce a collection of the allegedly “positive” results of Italian policies 
in the colonies, in a new attempt to save face (and some political and economic influence in the former 
colonies) in front of the international community. The Committee’s work also meant the beginning 
of a long period of exclusion of Italian academic historians from the study of the documents produced 
by the Italian colonial administration, which were exclusively accessed by the committee members. 
The result was the publication of six series made up of 41 volumes.43 Even if these provide some 
information for historical research on the most diverse aspects of Italian colonial history, the intent 
of the Committee was still that of celebrating what they defined the process of “civilisation” that Italy 
 
41  Wide-ranging works about Italian colonialism in Africa were also produced in the fascist period, but they were 
obviously influenced by the ideas of their time regarding the “civilising mission” of Italy in Africa. See for example 
Gennaro Mondaini, Manuale di storia e legislazione coloniale del Regno d’Italia, Parte 1. Storia Coloniale Storia 
Coloniale (Rome: A. Sampaolesi, 1927); Raffaele Ciasca, Storia coloniale dell’Italia contemporanea. Da Assab 
all’impero (Milan: Hoepli, 1940).  
42 In this sense a very useful and comprehensive work is that by Gennaro Mondaini, which offers a historical 
contextualisation for the Italian colonial policies until the end of the 1920s. Mondaini, Manuale di storia e legislazione 
coloniale del Regno d’Italia. Parte 1. Storia Coloniale; Gennaro Mondaini, Manuale di storia e legislazione coloniale 
del Regno d’Italia. Parte 2. Legislazione (Rome: A. Sampaolesi, 1924). An updated version of the work, mainly focussed 
on the history of Italian legislation in the colonies, was published in 1941: Gennaro Mondaini, La legislazione coloniale 
italiana nel suo sviluppo storico e nel suo stato attuale (1881-1940) (Milan: Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, 
1941).  
43  The volumes were divided in a historical series (3 monographs and 11 collections of documents), a scientific-cultural 
series (10 volumes), a historical-military series (8 volumes), an administrative-giuridical series (4 volumes), a civil series 
(2 volumes), and an economic-agarian series (3 volumes). See Nicola Labanca, In marcia verso Adua (Giulio Einaudi 
Editore, 1993), 19 note 59; Antonio M. Morone, ‘I custodi della memoria. Il Comitato per la documentazione dell’opera 
dell’Italia in Africa’, Zapruder 23 (2010): 36–37. In particular, I have consulted the first volume of the historical-military 
series for a necessary overview of the Italian military organisation in the colonies, for the completion of chapter 2. 
However, even in that volume, the celebratory intent of the work is apparent.  
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brought to the colonies.44 The aim was to separate the alleged “civilising” deeds of Italian colonialism 
of the “liberals” before the 1920s, from the degeneracy of the fascist period.   
Unique and rare exceptions that occurred during the time when the committee was still working, 
are represented by a book by Roberto Battaglia, a Marxist non-academic historian, and the 
contributions by Giorgio Rochat.45 In these works on the political and diplomatic history of Italian 
colonialism, the self-indulging colonial attitude disappears. This new tendency to analyse Italian 
colonial history from a critical perspective is further developed by Angelo Del Boca in his work Gli 
italiani in Africa Orientale. Del Boca underlines how the colonialism of pre-fascist Italy was no 
“different” from the “other European colonialisms”, or fascist colonialism.46 In fact, he was the first 
to stress the continuities in Italian colonial policies between the liberal and the fascist period. Del 
Boca was also one of the first historians of his generation to finally access those colonial archives 
monopolised by the Committee.47  
The first investigations into the social and economic impact of Italian colonialism on the colonised 
societies developed in the 1980s, in the wake of new developments of African History as a discipline 
in Italy. 
Significant in this sense are the works by Irma Taddia, who paid special attention to the 
consequences of Italian agrarian reforms on local societies in general, and family relations and 
political hierarchies in particular.48 At the same time, she investigated the consequences of these 
reforms on the organisation of the colonial economy during the entire period of Italian colonialism, 
 
44  It is worth noting that the first president of the committee was Francesco Saverio Caroselli, who had been governor 
of Italian Somalia from 1937 to 1940, and the committee itself was founded by the still-functioning Ministry of Italian 
Africa, which was dismissed in 1953. The committee was disbanded in 1984. Morone, ‘I custodi della memoria. Il 
Comitato per la documentazione dell’opera dell’Italia in Africa’, 23. Del Boca writes about the permanence of this self-
indulging attitude in Italian culture in L’Africa nella coscienza degli Italiani: miti, memorie, errori, sconfitte (Rome: 
Laterza, 1992).  
45  Roberto Battaglia, La prima guerra d’Africa (Turin: Einaudi, 1973); Giorgio Rochat, Il colonialismo italiano (Turin: 
Loescher, 1973). 
46  Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale: dall’unità alla marcia su Roma (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1992). 
47  For an overview of the literature on the history of Eritrea during Italian colonialism, see Irma Taddia, ‘Notes on 
Recent Italian Studies on Ethiopia and Eritrea’, Metodo 18 (2002); Marco Lenci, ‘Dalla storia delle colonie alla storia 
dell’Africa’, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 58, no. 2 
(2003): 207–18; Nicola Labanca, Oltremare: storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana (Bologna: Il mulino, 2007), 477–
547; Roberta Pergher, ‘Impero immaginario, impero vissuto. Recenti sviluppi nella storiografia del colonialismo italiano’, 
Ricerche di Storia Politica, no. 1 (2007).  
48  Irma Taddia, L’Eritrea-colonia, 1890-1952: paesaggi, strutture, uomini del colonialismo (F. Angeli, 1986). 
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finally attempting to assess the impact of Italian agrarian policies on the birth of an Eritrean agrarian 
entrepreneurial class. Her book L’Eritrea Colonia was also the first study to collect relevant data 
about Italian colonial budgets and expenditures, showing how the lack of investments in productive 
activities led the colony to be dependent on public expenses from the central government.49  
The publication in 1987 of a book by Tekeste Negash was another milestone in historical studies 
on Eritrea and the colonial economy.50 His work is particularly important because it is the first to 
recognise the importance of the role of the indigenous soldiers, the ascaris, for the society and the 
economy of the colony. He was also the first to look at the way in which colonial subjects began to 
be included in Italian colonial administration, mostly through the assignment of subaltern roles, but 
also through the introduction of a restricted education system.51 In his work, Negash introduced a 
new periodisation in the history of Italian colonialism in Eritrea, according to the economic roles that 
the Italians attributed to the colony over time. According to Negash, the first period was that between 
the Treaty of Wəčạle (1889) and the Battle of ‘Adwa (1896), when the Italians attempted to create an 
agrarian settlement colony. The appointment of the first civil administrator in 1897, Ferdinando 
Martini, represented the beginning of a second phase characterised by political stabilisation, with 
attempts to exploit the natural resources of the colony and enhance its commercial potential. This 
phase continued with the governors Salvago Raggi (1907-1914) and Jacopo Gasparini (1923-1928), 
when the colony became a pool of recruits for the Italian campaigns in Libya and Somalia. Finally, 
during the third phase (from 1932 to 1941), Eritrea assumed a strategic role in relation to the invasion 
of Ethiopia (1935-1936). This kind of periodisation can be useful in surveying the general trend of 
the Italian exploitation of the colony. However, some elements of continuity can be seen between the 
different phases. For example, as we will see in chapter 2, an idea of the colony as a recruiting pool 
existed well before the start of the campaign in Libya, and even if the number of recruits was smaller 
 
49  Ibid., 293–99. 
50  Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact, Acta Universitatis 
Upsaliensis. Studia Historica Upsaliensia (Uppsala: Uppsala University and Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987). 
51  Tekeste Negash, while acknowledging Taddia’s work as a turning point in studies of the history of Eritrea during 
Italian colonial period, disagrees on the extent of the impact of Italian colonialism on land tenure and agricultural 
production in Eritrea. Negash tends to downsize the impact of Italian colonialism in relation to broader Eritrean history. 
See Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 19.  
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compared to that of later periods, it was still important if compared to that of other African colonial 
armies of the time.  
According to Nicola Labanca, different Italian economic approaches to the colonies represented 
different attempts in economic exploitation to a greater degree than the subsequent application of 
well-thought-out economic planning.52 Labanca also pointed out that the economic impact of Italian 
colonialism has been a largely ignored problem by historians. The reason of this neglect lies, 
according to Labanca, in the prejudice towards Italian colonialism as a “poor” colonialism, and late-
comer in the “Scramble for Africa”, a colonialism with a limited capital investment.53 This was a 
common way of looking at Italian imperialism. A famous example is that of Vladimir Lenin, citing 
the German-Italian sociologist Robert Michels, who defined Italian imperialism as “imperialismo 
della povera gente” (“poor people’s imperialism”).54 What was conveyed by this definition was an 
understanding of Italian colonialism as a way to redirect unemployed Italian migrants toward newly 
acquired territories, while still keeping them under Italian sovereignty.55  
Gian Luca Podestà was the first economic historian to focus specifically on Italian colonialism. 
He developed a slightly different periodisation compared to Negash in his work about Italian 
economic activities in the Italian African colonies, using the First World War as a watershed.56 In his 
first approach to Italian economic investment in Eritrea, Podestà investigated the extent of the 
influence of Italian industrialists and entrepreneurs in the first phases of the Italian colonial period.57 
It was in his later volume, Il mito dell’Impero, that, looking at Italian East African colonies, he 
described the beginning, the outcomes, and the failures of the most important Italian enterprises. 
Podestà’s is the only comprehensive study on Italian productive activities in the colonies, and also 
 
52  Labanca, Oltremare, 267–307. 
53  Ibid., 20–25. 
54  Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, ‘Imperialism and Socialism in Italy’, in Lenin Collected Works, vol. 21 (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1974), 357–66; Robert Michels, L’imperialismo italiano, studi politico-demografici (Milan: Società Editrice 
Libraria, 1914). 
55  Samir Amin, in his typification of colonies, included Eritrea (then part of the Ethiopian Empire) in the group of 
“Africa of the colonial trade economy”. Samir Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa-Origins and 
Contemporary Forms’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 10, no. 4 (1972): 505. 
56  Gian Luca Podestà, Il mito dell’Impero. Economia, politica e lavoro nelle colonie Italiane dell’Africa orientale 1898-
1941 (Torino: Giappichelli, 2004). 




contains useful quantitative data about the extent of investments and the diversity of the Italian 
attempt to economically exploit the colonies.58 In this volume he also takes into account the most 
important monetary reforms in the Italian colonies, stressing their failure.  
The first extensive overview of Ethiopia and Eritrea’s monetary systems was developed by 
Richard Pankhurst. In his works, Pankhurst describes the currencies circulating in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia since the early 18th century, with special attention to the Maria Theresa thaler. Pankhurst 
relies on reports and accounts by explorers, colonial agents and administrators.59 
Arnaldo Mauri has published various articles and books dealing with the history of the banking 
system in Ethiopia. In his work, he has gathered relevant information about monetary circulation and 
colonial monetary policies in Eritrea. He retraces the history of Italian monetary reforms in the 
colony, focusing on the problems the Italians faced in building a colonial monetary system. Mauri’s 
sources are mostly colonial publications, but he also relies on archival resources to add some details 
on the first phases of the occupation and the introduction of the first banknotes in Eritrea.60    
More recently, Ercole Tuccimei has described the monetary history of the Italian colonies through 
the documents of the Archivio Storico della Banca d’Italia (ASBI). His work is important in 
understanding the role of the bank in the support of the Italian colonial monetary policies.61  
 
58   Gian Luca Podestà, Il mito dell’impero. Economia, politica e lavoro nelle colonie italiane dell’Africa orientale 1898-
1941 (Torino: Giappichelli, 2004). 
59  In most of his works, Pankhurst had Ethiopia as his unit of analysis. See Pankhurst, ‘“Primitive Money” in Ethiopia’, 
Journal de la Société des africanistes 32, no. 2 (1962): 213–48; Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935; 
Richard Pankhurst, ‘The Advent of the Maria Theresa Dollar in Ethiopia, Its Effect on Taxation and Wealth Accumulation 
and Other Economic, Political and Cultural Implications’, Northeast African Studies 1, no. 3 (1979): 19–48; Pankhurst, 
‘The Perpetuation of the Maria Theresa Dollar and Currency Problems in Italian-Occupied Ethiopia 1936-1941’, Journal 
of Ethiopian Studies 8, no. 2 (1970): 89–117. 
60  Arnaldo Mauri was among the first to access “documents of the Committee”. This is testified by the presence of two 
folders of the Archivio Storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana (ASMAI) containing the outline of a never-completed 
monograph and a collection of the receipts relative to the documents that he inspected. The outline of the monograph 
resembles that of his Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, published in 1964. Some information about the coins circulating 
in the Italian colonies can be also found in very detailed articles published in numismatic journals. See for example: 
Giuseppe Girola, ‘La circolazione del tallero e della lira in Etiopia durante l’occupazione italiana’, Rivista Italiana di 
Numismatica, 111 (2010): 323–60. Luigi Rizzoli, ‘Il vecchio “tallero” di Maria Teresa e alcuni tentativi di sostituirlo’, 
Rassegna Monetaria, 33, no. 5–6 (1936): 171–77. A thorough publication about the coins and banknotes circulating in 
the Horn of Africa is Dannis Gill, The Coinage of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somalia (Mincola, NY: Printing Mart of 
Long Island, Inc., 1991). 
61  Ercole Tuccimei, La banca d’Italia in Africa: introduzione all’attività dell’Istituto di emissione nelle colonie dall’età 
crispina alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale (Bari: Laterza, 1999). 
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Karin Pallaver’s research is concerned with the Italian monetary policies implemented in Eritrea 
and Somalia, as a consequence of the currency crisis brought about by the outbreak of the First World 
War.62 Pallaver explains why these policies did not work, finding an answer in the failed 
understanding of the intricacies of regional monetary circulation by Italian administrators. Steven 
Serels has also focused on Eritrean monetary history in a recent overview about the impact of colonial 
monetary policies in the southern Red Sea Region, which he considers the cause of the long-term 
monetary instability and economic poverty of the region. Important work has been presented by 
Akinobu Kuroda, who investigated the success of the Maria Theresa thaler in the Red Sea region, 
explaining its success through the use of his analytical concept of “complementarity”.63  
This dissertation builds on this body of literature and explores the construction of colonial policies 
and the consequences that these policies had on the ground. It serves to fill a gap in the literature on 
the monetary history of Eritrea during the Italian colonial period. 
My thesis also draws inspiration from a new wave of studies bringing the perspective on the social 
history of Eritrea closer to the ground, as well as confronting some aspects of the economic history 
of the colony. The most interesting works have dealt with the ability of relevant actors in confronting 
colonial power to acquire economic advantage,64 in addition to the implications of the introduction 
of wage labour on local patterns of inter-regional mobility65 and the processes of urbanisation in 
Eritrea.66 In these processes, the indigenous soldiers of the Italian army (the ascaris) filled an 
important role.67 Research conducted so far on the number of Eritrean youths enrolled in the Italian 
 
62 Karin Pallaver, ‘Da moneta straniera a moneta nazionale: Prima Guerra Mondiale, politiche coloniali e circolazione 
monetaria in Eritrea e Somalia’, in Africa. Storia, Antropologia, Economia, Migrazioni, ed. Donatella Strangio (Roma: 
Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2018), 95–124.  
63  This framework will be illustrated in chapter 3. Kuroda, ‘The Maria Theresa Dollar in the Early Twentieth-Century 
Red Sea Region: A Complementary Interface between Multiple Markets’; Kuroda, A Global History of Money. 
64  Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Governare l’arcipelago. Le isole Dhalak attraverso i domini coloniali’, in Governare l’Oltremare. 
Istituzioni, funzionari e società nel colonialismo italiano, eds. Gianni Dore et al., Studi Storici Carocci 193 (Rome: 
Carocci editore, 2013). 
65  Stefano Bellucci and Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Wage Labor and Mobility in Colonial Eritrea, 1880s to 1920s’, 
International Labor and Working-Class History 86 (2014): 89–106. 
66  Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, ‘From Warriors to Urban Dwellers: Ascari and the Military Factor in the Urban Development 
of Colonial Eritrea’, Cahiers d’études Africaines 175 (2004); Francesca Locatelli, ‘“Oziosi, Vagabondi e Pregiudicati”: 
Labor, Law, and Crime in Colonial Asmara, 1890-1941’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 40, no. 
2 (2007): 225–50. 
67  Bellucci and Zaccaria, ‘Wage Labor and Mobility in Colonial Eritrea, 1880s to 1920s’; Alessandro Volterra, Sudditi 
coloniali: ascari eritrei 1935-1941 (Milan: F. Angeli, 2005); Marco Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno: Ascari, irregolari e 
bande nella conquista dell’Eritrea 1885-1911 (Milan: Angeli, 1996). 
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army shows that the army could be considered the main employer in the colony, especially starting 
from the Italian invasion of Libya.68 As Alessandro Volterra as shown in his description of personal 
experiences collected through oral sources, the army was also an important engine for social mobility 
in the colony, even after a soldier’s service ended. However, Uoldelul Chelati Dirar has pointed out, 
the impact of the recruitment of ascaris on the Eritrean economy is a field that needs to be further 
investigated, together with their role in the spreading of wage labour in the colony.69  
 
Time, space and theory: The outline of this dissertation  
Irma Taddia has stressed the necessity of looking at the first Italian colony in east Africa in its 
economically- and environmentally- integrated regional dimension. The territory of the Mədri Baḥri 
(or Baḥr Mədər, a ge’ez definition meaning “land of the sea”) with the territory denominated Märäb-
Məllaš (beyond the Märäb river) constituted the province of Ethiopia that connected the highlands 
with the sea.70 The climatic zones that characterise the relatively narrow strip of land that became the 
Italian colony of Eritrea made the lowland areas and the highland areas economically 
interdependent.71 Generally speaking, the mostly agricultural highlands integrated economically with 
the pastoralist lowlands, and the whole region represented a transit zone for the caravan trade between 
the inland areas and the sea.72 More recently, Jonathan Miran has stressed the cultural and economic 
importance of the coastal areas of Eritrea, shifting the focus of the analysis from the highlands to the 
sea.73 This approach is part of a general process of re-territorialisation of the Red Sea as an integrated 
 
68   Alessandro Volterra, ‘Mercenari, guerrieri, fedelissimi. Percezione delle truppe coloniali eritree’, in La conquista 
dell’Impero e le leggi razziali tra cinema e memoria, ed. Carlo Felice Casula, Giovanni Spagnoletti, and Alessandro 
Triulzi, Archivio audiovisivo del movimento operaio e democratico. Annali (Rome: Effigi, 2020), 58. For an overview 
of the historiography regarding the number of colonial troops in the Italian army, see chapter 1, section 1 in this thesis.   
69  Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, ‘Truppe coloniali e l’individuazione dell’African agency. Il caso degli ascari eritrei’, Afriche 
e Orienti 9, 1 (2007): 53. 
70  Taddia, L’Eritrea-colonia, 46–47. 
71  Jonathan Miran points out the economic and social consequences of the climatic variability between the lowlands and 
the highlands. The highlands (1,500-3,000 metres above sea level) have a “bimodal rainfall regime” with two rainy 
periods (March-May and June-September), while the lowlands have limited rains between December and January. The 
Italian colony of Eritrea had an extension of 119,000 sq. km; Taddia, 91–93, 96; Jonathan Miran, Red Sea Citizens. 
Cosmopolitan Society and Cultural Change in Massawa (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 
29; Luigi Vittorio Bertarelli, Guida d’Italia del Touring Club Italiano. Possedimenti e colonie. (Milan: Touring Club 
Italiano, 1929), 519. 
72  Taddia, L’Eritrea-colonia, 50–60. 
73  Miran, Red Sea Citizens. 
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space, not only to be considered a transitional space between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. 
In the framework of the new Oceanic History turn, Jonathan Miran has recently discussed the multiple 
commercial, socio-cultural and political connections that linked the shores of the Red Sea over the 
centuries.74 This spatial framework is extremely relevant in understanding the historical reasons 
behind the development of a multiple currency system in the area.  
Another wave of studies has recently examined Italian colonialism in a transnational perspective, 
going beyond the borders of a single colony or present-day nation-state, and instead stressing the 
connections produced by mobility, cultural links and commercial interdependency.75 The importance 
of this approach is highlighted by Massimo Zaccaria, who urges us to look at the Italian colonies as 
an interconnected system, following the example of the New Imperial History and overcoming the 
centre-periphery nexus. To do so, Zaccaria focusses on the links among the colonies with a more 
“webbed” approach.76 Zaccaria also points toward the diverse directions that historical research could 
follow in producing a less fragmented representation of colonialism. The examples offered by 
Zaccaria span from the mobility of colonial administrators and their ideas to that of the indigenous 
soldiers, and the foundation of institutions meant to facilitate the transfer of technical expertise to the 
colonies.77 After all (as was shown by Federica Guazzini), the political borders of the colony itself 
were intentionally left porous, after the agreements with Ethiopia and British Sudan that brought them 
to their official definition between 1900 and 1902. On the one hand, it was difficult to control the 
pastoralist people’s movement at the borders and, hence, fix once and for all a political and fiscal 
jurisdiction on them. On the other hand, the indeterminacy of the borders left room for the Italians to 
manoeuvre with regard to territorial expansion, at least on the maps.78 A consequence of this can also 
 
74  Jonathan Miran, ‘The Red Sea’, in Oceanic Histories, eds. David Armitage, Alison Bashford, and Sujit Sivasundaram, 
Cambridge Oceanic Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 156–81. Alexis Wick reconstructs the 
definition of the Red Sea as an integrated regional space from the point of view of the Ottoman Empire. Alexis Wick, The 
Red Sea: In Search of Lost Space (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016). 
75  Shiferaw Bekele et al., ‘Introduction’. 
76  Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Italian Colonialism in Africa as a Connected System: Institutions, Men and Colonial Troops’, 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 47, no. 4 (2019): 722–23. 
77  Among the different fields in the history of Italian colonialism, Massimo Zaccaria also recognises that economic 
history remains one of the “less attractive” topics for historians dealing with Italian colonialism. Zaccaria, ‘Italian 
Colonialism in Africa as a Connected System’, 721.  
78  Federica Guazzini, ‘La geografia variabile del confine eritreo-etiopico tra passato e presente’, Africa: rivista 
trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 54, no. 3 (1999): 309–48. 
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be seen in the Italian administrative difficulties in keeping track of the caravan trade, as we will see 
in the third chapter.  
In this thesis, I will move both within and beyond the political borders of the colony. Looking at 
the colony as a political entity will be necessary when describing the policies that the Italians designed 
for the colony; but at the same time, I will broaden the scope at a regional level to examine the effects 
of these policies and the reason of their failure (see especially chapter 3). It will be necessary to look 
at the neighbouring territories when describing military labour relations before the arrival of the 
Italians, and the impact of the introduction of wage labour and new opportunities to accumulate 
wealth (chapter 2). In the first chapter, I will discuss the building of “colonial knowledge” about the 
monetary systems of Eritrea. The spatial dimension for this discussion will be that of the knowledge 
exchange and connections that linked the colony to Italy and to other European colonial powers.  
The choice of a thematic organisation for this thesis, instead of a chronological one, is influenced 
by the theoretical framework elaborated by Jane Guyer for her collection of papers on the different 
economic models, devices and practices that constitute contemporary economic systems, which she 
depicts as “platforms”.79 This framework allows the presentation of a complex subject, such as an 
economic or financial system, without the risk of oversimplifying it through the application of pre-
constituted models implying some sort of organic completeness.80 This kind of approach allows us to 
look at the single elements that compose a system, which she calls “assemblage”, and historically 
 
79  Jane Guyer, Legacies, Logics, Logistics: Essays in the Anthropology of the Platform Economy (Chicago, London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2016), 3–39. 
80  Ibid., 19. A few Ph.D. theses and articles that apply the Assemblage Theory approach to colonial contexts have been 
produced recently, dealing with diverse aspects of European colonialism. To give some examples, Andrew Lattas and 
Knut M. Rio use the concept of “assemblage” to describe the construction of “power” in colonial Melanesia as a 
composition of judicial-legal institutions with other practices to “control” people; Ben Dibbley describes the “socio-
technical assemblages” that contributed to produce a “practical anthropology” employed in the administration of colonial 
Papua New Guinea; Raquel Albarrán deals with the role of objects in the production of colonial tropes and discourses in 
Hispanic America. See Andrew Lattas and Knut M. Rio, ‘Introduction: Securing Modernity: Towards an Ethnography of 
Power in Contemporary Melanesia’, Oceania 81, no. 1 (2011): 1–21; Ben Dibley, ‘Assembling an Anthropological Actor: 
Anthropological Assemblage and Colonial Government in Papua’, History and Anthropology 25, no. 2 (2014): 263–79; 
Raquel Albarrán, ‘Colonial Assemblages: Objects, Territories, and Racialized Subjects in Pre-Independence Latin 
America (1492–1810)’, unpublished dissertation, University of Pennsylvania (2016) 
<https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1583>, accessed 30 March 2021.  
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analyse them.81 In this way, it is possible to identify the historical processes that have brought together 
those elements to form the “assemblage”. This approach enables two kinds of analytical operation. 
On the one hand, as every configuration of the assemblage depends on its historical context, it is 
possible to underline the processual nature of this composition: “the elements [which compose] the 
assemblages, already have a history, from which they would not be liberated through a process like 
assemblage”.82 On the other hand, we can underline the “internal heterogeneity [and] external 
connectedness” of the composition.83 
Using this framework to organise my dissertation, I will avoid the flattening of the representation 
of the Eritrean monetary system, highlighting instead the components that produced it and their 
historical nature, which makes the assemblage “one among several possible ones, on that particular 
grounding at that particular time”.84 In this way, through the “compositional” representation of the 
Eritrean monetary system in the Italian colonial period (and in its different historical configurations), 
my intention is also to produce an “archaeology” (in Jane Guyer’s sense of historicisation) of the 
elements that compose it, for example wages, credit, banks, silver coins, and even the engravings on 
coins.85 At the same time, I seek to avoid a teleological representation of the monetary system that 
moves toward a more complex or “evolved” form, a concept that was subsumed in that of the 
“monetary revolution”.  
 
81  Jane Guyer’s framework is a re-elaboration of Assemblage Theory and the “sibling” framework of the Actors 
Network Theory (ANT). At the same time, it is inspired by her debate with Michel Callon (see note 84, below). Guyer, 
Legacies, Logics, Logistics, 29. For a concise comparison between the two frameworks see Martin Müller, ‘Assemblages 
and Actor-Networks: Rethinking Socio-Material Power, Politics and Space: Assemblages and Actor-Networks’, 
Geography Compass 9, no. 1 (2015): 27–41. In particular, Assemblage Theory draws inspiration from the work by Gill 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). Elsewhere, Deleuze gives a very general definition of “assemblage” 
(agencement in his words): “It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes 
liaisons, relations between them across ages, sexes and reigns – different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is 
that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’. It is never filiations which are important but alliances, alloys; these 
are not successions, lines of descent, but contagions, epidemics, the wind”. As cited in Müller, ‘Assemblages and Actor-
Networks’, 28. However, a more complete systematisation of the Assemblage Theory framework is realised by Manuel 
De Landa, especially in  A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (London: Bloomsbury, 
2006). On the relationship between Assemblage Theory and History, see Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of 
Nonlinear History (New York: Zone Books, 2019). 
82  Guyer, Legacies, Logics, Logistics, 33. 
83  Ibid., 23. 
84  Ibid., 5. 
85  Another term that is used to describe the elements that compose an economic or a financial assemblage is “device” 




Although the chronological limits of most of the archival sources used in this research go from the 
Italian occupation of Massawa (1885) to the end of the currency exchange monopoly of the Bank of 
Italy in Eritrea after the First World War (1921), this thesis has a thematic structure which requires a 
different periodisation for each chapter.  
In the first chapter, I will give a brief overview of the monetary reforms of the Italian colony of 
Eritrea and the bordering areas during the time of Italian occupation. This overview serves as a guide 
for the subsequent discussion of the processes and discourses that contributed to the construction of 
a “colonial knowledge” regarding the monetary system of Eritrea. In order to do so, colonial reports 
and publications will be analysed, stressing their differences and their connections to ideas and 
models circulating among European colonial powers. This approach will be useful in showing the 
processes at work in the design of new currencies and new policies for the colonies. This will also 
help us to understand some of the reasons for their failure, and the political reasons that inspired the 
Italian attempts in the first place. The “assemblage theory” approach will illuminate the compositional 
and processual nature of the building of the colonial monetary system, by analysing the single 
elements that constitute it: in this case, discourses, ideas, and even the engraving on the coins.   
In the second chapter I will investigate the impact of colonial currencies in Eritrea through another 
perspective: that of the indigenous soldiers, the ascaris, that were also the first colonial subjects to be 
paid by the Italian colonial government. Given the social and economic relevance of military 
recruitment in Eritrea during the Italian colonial period, I will present an overview (not exhaustive, 
however) of the state of the art of research about military labour in the African colonies. This will be 
helpful in better contextualising the Eritrean case in the frame of European colonialism in Africa. 
After discussing the configurations of military labour relations preceding the arrival of the Italians, 
I will focus on the Italian approaches to incentivise enrolment in the colonial army and the reasons 
that motivated some Eritreans to do so. Then, the discourses and prejudices behind the introduction 
of the first limited measures of “social welfare” will be analysed. Finally, through the personal 
experience of the ascaris that were captured and mutilated in ‘Adwa, I will look at the manner in 
which they managed their wages, as well as the modalities in which they exploited the colonial wage 
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and subsidy system to store wealth according to local regimes of value. This will be made possible 
through the analysis of the correspondence between the veterans and the colonial administration.  
Finally, in the third chapter I will describe how local credit instruments were integrated before the 
opening of the first bank branch in Eritrea. An overview of the long history of calls for the opening 
of the bank and associated feasibility studies will be given, with an inspection of the opening of the 
first bank in Ethiopia. The opening of the first bank branch in Eritrea offered the colonial government 
new tools to attempt the control of the monetary system, especially when (during the First World 
War) the scarcity of currency heavily impaired the functioning of inter-regional trade and produced 
social discontent. The new tools introduced by the opening of the Gestione Talleri, the office of the 
bank that had acquired a monopoly for the exchange of the Maria Theresa thaler, allow us to analyse 
the degree of integration of the local Eritrean economy into a broader transregional network. This 
will help us to understand the vital importance of “local” currencies (such as the Maria Theresa thaler) 
for the functioning of the system.   
In this thesis, I will analyse the monetary system of Eritrea in a manner that goes beyond a mere 
chronological analysis of the most important milestones of the colonial monetary policies. I will focus 
on single aspects that are intimately related to money and the transitions that were ongoing in Eritrean 
society under colonial rule. This will allow the study to produce a multifaceted description of the 
monetary system, of colonial policies, of their impacts and consequences, and of the modalities in 
which colonial subjects confronted them. I am aware that this approach will not render a complete 
representation of the monetary history of Eritrea during Italian colonial period. It will, however, avoid 
underestimating the complexities at work. At the same time, the elements of the system that will be 
analysed can instead be described in a processual perspective, rather than as fixed components of the 
assemblage. In the scope of this approach, money will represent the form of “energy” that “powers” 
the assemblage.86  
 
 




The bulk of the sources collected during my research and employed in this thesis are those held at 
the Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE) in Rome. Among the 
collections of the ASDMAE, I particularly focus on the documents of the Archivio Eritrea (AE) and 
the Archivio Storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana (ASMAI). The history of these collections is 
a troubled one. While the ASMAI collection reunites the documents produced by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Italian Africa during the entire period of Italian colonisation in 
Africa, the AE collection contains the documents of the local archives of the Italian colony of Eritrea. 
Both archives have had a long history of relocations and alteration, mainly due to the events of the 
Second World War. However, the Archivio Eritrea is the one that went through the longest series of 
vicissitudes. The original collection was first altered during the British occupation of Asmara (from 
1 April 1941). Then, after a decade, the documents were shipped to Italy in 48 boxes, unordered, and 
consigned to the “Comitato per la documentazione dell’opera Italiana in Africa”, who monopolised 
access to the archive for years.87 Unfortunately, during those years, a portion of the documents were 
again moved from their original location. Nevertheless, this collection remains one of the richest 
sources of information consulted for this study. While the documents I analysed from the ASMAI 
collection consist of correspondence between the central government and the ministries responsible 
for the administration of the colony, the Archivio Eritrea contains the communications between 
various local offices in Eritrea. Apart from the official correspondence, a useful source of data for my 
thesis is represented by the reports that the regional commissioners were asked to send to the 
governors, in reply to their enquires on various urgent matters. The importance of these reports for 
the history of Eritrea has been stressed, for example, by Massimo Zaccaria in his introduction to the 
report compiled by Teobaldo Folchi about the administrative region of Massawa,88 or in the study by 
 
87  For information on the archives, see the foreword to the inventories written by Enrico Serra, available on the archive’s 
website: <https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/servizi/uapsds/storico_diplom/inventarionline.html> accessed on 30 March 2021. 
The inventories themselves were curated by Mario Gazzini. See Tiziana Gazzini, Ricordo di Mario Gazzini (1910-1997) 
(Rome: Futurgrafica, 2003). 
88  Massimo Zaccaria, Le note del commissario Teobaldo Folchi e i cenni storico amministrativi sul commissariato di 
Massaua (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2009), 9–79. 
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Barbara Sòrgoni on Alberto Pollera.89 In writing this dissertation, these kinds of reports have been 
useful in understanding the impact of the colony of the monetary policies employed during the First 
World War on smaller administrative units. Living at the “periphery” of the colony, the 
commissioners were at the forefront of the colonial administration and could collect first-hand 
information from the territories they were administering, from a perspective closer to the ground. The 
importance of these sources has been stressed by Irma Taddia on the occasion of discovering the last 
of these colonial “regional” archives left in Eritrea.90 
The problem of these sources lies in the absence of the voice of the colonial subjects. Most of the 
time, their voice is mediated by one of the interpreters that worked for the colonial administration. 
Given the asymmetries of power at play in the relationship between the administrators and colonial 
subjects, these documents need to be critically analysed. This is particularly true when the African 
voice is “transcribed” in the proceedings of trials and investigations.91 An exception is represented 
by the group of letters analysed in the second chapter, where I was able to reconstruct the way in 
which Eritrean veterans were managing their subsidies from their very own words. The letters 
compose a group of pleas written by the former soldiers themselves to ask the colonial government 
for subsidies or to apply for a job. Massimo Zaccaria shows how the practice of writing letters started 
spreading among the soldiers during the campaign in Libya.92 The presence of recurring expressions 
 
89  Barbara Sòrgoni, Etnografia e colonialismo: l’Eritrea e l’Etiopia di Alberto Pollera (1873-1939) (Torino: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 2001). 
90  Irma Taddia, ‘The Regional Archive at Addi Qäyyeh, Eritrea’, History in Africa 25 (1998): 423–25. A partial survey 
of the documents about the colonial troops held in this archive can be found in Alessandro Volterra, ‘Le carte militari 
coloniali italiane conservate nell’archivio eritreo di Mendefera’, Bollettino dell’Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico 12, no. 23–
24 (2012): 7–19. 
91  The debate on the validity of the proceedings of trials as historical source is ample and long-standing. While some 
scholars, such as the postmodernist anthropologists, stressed the “politics of domination” at play in the trials, others, like 
Carlo Ginzburg, stated that the role of deforming intermediaries should not be overemphasised: “the fact that a source is 
not ‘objective’ does not mean that it is unusable”. See Renato Rosaldo, ‘From the Door of His Tent: The Fieldworker and 
the Inquisitor’, in Writing Culture, ed. James Clifford and George E. Marcus (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: 
University of California Press, 1986), 79; Carlo Ginzburg, Il formaggio e i vermi: il cosmo di un mugnaio del ’500 (Turin: 
Einaudi, 1988), xv–xvi. 
92  Massimo Zaccaria, Anch’io per la tua bandiera: Il V battaglione ascari in missione sul fronte libico (1912), 1 
(Ravenna: Giorgio Pozzi editore, 2012); Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Writing Letters from the Libyan Front’, in Themes in Modern 




in those letters suggest that, at least among some sections of the society, letter writing was becoming 
a widespread practice from the first decade of the twentieth century. 93 
 The location of the ASDMAE collection allowed me to conveniently visit the library of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Here can be found the Fondo Eritrea, which is the collection once held 
at the library of Asmara during the Italian colonial period. In this collection it is possible to find some 
extremely rare official publications that give insights on the commercial environment of the colony. 
Among these publications I found also the essay that Pollera wrote while working as commercial 
agent in ‘Adwa, providing a description of the commercial network of the Təgray, its relation with 
Eritrea, and the fundamental role of the Maria Theresa thaler.  
 Another valuable and under-exploited source is the Archivio Storico della Banca d’Italia (ASBI) 
in Rome. This archive contains official documents, reports, financial statements, and correspondence 
covering two centuries of the history of the Bank of Italy. From this collection I consulted the section 
relevant to the colonial branches, and, amongst these documents, those of the Gestione Talleri offer 
a new perspective on the circulation of the Maria Theresa thaler (and later, the tallero d’Italia) in 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Red Sea region, through qualitative and quantitative data.  
I also consulted other archives that allowed for the cross-checking of data and broadening of 
perspective, such as the Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS) in Rome, the documents of the Foreign 
Office (FO) held at the National Archives in London (NA), the India Office Record (IOR) section of 
the British Library (BL) in London, the Archivio di Stato of Trieste (AS-TS), and Archivio dell’Ufficio 
Storico dello Stato Maggiore della Marina Militare (AUSSMM) in Rome. 
In January 2019 I spent some time in Eritrea with the aim of organising a longer and more 
structured research period during the last year of my PhD programme. Unfortunately, the global 
Covid-19 pandemic has made this impossible.94 During my brief time in Eritrea, I had the opportunity 
 
93  Irma Taddia has pointed toward the presence of substantial but scattered private correspondence in Italian colonial 
archives: Irma Taddia, ‘Correspondence as a New Source for African History’, Cahiers d’études Africaines 40, no. 157 
(2000): 109–34. 
94   The Covid-19 pandemic has also had an impact on access to the archive sources in Italy during the final year of 
research. Some of the aspects considered by the early research project that still need to be further investigated will be 
listed in the Conclusion to this thesis.  
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to meet the archive director and staff, verify the content of these archives, and collect an initial batch 
of data. In particular, I visited the archive of the Research and Documentation Centre (RDC) in 
Asmara and the library of the Pavoni Centre. The RDC is the government office responsible for the 
preservation of Eritrean archival heritage. At the RDC, I could personally verify the presence of 
documents related to the Italian colonial period. Among the collections of reports and correspondence 
by different colonial offices and administrative units, the “Fondo Notarile” (Notarial Fund) is very 
useful in assessing the wealth of some of the most active individuals in the colony, and tracking the 
movement of capital and assets. The Pavoni Centre holds the biggest library in Asmara, where I could 
consult a rich catalogue of publications and newspapers from the Italian colonial period.95  
Colonial publications have been also consulted at the library of the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e 
l’Oriente (IsIAO), at the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Rome, and at the private library Biblioteca-
Archivio Africana of Giancarlo Stella in Fusignano (Ravenna, Italy). For the completion of the first 
chapter, the study of published colonial sources has been fundamental. They not only represent a 
unique source of information on the monetary history of the colony of Eritrea. In fact, by reading 
these documents “along the grain”, as is suggested by Ann Laura Stoler, it is possible to transform 
these documents from means to objects of analysis.96   
Finally, a valuable source is also represented by the official bulletins (such as the Bullettino 





95 Other important sources for the colonial period in Eritrea are the archives of the Municipality and that of the High Court 
in Asmara, whose potential have been illustrated by both Francesca Locatelli and Alessandro Volterra. Francesca 
Locatelli, ‘The Archives of the Municipality and the High Court of Asmara, Eritrea: Discovering the Eritrea “Hidden 
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96  Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Thinking through Colonial Ontologies (Princeton and Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). 
27 
 
Orthographical note and translations 
For Amharic and Tegreñña terms, I used the indications of the Encyclopaedia Aethiopica.97 For 
the Turkish and Arabic terms, I have followed the Encyclopaedia of Islam.98 For popular place names, 
like “Asmara” and “Massawa”, I have used the common form. When reporting names of people and 
places from colonial sources I kept the orthography I found in the documents. All the translations 
from the Italian sources are made by the author.  
 
97  Siegbert Uhlig and Baye Yimam, eds., Encyclopaedia Aethiopica (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010). 








The currency problem in the Italian Colony of Eritrea: The 
Maria Theresa thaler in colonial sources (1857 – 1941) 
 
1.1 Introduction: Monetary systems and the construction of “colonial knowledge” 
The Italians began facing the broad success of the Maria Theresa thaler (MTT) in the Red Sea region 
before their actual occupation of the first strip of land in Africa. Italian colonialism took its first steps 
in East Africa in 1869 with a 6,000 MTT contract agreed between the agent Giuseppe Sapeto and the 
two brothers Ibrahim and Hassan ben Ahmad. This contract was for the transfer of the ‘Asäb bay to 
the Italian agent, in the wake of the growing European interest in the region sparked by the prospected 
opening of the Suez Canal.1 The opening of the new waterway produced a steep increase in trade 
volume in the Red Sea, which was further accelerated by the introduction of steam navigation.2 The 
use of MTT in the region has been reported since the second half of the eighteenth century.3  
The imbalance of trade, with the prevalence of imports, aided its diffusion, and at the time of the 
Napier expedition, the Ethiopian market was flooded with Maria Theresa thalers.4 
Towards the end of the 19th century, the silver thaler became the most employed metal coin in the 
Horn of Africa and the port towns on both shores of the Red Sea.5 Before the colonisation of the area, 
the Italians were aware of the success of this coin in the Red Sea and the Ethiopian plateau, as reported 
by explorers and missionaries that had visited the region since the first half of the century. For 
example, in 1857, Giuseppe Sapeto, then a missionary sent by Propaganda Fide, gave some 
 
1  Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale: dall’unità alla marcia su Roma (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1992), 
38. 
2  Jonathan Miran, Red Sea Citizens: Cosmopolitan Society and Cultural Change in Massawa (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 4; Jonathan Miran, ‘The Red Sea’, in Oceanic Histories, Cambridge 
Oceanic Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 160. 
3  See the next section for more details on the history of the Maria Theresa thaler.  
4  Richard Pankhurst, ‘The Advent of the Maria Theresa Dollar in Ethiopia, Its Effect on Taxation and Wealth 
Accumulation and Other Economic, Political and Cultural Implications.’, Northeast African Studies 1, no. 3 (1979): 20–
21; Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935, 1st edition (Addis Ababa: Haile Sellassie University 
Press, 1968), 469. The British expedition in Ethiopia against Emperor Téwodros, led by Sir Robert Napier, occurred in 
1867-1868, as a retaliation against the imprisonment of British envoys. See Pankhurst, 11–16. 
5  Pankhurst, ‘The Advent of the Maria Theresa Dollar in Ethiopia’.  
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information on the thalers to “those who might have the crazy idea [ghiribizzo] to wander in those 
countries for the sake of science”. He suggested bringing a little cash in the form of Maria Theresa 
thalers. He also advised travellers to check that each coin had seven dots embossed on the head’s 
crown, that the extremities of the Empress’s brooch were well in line and visible, and that the two 
initials, “S.” and “F.” were legible beneath her bust. If the coin did not match this description, the 
value of the money was null, and it would not be locally accepted.6  
What the Italians did not know at the time were the intricacies and specificities of the Maria 
Theresa thaler circulation, and the various reasons why the people of the region preferred this 
currency. In order to understand the circulation of the MTT, various colonial reports and studies 
focused on the Austrian coin, starting from the occupation of Massawa in 1885. In the first years of 
the occupation, the monetary question was dealt with briefly in commercial reports. The few 
paragraphs dealing with the thaler hastily attributed its success to the degree of cultural “evolution” 
of the people using it. The reports explained the success of the MTT as a combination of the 
attractiveness of its silver content and the inability of people to understand the operation of a fiduciary 
currency. Later on, and before the First World War, the issue of the MTT started to be addressed in a 
different way, and in the general framework of what started to be defined as the “Maria Theresa thaler 
problem”. Concern about the silver currency shifted from a commercial problem to a political one. 
The political perspective of these studies became even more evident at the end of the First World 
War, and remained a central issue until the Italian defeat in East Africa in 1941. The issue that was 
most debated in these publications was the correct strategy to adopt so as to replace the Austrian 
thaler with a coin issued by the Italian government.  
The literature on the epistemological tools developed by European administrators operating in 
colonial contexts is wide.  The classic essay by Edward Said, entitled ‘Orientalism’,7 laid the 
foundations for an interpretation of colonial knowledge as a tool for colonial domination, through the 
 
6  Giuseppe Sapeto, Viaggio e missione cattolica fra i mensa, i bogos e gli habab. Con un cenno geografico e storico 
dell’Abissinia (Rome: Propaganda Fide, 1857), 348. 
7  Edward W Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
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misrepresentation of the “other”. One of the many consequences of Said’s study was the downgrading 
of colonial documents from trustable sources to falsified representations of the colonised, largely 
composed to suit the Europeans and their imperialistic projects. This process produced what Sherry 
Ortner8 describes as a “crisis of representation”, a crisis that has characterised postcolonial studies 
since Said’s work. Colonial documents were considered useless for understanding indigenous 
societies, and this impoverished analyses, limiting interpretation to a “thin” representation of 
domination and resistance. Following the publication of Said’s essay, some studies revalued the 
critical use of colonial documents by historians.9 For example, Ann Stoler10 suggests swapping 
perspective, transforming the “archive” from a means to an object of ethnographical analysis. 
According to her, this process allows the highlighting of differences and conflicts inside the colonial 
society, and, especially, among the colonisers. This approach allows for dismantling the idea of 
colonialism as “a structure imposed on local practice”.11 At the same time, it emphasises that “colonial 
cultures were never direct translations of European society planted in the colonies”, but rather new 
cultural configurations.12 Nevertheless, as we will see in this chapter, the relationship between the 
colony and the metropole is relevant, both in the co-construction of new epistemological categories 
and for the consequences that historical contingencies in Europe had on the social, political and 
economic condition of the colony. For this reason, the study of the tools and outcomes of colonial 
epistemological processes calls for a definition of “knowledge” which “implies […] a transnational 
or a global web of connections and circulations”, not only encompassing the homeland and the 
colonies, but also different empires.13  
The genealogies and implications of the constructions of knowledge, and the sciences in the 
colonies, have been the object of a growing body of literature.  
 
8  Sherry B. Ortner, ‘Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 
37, no. 1 (1995): 22. 
9  Ricardo Roque and Kim A. Wagner, Engaging Colonial Knowledge: Reading European Archives in World History 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
10  Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Thinking through Colonial Ontologies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
11  Ann Laura Stoler, ‘Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, no. 1 (1989): 135. 
12  Ibid., 136. 
13  Roque and Wagner, Engaging Colonial Knowledge, 16. 
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George Basalla, with his diffusionist approach, was the first to bring attention to the use of science 
and knowledge in the colonies, defining “colonial science” as a moment of transition of European 
science to the non-European world.14 Overturning this representation, Richard Drayton underlines 
the role of “colonial science” in the forging of European empires,15 while David Turnbull highlights 
the role of “localness” in the production of “European science”.16 According to Turnbull, “the source 
of the power of [European] science […] lies not in the nature of scientific knowledge but in its greater 
ability to move and apply the knowledge it produces beyond the site of its production”.17 Moreover, 
he employs the concept of “assemblage”, deriving it directly from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,18 
to describe the construction of science as an “episteme with technologies added”, embracing a “wide 
variety of incompatible components” and describing “active and evolving practices rather than a 
passive and static structure”.19 Recalling the “assemblage” picture, David Wade Chambers and 
Richard Gillespie overcome the Eurocentric approach characterising their predecessors, focusing on 
what they call the “vectors of assemblage” that connect the “practices” of science and the “constructed 
social and physical environments”,20 to the “polycentric communication networks […] through which 
scientific knowledge and authority is produced, circulated, legitimated”.21  
More recently, the role of “experts” in Africa was stressed in a special issue of the journal History 
in Africa. This special issue focussed not only on the production, but also “dissemination and 
 
14  George Basalla, ‘The Spread of Western Science’, Science 15, no. 3775 (1967): 611–22. 
15  Richard Drayton, ‘Knowledge and Empire’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, edited by Peter Marshall J. 
and Alaine Low, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 232–52. 
16  David Turnbull, ‘Local Knowledge and Comparative Scientific Traditions’, Knowledge and Policy 6, no. 3 (1993): 
29–54. 
17  Ibid., 48. 
18  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), 90. 
19  Turnbull, ‘Local Knowledge and Comparative Scientific Traditions’, 33. 
20  David Wade Chambers and Richard Gillespie, ‘Locality in the History of Science: Colonial Science, Technoscience, 
and Indigenous Knowledge’, Osiris: Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise, 14 (2000): 230. For an 
updated overview of the literature on colonial knowledge and colonial science in British colonies, see Brett M. Bennett 
and Joseph M. Hodge, Science and Empire: Knowledge and Networks of Science across the British Empire, 1800-1970 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3–29. On the French colonies see Michael A. Osborne, ‘Science and the French 
Empire’, Isis 96, no. 1 (2005): 80–87. 
21  Bennett and Hodge, Science and Empire, 19. 
33 
 
reception” of “colonial knowledge”.22 The cases regarding German East Africa,23 Gabon,24 Nigeria,25 
Kenya,26 and the Gold Coast27 underline how, in colonial contexts, “expertise” was recognised by the 
degree to which it “fitted the expectations of the colonial state”,28 while underestimating African 
intellectual authority.29  
Another special issue on “colonial science” addressed colonial “systematic knowledge” in a 
comparative way. The authors focus on “the reciprocal influence and the multidirectional flows of 
materials, knowledge, and people between multiple centres”.30 The overviews on the French and 
British Empires show the differences between the French state-sponsored approach to “colonial 
science”, and that conducted by British scientific societies led by private interests.31  
Focussing on the first attempt at a coordinated scientific effort in British Africa, with the realisation 
of the African Research Survey (described as “the most important intelligence-gathering project of 
the interwar period”32), Helen Tilley analyses the influence of scientific expertise in the colonisation 
processes and at the impact of research in African colonial contexts on science itself, from the 1870s 
to the 1950s.33  In her work, Tilley also emphasises the attempts made by European researchers to 
share knowledge and research efforts in Africa, so as to “standardize colonial policies” and 
“incorporate these territories into the international economy”.34 At the same time, she highlights the 
complexity of colonial scientific enterprises by showing the existence of internal criticism and debate 
 
22  Dmitri van den Bersselaar, ‘Acknowledging Knowledge: Dissemination and Reception of Expertise in Colonial 
Africa’, History in Africa 33 (2006): 389–93. 
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30  Londa Schiebinger, ‘Introduction’, Isis 96, no. 1 (2005): 53. 
31  Mark Harrison, ‘Science and the British Empire’, Isis 96, no. 1 (1 March 2005): 56. 
32  Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-
1950 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 71. 
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among the project’s advisors themselves.35 Conflict, complexity, and discrepancies inside colonial 
administrations in the process of building “colonial knowledge” are also underlined in the volume 
edited by Ricardo Roque and Kim Wagner,36 as in the paper by Pauline von Hellermann about 
“colonial forest science” and local farming practices in Southern Nigeria.37 Von Hellermann also 
underlines the existence of transnational networks of exchange of colonial knowledge, made up of 
journals and conferences.38 Until the outbreak of the First World War, the Institut Colonial 
International (International Colonial Institute, ICI) in Brussels promoted the most important 
occasions for the exchange of colonial knowledge, during its biennial meetings.39 As shown by 
Florian Wagner, these “manifestations of colonial internationalism” allowed colonial activists to meet 
and discuss colonial issues in a co-operative fashion, without abandoning their nationalistic or 
“lobby” interests.40 As we will see in this chapter, the proceedings of these meetings were read by 
colonial ministries and administrators, providing material upon which to base the design of their 
policies.41   
The construction of colonial knowledge during Italian colonialism has been the subject of a few 
studies. Massimo Zaccaria,42 in his introduction to the reports compiled by Major Teobaldo Folchi 
regarding the Massawa Region in 1898, stresses that the importance of the information in these 
colonial reports goes beyond the useful data about the people of the eastern Eritrean lowlands. The 
document represents “a valuable opportunity to retrace how Italian colonialism built its knowledge 
of the people it ruled”43. Recently Zaccaria has further underlined the roles of Italian colonial agencies 
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and institutions, founded in the homeland, in coordinating expertise and sharing information to be 
applied to enhance the productivity of the colonies. One such institution was the Istituto Agricolo 
Coloniale Italiano (the Italian Colonial Agricultural Institute), founded in 1904.44 In the same article, 
the theme of building of a “colonial expertise” is linked to the mobility of low and high grade officers 
“carrying” their experience from one Italian colony to another, thus producing a representation of 
Italian colonialism as a “connected system”.45 This study fits in a growing body of research 
problematising the place of Africa in global history by specifically looking at “practical mechanisms 
of connection and to precise trajectories of engagement”.46 
Gianni Dore47 has dealt with colonial knowledge, which he defines “knowledge of the institution”, 
through the analysis of the case of the colonial officer Giovanni Ellero. Ellero worked as a 
commissioner in different regions of Italian East Africa between 1936 and 1941. Dore investigates 
the connection between the research activity carried out by one of the first professional Italian 
officers, and the influence this research had on the design of colonial policies. In a more recent 
volume, Dore has expanded his argument and relies on the writings of colonial administrators that 
worked among the Kunama people of Eritrea to highlight the role of knowledge in administration, 
and the processes of construction of a “knowledge of the institution”.48 
Barbara Sòrgoni49 has contributed to the debate through the intellectual and personal biography of 
Alberto Pollera. Sòrgoni addresses the issue of the difference between the so-called “old colonials”, 
like Pollera, and the new colonial officers who had passed an open competitive exam to be appointed 
as residents or commissioners in the colonies.50 The case of Alberto Pollera, who arrived in the colony 
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in 1894, is particularly interesting in this sense; it clearly shows the importance of individual 
experience and of political contingencies in the production of knowledge, over a long span of time.  
His private life was also in many ways exceptional. He had three children with a woman from Axum 
named Unesc Araià Captè, and a further three children with the Tigrinyan woman Chidan Menelik. 
Pollera married Chidan Menelik when he was on the verge of death in 1938, despite the racial 
legislation in force in Eritrea since that same year. Before his marriage, he had legitimised his 
children, thus allowing them to acquire the Italian citizenship. This legitimisation process was 
completed before it became practically impossible due to the proclamation of a racial legislation in 
the colony in 1937.51 Sòrgoni uses the biography of this “ethnographer by chance” to discuss the 
relationship between colonisers and colonised.52 In fact, Alberto Pollera did not have a specific 
academic education, but nonetheless became a scholar in the field during his long administrative 
career.53 He started by collecting data regarding indigenous common law, the property of land and 
the organisation of local societies and traditions, and produced more than one hundred articles and 
essays over a period of forty-five years. Sòrgoni’s intellectual biography of Pollera investigates “the 
discursive strategies” employed by colonial administrators to “control” colonial subjects and societies 
through the “essentialising description of the other”.54  
In line with this literature, which has focused on the relevance of the construction of colonial 
knowledge in the Italian colonies, this chapter will focus on some of the most significant studies and 
reports on the Maria Theresa thaler and the monetary problems of Eritrea. These reports have been 
both published and consulted by Italian colonial administrators from the second half of the 19th 
century, until the dismemberment of Italian East Africa in 1941. The analysis of these sources will 
serve several purposes. First, it will offer a layout of the most important monetary policies employed 
by colonial administrators in their attempt to shape the local monetary system, in order to guide the 
subsequent analysis in this and later chapters. It will give us a vantage point from which to examine 
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the monetary history of Eritrea, before we move on to the themes analysed in the next chapters. 
Second, it will provide a (partial) explanation of the reasons behind the failure of these policies. 
Finally, it will contribute to building a compositional representation of the colonial monetary system. 
To do this I will adopt Jane Guyer’s framing of the concept of “assemblage” to investigate the 
processes of construction of a “colonial knowledge” about the monetary system of Eritrea, from the 
landing of the Italians in Massawa till the end of Italian East Africa as a political entity.55 The story 
of the Italian attempts to replace the Maria Theresa thaler gives an excellent representation of the 
compositional nature of “colonial knowledge”. The construction of a colonial monetary system is not 
the simple outcome of policies designed in Europe, nor of the initiatives of colonial officers. It is a 
process involving, among other things, the most popular theories of monetary policy, together with 
geopolitical factors, evolutionary prejudices, field observations, and the ambition of “aspiring 
colonial agents” together with the experience of the “old colonials”. 
Following Zaccaria56 and Dore57, I will retrace the different stages of the construction of “colonial 
knowledge” of the monetary practices of Eritrean societies, and the extent to which this informed the 
implementation of colonial monetary policies. To do so, I will adopt Stoler’s suggestion in using 
colonial sources as the object (and the means) of my analysis.58 This process will trace the genealogy 
of the ideas, how they were born, contested and transformed, with the final aim of establishing how 
they inspired and modified colonial policies.  
By comparison of varied sources, this chapter will highlight the non-uniformity of the colonial 
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project. This is particularly relevant for the Italian colonial context, where different “colonial models” 
were experimented with, and different political and economic projects were implemented over time.59 
Finally, given that colonial knowledge is at the base of colonial policymaking, this analysis will help 
to explain the reasons behind the failure of Italian monetary policies in Eritrea. It is worth noting that 
Italian failures at building a colonial monetary system were at the origin of a growing body of 
literature produced on the theme. The discussions regarding these failures, and the subsequent 
proposals of new monetary policies, also represent valuable sources in finding an explanation for 
those failures, while gathering information about the financial and monetary landscape of the colony. 
The biographies of Italian administrators, and, especially, their education and personal background, 
have been considered by historians of Italian colonialism as extremely relevant in interpreting their 
political action.60 In this chapter, I will not examine the biographies of all the authors of the reports 
and publications, as it is not always possible to find detailed information. However, where possible, 
I included that biographical information that is necessary for the scope of my analysis. Moreover, the 
“biography” of the documents themselves can sometimes be traced, as some of the essays had been 
compiled as colonial reports before being published.  
After a brief account of the monetary reforms produced from the arrival of the Italians in Massawa 
to the end of Italian East Africa in 1941, I will analyse the scattered information that can be found in 
the documents of the administration and the publications concerned with the commercial 
opportunities offered by the recently occupied Italian territories, at the end of the nineteenth century. 
In the third section, I will introduce the report by Ercole Petazzi, which is the first colonial publication 
entirely dedicated to the monetary problems of Eritrea. In the fourth section I will present the first 
publication by an “expert”, Giovanni Carboneri, and his “virtual” dialogue with George de Lavelaye, 
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as well as the results of the 1912 Brussels conference on the monetary systems of the colonies 
organised by the Institut Colonial International. Carlo Rossetti will be the final author analysed 
predating the First World War. After Amanto di Fausto’s descriptions of the monetary “problems” of 
the interwar period, a report by the archaeologist Lucio Mariani will shed a light on the “back-end” 
process of the design of the new Tallero d’Italia. The last section will consider the three essays written 
by Alberto Pollera on the topic of the monetary circulation in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and will end with 
Francesco Saverio Caroselli’s evolutionary “ladder” of the monetary systems.  
Before moving on to the analysis of the process whereby “colonial knowledge” is constructed 
through the analysis of the discourses, I will briefly introduce the events that stimulated them as well 
as the results of the politics that have been “informed” by them. As mentioned above, this will help, 
on the one hand, to clarify the complicated series of monetary policies and failures that characterised 
the history of Eritrea and its bordering countries. Moreover, it will also contribute to a more complete 
representation of the colonial monetary assemblage.  
 
1.2 The Maria Theresa thaler in the Red Sea region and the monetary reforms in Eritrea, 
Ethiopia and Somalia  
It is not possible to trace the boundaries of the different currencies circulating in the Red Sea region 
at the end of the nineteenth century; and as we shall see, the multiple-currency system characterising 
the region continued to surpass colonial boundaries, as well. However, an overview of the different 
monetary reforms that the different political actors in the region tried to implement illustrates the 
extent and the intricacies of this system.   
The complex monetary circulation of the Southern Red Sea region stood out to the Italians in 1885, 
when they landed in Massawa. The Maria Theresa thaler was widely used for inter-regional and 
international trade, and Egyptian piastres were employed in the payment of the irregular troops the 
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Italians inherited from the Egyptian garrison.61 At the same time Indian merchants traded in rupees. 
A number of different commodity currencies were exchanged along the coasts of the Red Sea, such 
as glass beads and cotton cloth, and in the interior of Ethiopia, such as the salt bars, called amolé.62 
The Maria Theresa thaler was an 833 1000⁄  fine silver coin that had been minted since 1751, bearing 
the effigy of Empress Maria Theresa on the front and the bicephalous eagle, symbol of the Austro-
Hungarian empire, on the back (See Figure 3). During the reign of Maria Theresa, this coin became 
particularly successful in trading with the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea areas. Given its success, 
Jospeh II, the son of the Empress, decided to allow the continuation of its minting after his mother’s 
death in 1780.63 
 
 
Figure 3. Maria Theresa thaler 1780. Author’s personal collection. 
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formally controlling Massawa, allowed the pacific occupation of the port town by the Italians. See Rosoni, La Colonia 
Eritrea, 37; Nicola Labanca, Oltremare: storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana (Bologna: Il mulino, 2007), 62. For 
more information on the parallel use of multiple currencies in Massawa, see Arnaldo Mauri, ‘Eritrea’s Early Stages in 
Monetary and Banking Development’ (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2003), 4–5. For the payment 
of the irregular troops in Egyptian piastres, see chapter 2, section 3. For an analysis of the consequences of a multiple-
currency system in the colony before and during the First World War, see chapter 3.  
62  Ennio Quirino Mario Alamanni, La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi commerci (Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1891), 275, 705; 
Richard Pankhurst, ‘“Primitive Money” in Ethiopia’, Journal de la Société des Africanistes 32, no. 2 (1962): 213–48; 
Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 460–68. 




At the time of the Italian occupation of Massawa, the most important trade goods were butter, 
hides and skins, pearls and mother of pearl, and coffee. Besides pearls and mother of pearl fished out 
of the Red Sea, most of the other goods had to be imported from Ethiopia and Sudan, and paid for 
with MTTs.64 The primary destinations for these products were Aden and Trieste. In particular, rubber 
and resins, together with mother of pearl and coffee, were the most important products exported to 
Trieste.65 It is worth noting that at the time Trieste was the main port of the Austrian Empire, and 
trade with eastern countries and the Red Sea was carried out using Maria Theresa thalers minted in 
Vienna. In the first period of Italian occupation, so as not to hinder local and regional trade, the 
Italians decided to not prohibit the circulation of the MTT. Moreover, the military administration 
continued to issue payments in MTT, in order to use the 1,000,000 MTT they had brought into 
Massawa to finance their occupation expenses.66  
Eric Helleiner identifies four reasons why imperial powers tried to introduce new currencies in 
their colonies. Two of these reasons have to do with the elimination of transaction costs, both 
externally (between the colonies and the homeland) and internally (domestic transaction costs). 
Further reasons include the control of macroeconomic factors allowing the control over the colony 
monetary supply, and the revenue derived from seigniorage. Finally, an important reason to introduce 
a newly issued currency for the colonies was the promotion of imperial ideology.67 Most of these 
factors can be read in the pages describing the motivations of Italian officers and scholars for the 
introduction of a new colonial monetary system in Eritrea. In fact, ever since their arrival in Massawa, 
both the need to reduce transaction costs and ideological reasons motivated the Italians to introduce 
the lire into the new territories.68 In the Italian case, there were two kinds of “transaction” cost related 
 
64  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 371. 
65  Data about commerce in this period is quite imprecise. Alamanni collected his data from the Chamber of Commerce 
of Trieste for the year 1887 – see Alamanni, La Colonia Eritrea e i Suoi Commerci, 219 and the Archivio Storico del 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), Archivio Eritrea (AE), ‘Industria e commerci 1885-1927, Relazioni 
commerciali tra Trieste e Massaua’, n.d. [probably 1887-1888].  
66  Carlo Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane (Rome: Tipografia dell’Unione Editrice, 1914), 23; 
Francesco Saverio Caroselli, ‘Politica monetaria coloniale. 1931’, in Scritti Coloniali: dalla Conferenza di Parigi alla 
guerra dell’Asse (Bologna: Cappelli Editore, 1941), 204–5. 
67  Eric Helleiner, ‘The Monetary Dimensions of Colonialism: Why Did Imperial Powers Create Currency Blocks?’, 
Geopolitics 7, no. 1 (2002): 5–30; Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical 
Perspective (2018), 163–85. 
68  Caroselli, ‘Politica Monetaria Coloniale’, 204. 
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to the presence of a multiple currency system. First, there was the budgeting problem caused by 
dealing with multiple currencies. Expenses had to be registered in lire, even if the payments were 
issued in piastres or MTT. The official exchange rate had to be periodically fixed by the General 
Commander in Massawa, but the price on the market continued to fluctuate, exposing the system to 
speculation.69 The second “transaction” cost was related to the time that elapsed between buying new 
MTTs, and the arrival of that money in the colony. Being the quotation of the MTT variable, the value 
at the moment of purchase was almost never the same as that at the moment of the issuing of the coin 
in Massawa. For example, in 1886, in a note sent by the Ministry of the Treasury to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, it was reported that, as a consequence of a sudden rise in the quotation of the MTT, 
the Ministry of the Treasury bought 60,000 MTT at the price of 4.20 lire each in Bari, while the price 
fixed in Massawa was of 4.00 lire per thaler, resulting in a loss of almost 5 per cent.70  
However, the initial idea of introducing Italian lira in the colony was discarded. The first reason 
was related to the “symbolic value” of the national currency, underlined by Eric Helleiner as one of 
the reasons that restrained colonial powers in introducing a new currency to recently occupied 
territories.71 In fact, according to Caroselli, “concerns about indigenous politics suddenly developed, 
in order not to unsettle tradition, in order not to upset local people, by imposing with our dominion a 
different money”.72 Moreover, at that time the Italians were only controlling a strip of land around 
Massawa, and it would have been difficult to introduce the lira to the interior. Finally, the Italian 
monetary system was not stable enough to allow an expansion to the colonies.73 
In 1887, another attempt was made to solve these problems, by requesting from Austria the right 
to use the dies of the MTT held at the Venice and Milan mints (former mints of the Empire). This 
would allow the rapid minting of MTT. However, Vienna refused, on the basis that the silver coin, 
bearing the effigy of an Austrian Empress, was an expression of sovereignty which could not be 
 
69  Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 22. For more information on the use of Egyptian piastres in 
payments, see chapter 2, section 3.  
70  Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), Archivio Eritrea (AE), pacco 60, 1887, 
‘Nota del Ministero del Tesoro’, 14 December 1886. 
71  Helleiner, The Making of National Money, 182. 
72  Caroselli, ‘Politica monetaria coloniale’, 204. 




After the signing of the Treaty of Wəčạle with Ethiopia, another attempt was made to build a 
colonial monetary system by introducing an Italian-minted coin. Article 4 of the Additional 
Convention of the Treaty, signed by Ras Mäkwännən of Härär and the Italian Prime Minister 
Francesco Crispi on 1 October 1889,75 declared that the  
 
[…] Emperor of Ethiopia can issue for his States a special currency with a weight and a value 
to be arranged. It will be coined in the mints of the King of Italy, and it will be legal tender in the 
Italian territories too. If the King of Italy issues a currency for his African dominions, it will be 
legal tender in all the kingdoms of the Emperor of Ethiopia.76 
 
In the wake of this agreement, the Regio decreto no. 7049 of 10 August 1890 authorised the issuing 
of a new silver coin for the colony, along with its associated divisional coins.77  The tallero eritreo 
(Eritrean thaler) was an 800 1000⁄  fine silver coin, based on the model of the MTT but with the effigy 
of the King of Italy, Umberto I, on the front and a single-headed eagle with a cross on the back, 
together with the indication of the face value in Amharic, Arabic and Latin types. Its value was not 
free to float like the MTT, but was instead fixed at 5 lire. Its divisional silver coins had values of  4 10⁄  
(2 lire), 2 10⁄  (1 lire) and 
 1
10⁄  of an Eritrean thaler (0.50 cents of a lira) and were made with 
835
1000⁄  
fine silver. Finally, the issuing of bronze 10 and 5 cent coins was envisioned but never realised. 
Instead, Italian 10 and 5 cents of a lira coins were sent in the colony.78  
 
74  Being formerly a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire, the mints of Milan and Venice still had the stamps for the casting 
of the Maria Theresa thaler; see Rossetti, Il Regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 24–25. See also ASDMAE, ASMAI 
I, posizione 36 /18, ‘Varie sulla situazione - talleri Etiopia e rivendicazioni Austria, Regio Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 
Ufficio per l’Eritrea e i Protettorati, Coniazione di talleri di Maria Teresa nel Belgio, lettera all’ambasciatore a Vienna 
Conte Costantino Nigra’, 14 June 1896. 
75  Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale, 355–57. 
76  See article 4 of the ‘Convenzione Addizionale del Trattato di Uccialli’ in Beniamino Melli, L’Eritrea dalle sue origini 
a tutto l’anno 1901: appunti cronistorici, con ... un’ appendice di note geografiche e statistiche e di cenni sul Benadir e 
sui viaggi d’esplorazione (Milan: Hoepli, 1902). 
77  Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 27; ASDMAE, AE, pacco 98, ‘Decreto Reale n. 7049 relativo 
alla coniazione della nuova moneta, 29 settembre 1890’. 
78  Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 33. 
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Between 1891 and 1896, a total of 1,979,975 Eritrean thalers were issued,79 but they made little 
impression and soon disappeared from circulation. According to most of the authors that will be 
introduced in this chapter, the principal reasons for the failure lay in the difference in silver content 
of the new thaler, compared to that of the MTT (800 1000⁄  instead of 
 835
1000⁄ ), and the official value 
fixed for the new currency. The discrepancy between the silver content of the new coin (which was 
less than that of the MTT) and its official value provoked a disaffection to the new coin. Ercole Petazzi 
acknowledged the ability of indigenous jewellers to assay the silver content of the coins; the MTTs 
were the preferred source of silver used to create jewellery, which was one of the most widespread 
ways to store value in the region.80 However, Alberto Pollera gave a more convincing explanation 
why the Eritrean thaler was rejected. According to Pollera, the difference in the content of silver 
between the two coins was not sufficient to explain the failure of the tallero eritreo. The real reason 
was in the large difference between the MTT quotation and the Eritrean thaler’s official value of 5 
lire. In fact, soon after the issuing of the new currency, the value of the MTT dropped to 2.05 lire. 
Eritreans then preferred to buy the MTT to store value, as it offered almost the same quantity of silver 
at a lower price.81 The reasoning behind assigning a 5 lire value to the new thaler was that Italy was 
part of the monetary union, where the 5 lire coin was interchangeable with the 5 franc and all the 
other coins of the union with the same nominal value.82 In more basic terms, fixing the value of the 
new thaler at 5 lire was an attempt to pave the way for the introduction of the monetary system of the 
homeland. Moreover, in that period, the MTT quotation on the market was 4.75 lire, and the Italians 
believed that the difference was going to disappear once the new coin became widespread in the 
region.83 However, as we have seen, a drop in the international price of silver brought down the 
material value of the MTT.84 This sudden drop was the consequence of a combination of various 
 
79  Direzione generale del Tesoro, Ministero delle Finanze, ‘Relazione Della R. Zecca. 25 Esercizi Finanziari Dal 1o 
luglio 1914 al 30 Giugno 1939- XVII’ (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1941), 64. 
80  Ercole Petazzi, ‘Il problema monetario dell’Eritrea’, Rivista d’Africa 1–2 (1911): 55. 
81  Alberto Pollera, La vita commerciale etiopica e la circolazione monetaria Eritrea (Tivoli: A. Chicca, 1926), 63–64. 
82  Arnaldo Mauri, Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, Istituto di Economia Aziendale dell’Università Commerciale ‘L. 
Bocconi’(Milan: Giuffrè, 1967), 139. 
83  Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 28. 
84  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 486. 
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global factors. The international price of silver had risen from 0.92 American dollars per ounce in 
1889 to 1.21 American dollars per ounce in 1890, as a consequence of the sign of the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act.85. With this Act, the United States issued notes backed by the purchase of 4,500,000 
ounces of silver per month. When the Act was repealed in 1893,86 the price of silver began its decline, 
further pushed down by the halting of the free minting of silver by the Indian mints.87 By 1898, the 
minting of new Eritrean thalers was stopped, and a portion of the coins were withdrawn from 
circulation and used to mint Italian national divisionary coins.88 While 1,500,000 lire worth of 
Eritrean thalers was held by the Treasury of the colony, 6 million lire in Eritrean thalers and its 
subdivisions were still circulating in 1914.89  
In 1894, Mənilək’s own attempt to replace the Maria Theresa thaler in Ethiopia had also failed, 
even though the new issue had the same fineness of the Maria Theresa thaler, thus confirming 
Pollera’s hypothesis about the irrelevance of this feature in the failure of the Eritrean thaler.90 His 
idea of issuing a new silver coin goes back to 1875, when he was still King of Šäwa. He ultimately 
abandoned the project, so as not to harm his relationship with the then-Emperor Yoḥannəs.91 After 
the relationship with Italy worsened as a consequence of disagreements regarding the Treaty of 
Wəčạle, Emperor Mənilək went on with his project to issue his own coin, as envisaged by the 
Additional Convention, but without any further agreement with Italy.92  
Mənilək issued the first coins in 1894, but only in limited quantities (20,000 coins in 1894, and 
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88  Giovanni Carboneri, Il tallero di Maria Teresa e la questione monetaria della Colonia Eritrea, Tipografia Nazionale 
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89  Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 32. 
90  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, 50/1, ‘Circolazione Monetaria Etiopia’ (1912). 
91  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935, 478. 
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200 in 1896), and were coined in the Paris mint after an agreement was signed by the Emperor’s 
French advisor Leon Chefneux.93  
The Mənilək dollar (called the bərr) was modelled on the MTT, only slightly heavier (28.075 
grams instead of 28.0668 grams). The front of the coin bore the effigy of the Emperor, and the back 
a representation of the Lion of Judah carrying a flag.94 The Mənilək dollar’s value was left free to 
float at par with the MTT market value. The first issue included six coins of lower denomination: 1 2⁄   
dollar, 1 4⁄  dollar and 
1




32⁄  and 
1
64⁄  dollar copper coins.
95 However, 
later on, only the silver thaler and two small denomination coins were issued: a silver 1 20⁄  of a dollar 
piece called gerš (later valued 1 16⁄  dollar) and a copper cent of a thaler called matoñña.
96 A much 
bigger issue of currency was financed by the 10 million lire received from Italy as compensation after 
the battle of ‘Adwa.97 However, even Mənilək’s dollar did not manage to supplant the MTT, 
especially in interregional commerce.  
Only its smaller denominations had some success in Ethiopia, competing with other non-metallic 
currencies such as salt bars and bullets.98 Between 1894 and 1911, 58 million MTT were minted, half 
of which probably reached Ethiopia, where only one third of a million of Mənilək’s dollars were in 
circulation.99   
Mənilək had not been the only African ruler to attempt a monetary reform in the region at that 
time. Before him, the Mahdī had attempted to impose his own currency soon after the occupation of 
Ḵh̲arṭūm in 1885, in order to assert his independence from Egypt.100 Muḥammad Aḥmad, a Nubian 
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94  Ibid. 
95  Ibid. 
96  Ibid., 482. 
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99  Ibid., 486. 
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religious scholar from the province of Dongola, had assumed the title of ‘Mahdī’, an Islamic 
messianic figure, in 1881, after he and his followers gained their first victories against the troops of 
the Egyptian administration.101 His first coins were struck by melting the coins looted during the war, 
held in the Bayt al-Māl (the Treasury) in Ḵh̲arṭūm, and consisted in a gold pound, a silver dollar coin, 
and a half dollar coin.102 Before the issuing of the new coins, the MTT was the currency used to trade 
with Ethiopia and the ports of Sawākin and Massawa, circulating side-by-side with Egyptian and 
British gold coins, the Turkish lira (locally known as the Mejīdi dollar), and other smaller-
denomination coins.103 Lacking any lower denominations for the Mahdī issue, cotton cloth called 
dammūr circulated among the population to be exchanged in smaller transactions.104 However, the 
Mahdī’s coins were never accepted at face value, notwithstanding the penalties menaced by the issuer 
on those who refused to accept them.105 After the Mahdī’s death, his officer and successor, Kh̲alīfa 
ʿAbd Allāh, issued new coins from Omdurman. His treasurers convinced him to debase the coins, in 
order to earn revenues through seigniorage.106 This proved to be detrimental, as the merchants started 
to fix the prices according to the different finesse of the coins that started circulating in the market.107 
As a consequence, the people’s trust in the mahdists’ coinage was already low when they were 
defeated in 1899, and the Egyptian pound became the legal tender.108   
In Italian Somalia, monetary reforms were slightly different from those employed in Eritrea, and 
had different outcomes. Somalia was also interested by the circulation of the MTT. However, it was 
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more influenced by the trade networks of the Indian Ocean.109 Hence, together with the MTT 
circulated the besa, a lower denomination coin originating from Zanzibar, Oman and Mombasa.110 
When the Italian government officially took control of the Benadir colony in 1905, a lower 
denomination nickel coin was introduced, with a value of 25 bese or 1 6⁄  of an MTT (150 bese = 1 
MTT). In addition, Italian cents were introduced, circulating with a value of 1 besa each.111 In 1909, 
when all the Italian occupied territories were reunited in the Italian Somalia colony, new Italian besa 
was introduced, while the MTT was left free to circulate.112  The previously circulating coins were 
withdrawn and 1, 2 and 4 bese bronze coins were issued.113 Finally, to align the Italian colony to the 
British system in force in Kenya and Uganda, the value of the besa was adjusted, and the ratio of besa 
to thaler was brought to 100 bese for 1 MTT.114 In order to further integrate the local economy into 
the Indian Ocean system, the Italians attempted to sign an agreement for the issuing of Italian rupees 
to also be accepted in British territories. When the British refused in 1910, the Italians went ahead 
and issued a 916.66 fine silver rupee of 100 bese value, with lower denominations of 1, 1 2⁄  and 
1
4⁄  
besa.115 The rupee was pegged to the pound sterling through the fixed exchange rate of the Indian 
rupee, at 15 rupee per pound. However, the 2.9 million rupees issued circulated only in the 
commercial towns frequented by Italians and Europeans, while the MTT was preferred elsewhere.116   
At the outbreak of the First World War, both Eritrea and Somalia were affected by a major lack of 
currency, due to the halting of minting, the import of MTTs into Eritrea, the minting of Somali rupees 
in Italy, and to the skyrocketing price of silver.117  
In Eritrea, the lack of MTT convinced the Italians to make another attempt in introducing a new 
silver coin in the colony. On 31 May 1918, the tallero d’Italia, a 0.835 silver coin of the same weight 
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and diameter as the MTT, was issued as a “commodity currency” with a value left free to float.118 A 
new issue of lower-denomination coins in nickel started arriving in the colony, to take the place of 
the rapidly-disappearing older divisionary silver coins.119 The issuing of the tallero d’Italia was yet 
another failure, for two reasons. First, the scarce quantity of issued coins (510,000 pieces120) could 
not respond to the high demand for silver in interregional commerce, and thus the MTT continued to 
be preferred because it was widely accepted. Second, the high demand for MTT made it appreciate 
in relation to the new tallero d’Italia coins which, containing a slightly higher quantity of silver, was 
soon demonetised and sold for its silver content.121  
In Somalia, in order to deal with the rising price of silver and the appreciation of the rupee, the 
fixed exchange rate was suspended in 1919.122 Further to this, in both Somalia and Eritrea banknotes 
were introduced during the War to address the scarcity of currency. Despite these administrative 
efforts, paper money was only marginally accepted locally and not at all in interregional commerce.123  
Similar problems affected Ethiopia, where 280,000 thalers worth of paper money were issued in 
1914, in notes of 500, 100, 10 and 5 dollars, but again the currency did not circulate widely.124 A new 
issue of metal currency was repeated by Emperor Ḫaylä Śəllase in 1932, while a 2 dollar bill was 
issued in 1933. The strength of this banknote was that it was 100% guaranteed and could be freely 
exchanged for gold. This came in light of a monetary reform designed by the Emperor’s financial 
advisor Everet Andrews Colson. This reform proposed pegging the value of the Ethiopian dollar to 
gold first and pound sterling later, when Britain left the gold standard in 1931. Finally, new dollar 
subdivisions were issued in 1933, namely 50, 25 and 10 cent coins in nickel and 5 and 1 cent coins 
in bronze. These coins, however, only ever saw widespread use in the towns.125 The period of 
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uncertainty that began with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia pushed people to convert their Ethiopian 
dollars into MTT, which were by then flooding Ethiopia in an Italian effort to destabilise the local 
economy and finance their military operations.126 In fact, after the First World War, Italy had asked 
Austria three times for the right to coin its own MTT in Italian mints. The first request was on the 
occasion of the Paris Peace Conference, the second in 1922, as a form of war compensation, and the 
third, when a monopoly was acquired in 1935, just before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.127 This 
resulted in other European powers, such as Britain and France, minting their own MTT, considering 
the exclusive rights of Austria null and void.   
Only with the foundation of Italian East Africa did the Italian lira became the only legal tender in 
the Empire.128 This was also as a consequence of the growth of trade volume with the homeland. 
However, the MTT never completely disappeared, and circulated simultaneously with the lira.129 In 
Somalia, a Somali lira was introduced in 1925.130 
I will now move on to the analysis of the studies concerned with the monetary policies that tried 
to shape the colonial monetary system.131  The analysis of these studies serves a double purpose. On 
the one hand, it helps us to understand the reasons behind the failure of Italian colonial monetary 
reforms. On the other hand, it will help to represent the complexity of the colonial monetary 
“assemblage”. This brief outline of the monetary reforms in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia has offered 
 
126  Ibid., 493–94. 
127  Caroselli, ‘Politica monetaria coloniale’, 210. 
128  See ‘Regio Decreto-legge 2 luglio 1936, n. 1371’ in Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d’Italia, no. 168 (1936). 
129  Caroselli, ‘Politica monetaria coloniale’, 224. 
130  Pallaver, ‘Da moneta straniera a moneta nazionale’, 118. 
131  There were different dynamics, outcomes and interests associated with the British- and French-controlled territories 
in the region during this period. As we have seen above, from 1899 in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Egyptian pound 
(which was pegged to the British pound) became the official currency and spread successfully in most of the territory, 
relegating the use of the MTT to the borders and to inter-regional commerce. In the Côte Française des Somalis, the 
French were only controlling Djibouti and a thin strip of land surrounding the railroad to Addis Abäba that was completed 
in 1917. Hence, French francs were only successfully imposed in the port town of Djibouti. For an overview of the 
monetary reforms in the region, see Steven Serels, ‘The Circulaton of Modern Currencies’, 141-164. The cases of 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania are beyond the scope of the present study. Moreover, the introduction of the Italian monetary 
system there followed a slightly different pattern. Before the opening of the first branch of the Banco di Roma in Tripoli 
(1907), the Turkish authorities were attempting to replace the European currencies (included the Italian lira) already 
circulating there with Turkish money. See Luigi De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma. Volume I (Roma: Banco di Roma, 
1982), p. 249. After the end of the Italo-Turkish War, the Italians started withdrawing the Ottoman lira from circulation 
(the deadline for the exchange of the Ottoman currency was extended until the 31 December 1914). As a consequence, 
according to the official sources the lira was already widely circulating when it was declared legal tender in Libya in 1922 





a glimpse of the “external connectedness” (the impact of the price of silver and of environmental or 
financial international crises) and “internal heterogeneity” (the attempt to adapt monetary policies to 
local needs and the local responses to these policies) of the different monetary systems. 132 The next 
section will further investigate on the internal differences between the various monetary problems in 
Eritrea, and yet their connectedness with widely circulating ideas and models. All these elements 
taken together contribute to the compositional nature of the colonial economic and financial system.  
 
1.3 The Italians and the monetary problem in the colony of Italian Eritrea: The early years  
Colonial publications have been widely referenced by recent studies on the Maria Theresa thaler 
and its role in the Italian colonies. Richard Pankhurst dealt with the Austrian coin in several works 
on the economic history of Eritrea and Ethiopia. He focused on its circulation together with other 
monetary forms, and its impact on the collection of tributes and wealth accumulation by Ethiopian  
chiefs.133 Arnaldo Mauri wrote about the monetary history of the Italian colonies in his works about 
the history of banking in the Horn of Africa.134 Adrian Tschoegl retraced the history of the Maria 
Theresa thaler and its diffusion, emphasising its “international” nature.135 The illuminating paper by 
Akinobu Kuroda, concerned with the role of the Maria Theresa thaler in the economy of the Southern 
Red Sea, sheds light on its “buffer” function in a multiple currency system, allowing local markets to 
connect to international markets.136  
Between the foundation of the Italian colony of Eritrea in 1890 and the first decade of the 20th 
century, discussions regarding the monetary problems of the colony were relegated to colonial 
correspondence and reports, and no specific studies about the monetary circulation of Eritrea were 
 
132  Guyer, Legacies, Logics, Logistics, 23.  
133  Pankhurst, ‘“Primitive Money” in Ethiopia’; Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia; Pankhurst, ‘The Advent of 
the Maria Theresa Dollar in Ethiopia’. Richard Pankhurst, ‘The Maria Theresa Dollar in Pre-War Ethiopia’, Journal of 
Ethiopian Studies 1, no. 1 (1963): 8–26. Richard Pankhurst, ‘The Perpetuation of the Maria Theresa Dollar and Currency 
Problems in Italian-Occupied Ethiopia 1936-1941’, Journal of Ethiopian Studies 8, no. 2 (1970): 89–117. 
134  Arnaldo Mauri and Clara Caselli, ‘Moneta e Banca in Etiopia’ (Milan: Giuffre, 1986); Mauri, ‘Eritrea’s Early Stages 
in Monetary and Banking Development’. 
135  Tschoegl, ‘Maria Theresa’s Thaler’. 
136  Akinobu Kuroda, ‘The Maria Theresa Dollar in the Early Twentieth-Century Red Sea Region: A Complementary 




During the course of designing the tallero eritreo, there were various discussions between colonial 
officers, diplomatic agents and the Italian government about the need to make the new issue 
acceptable to local merchants and traders. On 30 September 1889, the lawyer and diplomat Giacinto 
Fossati-Reyneri wrote a letter to the Chief of the Africa Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Alberto Pisani Dossi, stating that the presence of the Christian cross on the back of the coin would 
have been “unpopular” with Muslim traders in the Red Sea area.138 To support his argument, Fossati-
Reyneri gave the example of Morocco, where he had been secretary of the Italian legation from 31 
December 1878 to 27 June 1880,139 and where Spanish dollars were favoured over the Italian scudi, 
which had a cross on the back.140 However, his suggestion was not taken into account, perhaps 
because the design of the new coin had been already completed by the Italian Mint, and its imminent 
issue was already in the news. It must be mentioned that there is no recorded evidence that the 
engraved cross was the reason for the failure of the new thaler. The presence of the cross was not the 
only carefully discussed matter surrounding the issuing of the new currency. For instance, on the back 
of the Eritrean thaler and its lower denominations, the face value of the coin was also indicated in 
Amharic and Arabic. In October 1890, to assess the accuracy of the Amharic inscription on the 4 10⁄  
of a thaler denomination, the Governor of the Colony, Antonio Gandolfi, consulted Father Jean-
Baptiste Coulbeaux (a French missionary of the Congregation of the Mission) and Alex Svensson, 
(the director of the Swedish church mission). These two missionaries were considered “the most 
authoritative in the field”.141  Moreover, the scattered information about the discussions on the design 
of the coin show that the front of the Eritrean thaler was also carefully considered. In a letter sent by 
 
137  Some examples can be found in ASDMAE, Archivio Storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana I (ASMAI I) I, 22/1; 
see also the reports compiled by Ennio Quirino Alamanni, only partially published in 1891, ASDMAE, ASMAI I, 80/1. 
138  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, 22/1, ‘Circolazione monetaria 1885-1913’. Pisani-Dossi was also a renowned intellectual. A 
biographic profile of Pisani-Dossi can be found in Francesco Lioce, ‘Pisani-Dossi, Alberto Carlo’, Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani, 84 (2015), <https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/pisani-dossi-alberto-carlo_%28Dizionario-
Biografico%29/> accessed on 30 March 2021.  
139  Giacinto Fossati Reyneri, in Stati di Servizio, Annuario Diplomatico del Regno d’Italia per l’anno 1890, Minsitero 
degli Affari Esteri, 1890, p. 156. 
140  The Spanish dollars and the Italian scudi were used there because local silver coins of the same value were lacking. 
ASDMAE, ASMAI I, 22/1, ‘Circolazione monetaria 1885-1913’. 
141  ASDMAE, ASMAI 22/1, ‘Circolazione monetaria 1885-1913, Circolazione monetaria tallero di Maria Teresa 1890, 
Lettera del Governatore della Colonia al Ministero del Tesoro, 17 November 1890’.  
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the director of the Treasury, Carlo Cantoni, to the Chief of the Africa Office of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Alberto Pisani Dossi, the face of the coin was discussed. This letter indicates that Cantoni 
preferred that the Iron Crown of the Kingdom of Italy was represented on the head of the King. A 
new picture of the King had been taken for the purpose of the engraving of the coin, without the 
crown. However, the picture was considered “anything but beautiful”. Nonetheless, the director of 
the Treasury did not believe that the crown would improve the final product. Moreover, the engraver 
of the mint, Filippo Speranza, had already finished his work on the coin, and could not be considered 
responsible for the final result, as he had simply followed the instructions he was given.142 
Apparently, the engraver had to start all over again as the crown, in the end, was put on the head of 
the King (See Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Tallero Eritreo, 1890, Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com , CC BY-SA 2.5 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5 , via Wikimedia Commons, accessed  on 26 December 2020 
 
As we have seen, in this phase of the monetary history of the colony, most of the information about 
the monetary system can be found in the papers, letters, and other documents of the colonial and 
central administration. The Maria Theresa thaler was only mentioned in some publicly accessible 
 
142  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, 22/1, Circolazione monetaria 1885-1913, Circolazione Monetaria tallero di Maria Teresa, 




publications in terms of the commercial opportunities it offered in the southern Red Sea region.143 
 The most comprehensive published work on the trade of Eritrea and the southern Red Sea region 
was written by Ennio Quirino Alamanni.144 The author had been a soldier in Massawa between 1887 
and 1888, when he wrote a report about the commercial activities between Trieste and Massawa.145 
The report was the seed that would grow into his thorough work titled La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi 
commerci (1891).146 This book is a collection of data regarding commerce in Massawa, ‘Asäb, the 
Somali region, some port towns of the Red Sea, Ethiopia and Härär. Together with the data regarding 
the movement of goods and the list of those commodities that could have been most easily sold in the 
region, there was also information about weather, geographical features, endemic diseases, and local 
customs. In the report preceding his publication, Alamanni dedicated a short note to the Austrian coin. 
 
The African people have a special sympathy for this coin, but I could not say on what historical 
reasons it is based. The fact is that every year, more or less large quantities of Maria Theresa 
thalers are shipped to Africa that do not come back to Europe; they get lost over there, in the black 
continent, and are exchanged in trade by people we do not know well, or that we do not know at 
all. The senna [Sennae folium], the tortoiseshell, the mother-of-pearl, the coffee ecct. [sic], all the 
goods coming from Massaua and Abyssinia are negotiated on the basis of the thaler.147   
  
 
143  Alamanni, La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi commerci; Renato Paoli, Nella colonia Eritrea: studi e viaggi (Milan: Fratelli 
Treves, 1908); Michele Checchi, Pesi e misure in uso nella Colonia Eritrea (Rome: Manuzio, 1910). 
144  Alamanni, La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi commerci. 
145  Biographical information about Ennio Quirino Alamanni is scarce. He was named in some of Gaetano Salvemini’s 
articles in connection with a murky affair regarding some fake correspondence between Francesco Crispi, Gerhald Rohlfs 
and Manfredo Camperio, talking about some 1894-1895 Libyan issues, that Alamanni sent to editorial staff of the 
newspaper La Ragione in 1911. The following podcast includes more information about the role of Ennio Quirino 
Alamanni in this issue: WuMing 2, “Tripoli, suol del dolore. Ieri è oggi”, Biblioteca Comunale di Rastignano, 17 March 
2011, < https://www.wumingfoundation.com/giap/2011/03/tripoli-suol-del-dolore-ieri-e-oggi/ > accessed 30 March 
2021. 
146  In the foreword to his book, Alamanni states that, according to the data of the Trieste Chamber of Commerce, the 
products arriving from that harbour were Italian products, shipped as if they were Austrian. See Alamanni, La Colonia 
Eritrea e i suoi commerci, xv. 
147  ASDMAE, AE 27, ‘Industria e commerci 1885-1927, Relazioni commerciali tra Trieste e Massaua’, n.d. (probably 
1887-1888). Alamanni’s name does not appear in the report, but it is possible to attribute the report to him by comparing 
it with pages 214 to 230 in his book La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi commerci. However, here is not possible to find the note 
about the Maria Theresa thaler. See Alamanni, La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi commerci, 214–30. 
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In this note we can find all the elements which characterised later discussions about the Maria 
Theresa thaler. The reference to the “special sympathy” of African people for this coin anticipates the 
subsequent “cultural” explanations that will be adopted by other authors to justify the wide diffusion 
of the coin in the region. The thalers which “get lost over there” represent the scarce knowledge the 
Italians had of the circulation of these coins, and of the directions the thaler took in international trade. 
As will be discussed in the following pages, the studies that followed Alamanni’s report contained 
the same colonial tropes.  
In his later volume, Alamanni devoted some scattered paragraphs to the monetary problem. In the 
section of the book focusing on Massawa,148 he allocated two pages to units of measurement and 
circulating money. He did the same for Harär’,149 Sudan,150 Ethiopia,151 and the port towns of the Red 
Sea (see Table 2).152 Finally, he included a table with the conversion in lire of all the means of 
exchange and units of accounts circulating in the Red Sea region (see Table 3).153   
  
 
148  Ibid., 275. 
149  Ibid., 449. 
150  Ibid., 594. 
151  Ibid., 827. 
152  Ibid., 705. 





[KIND OF UNIT] 
DENOMINAZIONE 
[NAME] 
PAESE IN CUI SI 
USA [PLACE 
WHERE IT IS 
USED] 
VALORE [VALUE] 
Monete [Coins, money] Guerch Sulle due coste [On 
the two shores of 
the Red Sea] 
1 piastra [1 piastre] 
Id. Sale [Salt bars] Abissinia [Ethiopia] 45 a 60 -a tall. [45 to 60 
per MTT] 
Id. Tele [Cotton cloths] Litorale Abissinia 
[East shore of the 
Red Sea] 
45 a 60 -a tall [45 to 60 
per MTT] 
Id. Tabacco [Tobacco] Id. Id. 
Pesi [Weight] Kamlek Sulle due coste [On 
the two shores of 
the Red Sea] 
10 quintali [10 q] 
Id. Fanasle Id. 20 rotoli 
Id. Uakia Massaua-Suakim 32 rotoli 
Id. Rotolo Sulle due coste [On 
the two shores of 
the Red Sea] 
1 libra di 16 once [1 libre 
of 16 ounces] 
Id. Okiet Id. 1 oncia [1 ounce] 
Misure [other measures] Medda Abissinia [Ethiopia] 25 rotoli 
Id. Medana Massaua 25 oggetti della 
medesima natura [25 
objects of the same kind] 
Table 2: Units of measurement and currencies of the Red Sea. Source: Alamanni, La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi 














L. [VALUE IN LIRE IN 1887-1888] 
Tallero di Maria Theresa [MTT] 5.50 
Dollaro degli Stati Uniti (America) [US dollar] 5.50 
Rupia dell’India [Indian rupee] 2.50 
Moneta di rame, pesa dell’India [besa] 0.04166 
Quadruple d’oro di Spagna [Eight escudo coin] 82.50 
Sovrane inglesi [British sovereign] 25.00 
Pezze da 5 franchi [5 franc pieces] 5.00 
Napoleoni [Napoléon] 20.00 
Table 3: Money used on the East African coast. Source: Alamanni, Ennio Quirino Mario. La Colonia Eritrea 
e i suoi commerci. Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1891:872.155 
 
The first failed attempts to introduce a colonial monetary system provide us with an opportunity 
to analyse both the financial and economic conditions of the colony, as well as the process of 
construction of a “colonial knowledge” on the monetary systems for solving the monetary problems 
themselves. From the 1910s, different reports began to appear, analysing what we can call the “thaler 
problem”.156  
The first essay on this matter was published by the colonial officer Ercole Petazzi in 1911.157 
 
155  In this table I have again elected to report the Italian names used by Alamanni, with the English translation in brackets. 
See ibid., 872. 
156  The “thaler problem” is the translation of the title of the last of Alberto Pollera’s articles on the issue. However, the 
term “problem” appears in almost all the publications that I have analysed here: from Petazzi’s “Monetary Problem of 
Eritrea”, to Carboneri’s “Monetary Problem”. Even Amanto di Fausto’s considerations about monetary circulation in 
Eritrea, as we will see, will be included in the collection of “Problems of the Postwar Period” published by the Ministry 
of the Colony in 1918.  See Alberto Pollera, ‘Il problema del tallero’, La Rassegna Italiana 236 (1938): 65–69; Petazzi, 
‘Il problema monetario dell’Eritrea’; Carboneri, Il tallero di Maria Teresa e la questione monetaria della Colonia Eritrea; 
Amanto Di Fausto, ‘Relazione n. 13. Sistema Monetario’, in Problemi del dopoguerra. Relazione del Governo 
dell’Eritrea (Tipografia nazionale Bertero, 1918). 
157  Even on the occasion of the first Congresso Coloniale (Colonial Congress), held in Asmara in 1905, the monetary 
problem did not represent the main topic of any session. The Congress was held in Asmara from 25 September to 14 
October 1905. It was promoted during the 4th Congress of the Italian Geographical Society in 1901 and organised by 
Carlo Rossetti. About 200 people took part in the Congress, most of them being colonial officers, agents and entrepreneurs 
living in Eritrea. The only speaker to briefly address the monetary matter in his presentation was Eteocle Cagnassi: while 
advocating the opening of a bank in Eritrea, Cagnassi also debated the opportunity for a colonial bank to issue paper 
money. Eteocle Cagnassi, ‘La fondazione di un istituto di credito per l’Africa italiana e lo sviluppo economico della 
Colonia Eritrea’, in Atti del Congresso coloniale italiano in Asmara settembre-ottobre 1905, ed. Carlo Rossetti, vol. 1 
(Rome: Tipografia dell’Unione cooperativa editrice, 1906), 53. About the organisation of the first colonial congress, see: 
See Alberto Acquarone, ‘Politica estera e organizzazione del consenso nell’età giolittiana: Il Congresso dell’Asmara e la 
fondazione dell’Istituto Coloniale Italiano’, in Dopo Adua: politica e amministrazione coloniale (Rome: Ministero per i 
beni culturali e ambientali, 1989), 255–410. About the opening of a bank in Eritrea and Cagnassi’s presentation at the 




Similarly to Alamanni’s work, Petazzi’s essay on the monetary problems of Eritrea was first written 
as a colonial report, signed by “the aspiring colonial agent Ercole Petazzi” on 31 August 1911. This 
report was later transformed into an article and published in the Rivista d’Africa, with the title ‘The 
monetary problem of Eritrea’.158 The “aspiring colonial agent” was stationed in Asmara when he 
published this first comprehensive report on Eritrea’s monetary problems. Petazzi would go on to 
make a name for himself, rising through colonial ranks and becoming Vice Governor of Italian 
Somalia in 1936, and then supervisor of the personnel division of the Ministry of Italian Africa, finally 
affiliating to the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI).159 His report began with an analysis of the growth 
in the importation of the Maria Theresa thaler into Eritrea in the period from 1907 to 1910. In this 
time interval, the total value of imported thalers rose from 412,910 lire to 4,211,134 lire.160 Even 
though some figures report a growth of exports from 1907 to 1910 (4,310,000 lire to 11,135,000 lire), 
it is more probable that the impressive increase in imported thalers was related to a combination of 
factors affecting the international price of silver. Among these, the most important is the sudden 
decline of the silver price starting from 1908. This decline followed a steady upward trend between 
1905 and 1907, and led to a decline in the price of MTT, and more purchases by the colonial 
government and private companies operating in the colony. The primary reason for the rise was the 
high demand for silver from the Indian mints, due to the need for currency in responding to a higher 
volume of goods exchanged during those years.161 A subsequent slack period of Indian trade due to 
a devastating monsoon, together with the concomitant American financial crisis, lowered the demand 
for silver. By 1908, the international price of silver had fallen by 30 per cent.162 
 
158  ASDMAE, AE 169, ‘Varie 1892-1916, Petazzi Ercole, Appunti sulla questione monetaria in eritrea, 31 agosto 1911’. 
159  At the “Biblioteca Comunale ‘Giuseppina Petazzi Madiai’” in Menaggio (Como, Italy), one can consult the collection 
of private documents donated by Ercole Petazzi in 1963. These documents have not been catalogued yet, but they are 
bound to be the subject of further research. See also Chiara Giorgi, L’Africa come carriera: funzioni e funzionari del 
colonialismo italiano (Rome: Carocci, 2012), 184; Matteo Dominioni, ‘Le colonie in casa. Il fondo africanista 
“Giuseppina Petazzi Madiai” di Menaggio’, Zapruder (2005), 123–25. 
160  Petazzi reports the data found in Paoli, Nella colonia Eritrea. Starting from 1907, a one per cent fee was applied to 
the Maria Theresa thalers reaching the colony through the customs office in Massawa. See ASDMAE, ASMAI I 22/1, 
‘Regio Decreto 16 giugno 1907, Diritto di statistica dell’1% sui talleri M.T.’. 
161  Edwin W. Kemmerer, ‘The Recent Rise in the Price of Silver’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 26, no. 2 (1912): 
232–34. 
162  Ibid., 234; Leavens, Silver Money, 82. 
59 
 
Petazzi defined this period of growth as a “monetary invasion”.163 In order to highlight the 
importance of this increase, Petazzi pointed to the “considerable profit” for Austria produced by the 
minting of the coin, given the value of silver and the minting costs. Petazzi’s analysis, as well as 
Alamanni’s one, was characterised by the attention given to the geographical and commercial context 
of the colony of Italian Eritrea. As has been mentioned, in the first years of Italian occupation the aim 
of the colonial government was that of not blocking inter-regional and transnational commerce by 
forbidding the use of MTTs. For this reason, the first studies about monetary circulation in the colony 
focused also on the commercial network of the colony, and the currencies used in this network. 
Petazzi acknowledged that the monetary circulation of Eritrea was influenced by that of the markets 
with whom the Italian colony traded the most: Sudan, Egypt, Aden (and Arabian Peninsula), and 
India.164 In these markets, Petazzi noted, two important coins circulated: the MTT, and the Indian 
rupee.165 Moreover, Petazzi pointed out that of the two currencies, the MTT had the most “unstable” 
value, being a “commodity currency”.166 For this reason, he proposed the introduction of a new 
currency with a stable value, that, however, would be equal the value of its silver content. As we have 
seen, Petazzi believed that the discrepancy between the silver content and the official value of the 
tallero eritreo was the reason for its failure. In order to stabilise the value of the new currency, Petazzi 
proposed pegging it to an international trading currency, such as the pound sterling.167 In fact, the 
pound sterling was the most widespread international trading currency in those markets with an 
influence on Eritrean trade, especially Aden. His final proposal was a new currency whose official 
value had to be equal to one tenth of a pound, whose value at that time was 25.20 lire.168 It is worth 
noting that Petazzi’s proposal was based on his perception of the contemporary economic and 
financial landscape. At that time, the value of the MTT had been quite stable at around 2.50 lire, 
which was also the value of the new coin proposed by Petazzi. However, as we will see in the third 
 
163  Petazzi, ‘Il problema monetario dell’Eritrea’, 549. 
164  Ibid., 552. 
165  Ibid., 534. 
166  Ibid., 535. 
167  Ibid., 555. 
168  Ibid. 
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chapter, major global crises and the fluctuation of the silver on the market was destined to have a 
substantial effect on the value of the MTT, disrupting the relative stability of the currency’s value in 
lire. Notwithstanding the influence of Petazzi’s analysis, his proposal was not adopted, as the pegging 
of the new coin would result in too big an influence of the British markets to the Eritrean market. 
In this phase, the construction of a “colonial knowledge” about the monetary system of the colony 
was carried out by low-ranked and younger officers with no specific expertise in finance, but a 
significant ability in collecting information for their senior officers. Their duties were most probably 
completed with the ultimate aim of increasing their chances for promotion. Even though their 
suggestions would not be directly adopted for the design of new monetary policies, as we will see, 
their analyses contributed to the composition of further studies confronting the monetary problems of 
the colony. This fostered a virtual dialogue among the different scholars and officers, eventually 
inspiring new monetary policies. At the eve of the First World War, studies on the Eritrean monetary 
system would be carried out by senior officers, a sign that the issue had become more and more 
politically and economically relevant.  
 
1.4 The Maria Theresa thaler in pre-War studies 
Giovanni Carboneri, in his 1912 publication, referred to the same data regarding the Maria Theresa 
thaler “monetary invasion” that was used by Petazzi.169 Carboneri was the first “expert” to deal with 
the monetary problems of the colony, being the Secretary of the Regia commissione monetaria (the 
Royal Monetary Commission) of the Ministry of Treasury. The Regia commissione was established 
in 1904, and its role was that of researching techniques for the production of coins and banknotes and 
designing new models.170 
While praising Petazzi’s work, Carboneri believed that the monetary problems of Eritrea could not 
be solved by just focusing on the substitution of the Maria Theresa thaler. According to him, it was 
 
169  Giovanni Carboneri became departmental head in 1920. He later wrote again about currencies: see La circolazione 
monetaria dei diversi Stati, 1915. 
170  ‘Commissione monetaria’, Rivista Italiana di Numismatica (1905), 138–39. 
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necessary to bring attention to the entire regional trading system, in addition to “cultural” aspects. In 
his opinion, the colony was in a transitional phase from a “barter system” to money. The solution to 
the monetary problem was to get Eritreans used to the idea of money, and then stimulate their 
acquaintance with “the monetary devices of the great modern nations”.171 
Carboneri agreed with Petazzi in identifying the failure of the tallero eritreo in its 
disproportionally high nominal value, and in its inconvertibility to gold (or lire).172 According to 
Carboneri, this was a consequence of not having followed the suggestions provided by George de 
Laveleye during the session about the “monetary systems of the colonies” at the Institut Colonial 
International in Brussels in 1912. George de Laveleye (1847-1921) was the nephew of the economist 
Emile de Laveleye, and honorary president of the Banque de Bruxelles.173 In 1911, he compiled a 
report on the monetary problems in the European colonies for the Institut Colonial Internationale in 
Brussels, titled Le Regime monétaire dans les colonies. Later on, he was the keynote speaker at a 
conference organised on the same issue in 1912.174 As reported by Carboneri, de Laveleye’s proposal 
to adopt a colonial currency involved the introduction of a silver coin of an inferior fineness compared 
to those circulating in Europe. He opted for silver because the value of gold was considered too high 
for the colonies. The currency should have been a legal tender freely exchangeable in the colony. On 
the contrary, the Eritrean thaler was designed with a disproportionate nominal value, a fineness that 
was inferior to that of its own subdivisions, and was of poor quality. According to Carboneri, the only 
merit of the 1890 issue was to acquaint the inhabitants of the colony with the use of metal coins in 
everyday transactions. Based on the prejudice of the non-acquaintance of Africans with metal coins, 
de Laveleye suggested introducing large quantities of low-denomination coins in the “new” colonies, 
 
171  Carboneri, Il tallero di Maria Teresa e la questione monetaria della Colonia Eritrea, 6. 
172  The exchange of the tallero eritreo (and its subdivisions) was allowed only at the provincial Treasury in Naples, so 
it was impossible for a colonial subject to legally convert them into lire. See Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie 
italiane, 27. 
173  For more information about George de Laveleye, see Inst. roy. colon. Belge, Biographie Coloniale Belge, T. IV, col. 
497-499 (1955). 
174  Before their meetings, the institute’s members would commission the writing of reports on selected topics to 
specialists. The reports would then be discussed during their meetings. Wagner, ‘Private Colonialism and International 
Co-Operation in Europe, 1870-1914’, 89-90. For more information about the de Laveleye report and the outcomes of the 
conference, see Institut Colonial International, Compte Rendu de la Session tenue à Bruxelles les 29, 30 et 31 Juillet 1912. 
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in order to increase domestic transactions.175 While developing the local economies, the colonial 
monetary system should have been made closer to that of the homeland.  
During the 1912 conference, de Laveleye and the other speakers lamented the absence of Italian 
representatives. Nevertheless, the Eritrean case was the focus of a heated debate.176 Contrary to what 
Petazzi stated, de Laveleye believed that the main reason for the failure of the Eritrean thaler was the 
low quantity of new currency issued. Moreover, during the conference, de Laveleye underlined the 
political reasons that led to the Italians trying to substitute the Austrian thaler. According to de 
Laveleye, in dealing with the monetary problem in the colonies, it was necessary to distinguish 
between currencies used for inter-regional trade and locally used currencies. This assumption is well-
summarised in his reply to the request to write a book on this very theme:  
 
Je lui répondis tout simplement que c'était impossible, que la question pouvait se résumer en 
une phrase: “La monnaie coloniale par excellence, c'est la livre sterling au port d'attache et 
n'importe quoi à l'intérieur”.177 
 
In saying so, de Laveleye was stating that while a currency with a stable value was necessary for 
international commerce, any means of exchange with a limited intrinsic value would do its job in the 
colony, provided that the quantity was enough to stimulate local commerce.178 The advice given by 
de Laveleye was mostly concerned with the internal monetary circulation of “newly acquired” 
 
175  Ibid. 134. De Laveleye’s proposal is well summarised in his report in Le Regime monétaire dans les colonies (1911): 
“A côté d'une monnaie de compte internationale qui doit être le plus possible à l'abri des oscillations de valeur, une colonie 
doit posséder une monnaie spéciale ne servant qu'à l'intérieur pour faciliter les transactions journalières. Cette monnaie 
doit être appropriée aux besoins de la colonie, c'est-à-dire, dans les colonies neuves, être surtout composée de pièces du 
plus infime import et d'un métal vil. Peu importe d'ailleurs que cette monnaie intérieure soit d'un métal plus ou moins 
précieux ou d'un titre plus ou moins élevé. Il ne s'agit que d'une monnaie destinée à remplacer les moyens primitifs 
d'échange; elle sera bonne si elle est adoptée par les indigènes; elle sera utile à un autre point de vue si elle fait connaître 
l'effigie du Souverain ou l'emblème de la nation”. See de Laveleye, 1912, ‘Le Régime monétaire dans les colonies, 
Rapport Supplémentaire, in Institut Colonial International, 1912’, in Compte Rendu de la Session tenue à Bruxelles les 
29, 30 et 31 Juillet 1912, 361-363. 
176  Ibid., 176. 
177  Ibid., 130. 
178  Carlo Rossetti, whose work will be analysed below, declared that the monetary system of Italian Somalia perfectly 




colonies. On the contrary, Petazzi and Carboneri strove to find an alternative to the Maria Theresa 
thaler, whose “international” nature had been already recognised by Alamanni years before them. 
Carboneri’s publication is credited with introducing de Laveleye’s proposal and the outcomes of 
the Brussels conference to the Italian debate concerning Eritrea. His solution was a derivative of the 
one proposed by de Laveleye. He presented three ways of dealing with the monetary problem in 
Eritrea. The first envisaged the use of the lira as legal tender for international trade, with silver and 
smaller copper coins for local commerce. This solution was not feasible at the time, given the Italian 
trade imbalance toward imports and the low commercial volume of exports from Eritrea to Italy. The 
second proposed solution was the introduction of an “indigenous” currency, with a fixed exchange 
rate to the gold standard. This was basically what the Italians had attempted with the tallero eritreo, 
it being pegged to the lira which was then on the gold standard system. However, Carboneri’s 
proposal underlined the importance of issuing small coins with a very low silver content compared 
to that of the monetary unit, in order to avoid their disappearance from circulation as described by the 
Gresham law.179 The third proposed solution was a mixed system, which, according to Carboneri, 
would have been more appropriate for a colony like Eritrea, that in his words, was at “not too high” 
a cultural level.180 The solution would allow a smoother passage from the commodity money system 
to a fiat money system. In such a system, together with the circulation of the lira, its coins, and the 
subdivisions of the tallero eritreo, a new coin issued by the Italian government would have been 
introduced, with a floating rate like that of the Maria Theresa thaler. In this way, the new coin would 
have been “backed by the powerful local government”,181 while the Maria Theresa thaler was left to 
its fate. A prerequisite for the diffusion of the new coin in the Red Sea region was the opening of 
credit institutions in order to support it. However, as will be seen in chapter 3, this would only happen 
 
179  Gresham’s Law is often described with the aphorism “bad money drives out good”. This is, however, inaccurate and 
incomplete. For Gresham’s Law to come into play, it is necessary that both currencies have the same nominal value and 
that the more “precious” currency has a higher value when it is employed for other functions. According to this definition, 
it is clear that Caboneri used the term inappropriately, as he applied it to the introduction of the subdivisions of the new 
coin, hence those coins with a lower nominal value. For more information about the history of the formulation and use of 
Gresham’s Law in economic historiography, see Robert Mundell, ‘Uses and Abuses of Gresham’s Law in the History of 
Money’, Zagreb Journal of Economics 2, no. 2 (1998): 3–38. 
180  Carboneri, Il tallero di Maria Teresa e la questione monetaria della Colonia Eritrea, 24. 
181  Ibid., 27. 
64 
 
in 1913, with the opening of the first branch of the Bank of Italy in Eritrea.  
Carboneri did not agree with Petazzi’s proposal of pegging the new colonial currency to the British 
pound, it being “the currency par excellence in the markets of Aden and Zanzibar”,182 and therefore 
the common denominator of the most influential markets for the trade of the colony. According to 
Carboneri, this solution would have “dethroned a trade currency, without any political importance, 
such as the Maria Theresa thaler, to substitute it with a currency issued by a powerful nation, thus 
increasing, without any reason, its reputation in those regions”.183  
In 1914 Carlo Rossetti published his Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane. Rossetti was the 
first organiser of the Congresso Coloniale (Colonial Conference) in Asmara in 1905, and he had been 
a capitano di vascello (“naval vessel captain”) before being appointed Consular Officer in Ḵh̲arṭūm 
(1907-1911), and finally becoming director-general of the Ministry of the Colonies in 1914.184 His 
many interests ranged from legislation for African wildlife conservation and the history of Korea, to 
prestidigitation. This can be seen in his diverse publications.185 In his publication on colonial 
monetary systems, Rossetti addressed the problem by extending his analysis to all the Italian colonies. 
His book is made up of a general introduction, three sections dedicated to the four Italian colonies in 
Africa (Eritrea, Somalia, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), and an appendix with the most important laws 
and decrees regarding Italian colonial monetary policies. Rossetti noted that most of the studies 
regarding the monetary problem of Italian colonies were focussed on Eritrea. For this reason, he was 
extremely disappointed by the absence of Italian representatives at the conference of the Institut 
Colonial Internationale in 1912. Rossetti too referred to the monetary policies of the British Empire 
and the multiple systems produced by the British monetary policies, thus showing the complexity of 
the issue. According to Rossetti it was necessary to take into account some elements that were usually 
 
182  Petazzi, ‘Il problema monetario dell’Eritrea’, 555. 
183  Carboneri, Il tallero di Maria Teresa e la questione monetaria della Colonia Eritrea, 12. 
184  Giuseppe Puglisi, Chi è dell’Eritrea: dizionario biografico (Asmara: Agenzia Regina, 1952).  
185  Among the several publications by Rossetti, see especially Storia diplomatica dell’Etiopia durante il regno di Menelik 
II (1901), Lettere dalla Corea (1904), Corea e coreani (1904-1905), La conservazione della fauna indigena nei paesi 
nuovi (1911), Manuale di legislazione della Somalia italiana (1913). Rossetti is famous for being one of the initiators of 
modern stage magic in Italy with his book Magia delle carte (1935). 
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not considered by economists in the countries that he defined as belonging to the “old civilisation”.186 
Rossetti saw the reason for the failure of the tallero eritreo not only in its silver content, but also in 
not having supported the authenticity of the coin with the people of the colony, in that they did not 
have any possibility of exchange it with the lira.187 According to Rossetti, the failure of the Eritrean 
thaler did not represent an exception to the Gresham law. In fact, because the tallero eritreo, 
considered a “bad currency”, did not even manage to enter the local monetary system, the Gresham 
law framework was inappropriate in describing the outcome.   
Rossetti underlined the important function of storage of value (represented by the demonetisation 
practices) that the new coin should have, which he considered prevalent in those countries with “an 
inferior civilisation level and a rudimentary economy”.188 Like Carboneri before him, he believed 
that the only motivations in replacing the Maria Theresa thaler were political. He also believed that 
Austria would never interrupt the minting of the thalers, and therefore ceding the profits derived from 
its production. This point is interesting, as it was the scarcity of circulating thalers, due to the halting 
of minting new thalers by Austria during the First World War, that led to the need for a new solution 
for the Italian government and the issuing of the tallero d’Italia.189     
The organisation of international conferences shows the importance of the monetary problem for 
the imperial powers, and the references to these conferences that we find in Italian publications are 
an attempt to relate to a European tradition of “colonial science”, notwithstanding the Italian absence 
at the conference organised by the Institut Colonial Internationale in Brussels in 1912. The references 
to the conference held at the Institut Colonial Internationale show how the experiences of colonial 
administrators contributed to fostering new interpretative models and producing new political 
strategies once they were back in Europe. In this sense, “colonial knowledge” produced a 
“transnational web of connections”, and was in turn fed by it.190  Quite often reference models exist 
because, when they are linked to colonial experience “in the field”, they become useful for 
 
186  Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 10. 
187  See note 157. 
188  Rossetti, Il regime monetario delle colonie italiane, 14. 
189  Tschoegl, ‘Maria Theresa’s Thaler’, 448. 
190  Roque and Wagner, Engaging Colonial Knowledge, 16. 
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“imagining” a colonial project. This can be seen with the case of the British model, which is often 
referenced by the authors I cited in these paragraphs as an example of “adaptability” to different 
colonial contexts.  
At this point, the production of studies regarding the monetary issues of Eritrea were enriched by 
new elements. First of all, the concept of a “culturally” defined level of “monetary” evolution was 
introduced. The reasons why the colonial coins were not accepted, according to Carboneri, should 
not only be investigated through the analysis of the economic context. The indigenous people had to 
be “educated” to the use of currency. A second aspect that enriched the compositional representation 
of a “colonial knowledge” was the connection with an international discourse on colonial monetary 
systems, whose aim was to find ad hoc solutions to be employed in European colonies. The Eritrean 
“assemblage” became a model for the Brussels conference, and, at the same time, the ideas produced 
during the conference entered the Italian publications focussed on the theme. On the eve of the First 
World War, we can also see some of the elements that would go on to characterise later studies: more 
focus on the political aspects related to colonial currencies and the attention paid to the “cultural 
level” of a colony, together with the need to produce different policies for different “cultural levels”.   
 
1.5 The monetary problem after the War and the issuing of the tallero d’Italia  
During the First World War, European states limited the buying and selling of precious metals by 
private companies, in order to protect their gold reserves. Preservation of reserves was vital due to 
the need to be able to buy the supplies required for the war effort. This provoked the suspension of 
the mechanisms that allowed the maintenance of the necessary balance for the gold standard, which 
had been in force since the end of the 19th century. Consequently, the exchange rates started 
fluctuating.191 Even though most countries went back to the gold standard by 1927, the global 
monetary landscape was deeply changed after the war, with the British pound losing its leading role 
 
191  Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, third edition (2019), 44. 
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in the global markets.192 The lira lost 40 per cent of its value between 1914 and 1918.193  
At the end of the War, the Secretary of the Treasury Amanto Di Fausto wrote a report about the 
state of affairs of the monetary systems of the Italian colonies.194 He acknowledged the distribution 
of roles among the different circulating monetary forms in the colony, with the Maria Theresa thaler 
used in inter-regional trade, and the lira and the Eritrean thaler (with their subdivisions) almost only 
locally employed.195 At the same time, given the differences between the Italian colonies, he admitted 
that it was not possible to design a unique monetary system for all of them.196 In a few lines, Di Fausto 
clearly described the situation of the monetary circulation in the colony of Italian Eritrea. The scarcity 
of Maria Theresa thalers (together with the ban on the use of thalers in the markets) helped the 
diffusion of the lira in local markets. However, because the supply of lire coins was insufficient, 
banknotes started circulating in Eritrea, together with vouchers issued by private companies lacking 
any government authorisation.197  Di Fausto considered money as “one of the most effective tools to 
extend influence in the colonies”.198 He therefore proposed taking advantage of the need for thalers 
in the neighbouring region of Təgray in Ethiopia, to introduce a new thaler, minted by the Italian 
government. Moreover, he suggested introducing in Ethiopia the subdivisions of the lira used in 
Eritrea, so that these could facilitate the introduction of the new thaler.199  
The report by the Secretary of Treasury, Di Fausto, proves that the disruption of monetary 
circulation provoked by the First World War called for a more centralised approach to the monetary 
problems of Eritrea. During the War, Governor Giacomo De Martino had already nominated an ad 
 
192  Ibid., 41. 
193  At that time, it became impossible for Italy to support the value of the lira with its metal reserves. As a result, the 
Italian government (as with most of the European government in this period) was forced to introduce banknotes into its 
colonies, to preserve circulation and commerce. See Mauri, ‘Eritrea’s Early Stages in Monetary and Banking 
Development’; Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli, A Monetary History of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 122. 
194  Di Fausto, ‘Relazione n. 13. Sistema Monetario’. 
195  Ibid., 117. 
196  Ibid. For example, the lira was successfully introduced into Libya, as commercial exchange occurred almost 
exclusively with Italy. In Italian Somalia, a rupee (pegged to the Indian rupee) was introduced. See section 2 in this 
chapter. 
197 The use of banknotes and vouchers to compensate for the lack of circulating coins in Eritrea during and after the 
First World War will be addressed in chapter 3. See, in particular, section 3.3.2. 
198  Ibid., 119. 
199  Ibid., 121. 
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hoc commission to study MTT circulation in the colony, and proposed to the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs the issuing of a new silver coin to replace the MTT.200As we have seen in the second section, 
the new thaler was issued on 31 May 1918, and was called the tallero d’Italia. Some of the previous 
suggestions offered by the officers and scholars that published on the matter contributed to the design 
of the new monetary policy. In fact, the design of the new monetary system was explicitly inspired 
by Carboneri’s proposal. In particular, the new coin was conceived as a “commodity currency” and 
its structural qualities were almost identical to those of the MTT, that had to circulate together with 
the other fiduciary currencies in order to allow a smoother passage to a complete fiat money system.  
The decision-making process behind the design of the new thaler was complex and involved the 
participation of Professor Luigi Mariani, an archaeologist from the Sapienza University of Rome, and 
director of the archaeological services of the Ministry of the Colonies. His contribution is reported in 
the official publication introducing the new tallero d’Italia.201 According to Mariani, the previous 
attempt (the tallero eritreo) had failed because the government had not realised the commodity-
money nature of the thaler. As we saw in the first section, the tallero eritreo was conceived as a fiat 
money, with a fixed exchange rate to the Italian lira. Therefore, Professor Mariani believed that 
another “thaler” was necessary, as “in eastern countries” where a “logical setting of values” did not 
exist, the Maria Theresa thaler had all the features requested by “those people”: the “constancy of the 
model” (as it was in 1870) and high intrinsic value. These features made the thaler an “official 
money”, but a commodity money too, so as to be suitable for the “exchanges that were regulated in a 
 
200   It is worth noting that Senator Giacomo De Martino had been the governor of Italian Somalia when the Italian rupee 
was introduced in the colony, as mentioned in section 2 of this chapter. De Martino had also illustrated the monetary 
system of Italian Somalia and the consequences of its reform in a section of his official report to the Italian Parliament. 
Furthermore, his successors dedicated specific sections of his report to the Parliamentary sitting for the study of the 
monetary problems of Somalia; see for example Carlo Riveri, Relazione presentata dall’Avv. Carlo Riveri il 10 ottobre 
1921 sulla situazione generale della Somalia italiana (Rome: Sindacato Italiano Arti Grafiche, 1921), 47–50. 
Surprisingly, the first and very detailed report by Ferdinando Martini on the Italian colony of Eritrea did not deal with the 
Maria Theresa thaler at all. The monetary problems of Somalia had in any case been quite central to the Italian political 
agenda since the foundation of the colony, as the first ministerial commission for the study of its monetary system was 
constituted in 1906. See Claudio Sessa, ‘Colonialismo monetario. L’esperienza italiana in Somalia e la difficile 
transizione (1905-1950)’, PhD thesis (Università degli Studi di Genova, 1920), 83–84.   
201  Mariani, Il nuovo tallero italiano. For more on Lucio Mariani, see L. Mazzocco, ‘Mariani Lucio’ in Dizionario 
Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 70, <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/lucio-mariani_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/>, 




Mariani’s study was entirely focused on the design and styling of the coin, especially regarding the 
engravings of the new thaler. His report reflects his high level of awareness of the role of the coins in 
conveying “the dominant preoccupations of the issuing authority [and its] particular view of social 
and political relationships that obtained in the currency circulation area”. The new design, according 
to Mariani, had “to claim […] respect for [Italian] currency, [which is] the sign of [Italy’s] financial 
and moral power in the Red Sea”.203 For this reason, three options were considered for the design of 
the new coin.  
The first was to bring back an old silver thaler of the Republic of Venice used in trade with eastern 
countries, the Alvise Mocenigo’s thaler of 1768. The reason for suggesting this particular coin was 
in its resemblance to the Austrian one, and because it was “an historical coin”. This option was 
rejected because of the presence of Venetian emblems on the coin, that could jeopardise the political 
aims of the new issue.204 
 The second option was once again based on European “classical” criteria: the ancient Roman custom 
of representing the personification of the provinces of the empire on the coins.205 Here, a 
personification of Eritrea was to be engraved on the front of the coin. In addition, other elements, 
recalling the economic resources of the colony, such as “tufts of dura,206 doum palm fruits207 or other 
products, typical of the country”.208 This option was rejected because it was considered more 
“convenient” that the new coin bore the effigy of the issuing country.209 For this reason, the third 
option was chosen in the end. The tallero d’Italia was conceived to be as similar as possible to the 
MTT, but at the same time giving it an “Italian character”.210 The woman represented on the front 
was the personification of Italy. On the back the eagle was kept, but with one head instead of the two 
 
202  Mariani, Il nuovo tallero italiano, 3. 
203  Mariani, Il nuovo tallero italiano, 4. 
204  Ibid., 5. 
205  Ibid., 7. 
206  “Dura” was the name given to the Sorghum vulgare, which was the staple food in Eritrea.  
207  The seeds of the doum palm (Hyphaene thebaica) were used in the production of buttons.  
208  Mariani, Il nuovo tallero italiano, 7. 
209  Ibid., 8. 
210  Ibid., 9. 
70 
 
that were the symbol of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Italian cross, the emblem called scudo 
sabaudo, was also retained, on the grounds that the symbol was already known in Muslim countries 
and that “it would be disrespectful towards those people to attribute to them a religious superstition 
in historical and political matters”.211 Finally, on the back of the coin, the inscription «AD 
NEGOT[iorum] ERYTHR[aeorum] COMMOD[itatem] ARG[entum] SIGN[atum]» (“for the benefit 
of the trades of the Red Sea”212) underlined the new coin’s function as commodity-money, argentum 
signatum, and not fiat money.213 
 
Figure 5. Tallero d’Italia, 1918. Author’s personal collection (reproduction). 
 
The inscriptions in Amharic and Arabic, which were present on the Eritrean thaler of 1891, 
disappeared. It is quite clear that the new inscription in Latin was speaking to Europeans, and not to 
Eritreans (See Figure 5).  
The decision-making around the design of the new tallero d’Italia adds another component to the 
assemblage. Together with the persistence of the colonial trope of the primitiveness of the local 
economy (through the necessity of introducing an “old”, hence unchanging, coin, and the lack of a 
 
211  Ibid., 9. 
212  The name “Eritrea” comes from the Latin adjective “erythraeus” (Ancient Greek ᾿Ερυϑραῖος), which means “red”. 
Formerly the name referred to the Red Sea (Ancient Greek “Ερυϑραῖος πόντος” or “᾿Ερυϑρὰ ϑάλασσα”), so it is possible 
that the Italians were stating, through the inscription, that the new coin was meant to be used in the whole Red Sea region. 
See “eritrèo” in Vocabolario Online, Treccani, <https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/eritreo/>, accessed 30 March 2021. 
213  Mariani, Il nuovo tallero italiano, 12. 
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“logical setting of values”), Mariani’s presentation clearly represents an attempt to strengthen national 
identity and convey an image of superiority.214 It seems to be a payback for the Italian “mutilated 
victory” against Austria, and its double refusal, after the war, to concede the minting of the MTT to 
Italy. The appeal to Mocenigo’s thaler also appears to be an attempt to re-assert, in Mariani’s words, 
the will to acquire a new commercial supremacy in the “east”, or “at least the respect for its own [i.e. 
Italian] currency, a sign of its financial and moral power in the Red Sea”. In this sense, the issuing of 
a new currency for the colony represented a tool for strengthening national identity after the end of 
the First World War.215 Finally, as stated by Wambui Mwangi, “currency design depends on the 
issuing authority’s self-representation” and that of colonial state and colonised territory and 
subjects.216 However, the message on the new Italian thaler was addressed more to the European 
“enemies” of Italy than to the non-European “users” of the coin. In fact, the Amharic and Arabic 
inscriptions of the tallero eritreo disappeared, substituted by the engraving in Latin.  
  
 
214  Helleiner, The Making of National Money, 180. 
215  Ibid., 100. 
216  The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant: Political Imagery and the Ambiguous Art of Currency Design in Colonial 
Kenya’, Geopolitics 7, no. 1 (2002): 34. 
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1.6 The works by Alberto Pollera and the fall of the Empire 
Alberto Pollera represents an example of those “old colonials” who were able to combine 
administrative roles in the colony with research activity. Even though he had been in the colony since 
1894, his first contribution on the monetary problems of Eritrea only appeared in 1916, in the Rivista 
Coloniale.217 In his article, Pollera cited previous work by Petazzi, Carboneri and Rossetti, but 
avoided directly engaging with them, leaving the debate for “those interested in discussing the 
theories around the Eritrean monetary system developed by them”.218 Pollera’s study represents an 
exception as it did not deal with monetary policy theories but rather focused on the “ethnographic” 
aspects of the local use of the Maria Theresa thaler. In doing so, he described different ways in which 
the introduction of the MTT had an impact on units of measurement used in the markets or by 
indigenous “common law”. For example, the nefchì (which was a unit of measurement for 10 
kilograms of grain) had been equalised to 1 MTT, a horse to 30 MTT and so on, and the same 
conversions applied both in the markets and in the settlement of fines in indigenous courts.219 
Moreover, the MTT came to be used as a unit of measurement, where the rotolo became a multiple 
of the MTT.220 On these points, Pollera compared the persistence of the MTT, notwithstanding the 
Italian attempts to substitute it, to the Italian tradition of negotiating the buying and selling of 
 
217  The Rivista Coloniale was the journal of the Istituto Coloniale Italiano, and was founded in Rome in 1906. Its aim 
was the promotion of economic activities in the colonies and the organisation of Italian emigration. Carlo Rossetti was 
its first secretary. See Acquarone, ‘Politica estera e organizzazione del consenso nell’età Giolittiana: Il Congresso 
dell’Asmara e la fondazione dell’Istituto Coloniale Italiano’, 255–410. Pollera’s is the first article specifically dedicated 
to the problems of monetary circulation in the Italian colonies to appear in the journal. After this article, news and short 
essays about the “monetary problem” in Africa appeared in the issues of this journal every year. This was another sign of 
the growing interest about African monetary systems in Europe. Some articles were also focussed on the monetary 
problems of other European colonial powers. For example, in 1921 two articles were published about the currency crisis 
in British East Africa: ‘La crisi monetaria nell’Africa Orientale Britannica’, Rivista Coloniale 18, no. 4 (1921), 180; and 
‘Sistema monetario al Kenya’, Rivista Coloniale 18, no. 4 (1921), 180–181. Another insightful essay about the monetary 
system of Italian Somalia was published in this journal by Alberto Allegrini in 1925: ‘Il problema monetario della Somalia 
Italiana’, Rivista Coloniale 20, no. 2 (1925), 158–165. In the same year, an excerpt from Alberto Pollera’s La vita 
commerciale etiopica e la circolazione monetaria Eritrea (which will be analysed later in this study) was published in 
the Rivista Coloniale: ‘La circolazione monetaria nell’Eritrea e il commercio etiopico’, Rivista Coloniale 20, no. 2 (1925), 
397–414. In 1927, the issuing of the journal was interrupted and the journal L’Oltremare, took its place. See ‘Commiato’, 
Rivista Coloniale 22, no. 5 (1927), 335–337.  
218  Alberto Pollera, ‘Il tallero di Maria Teresa nella circolazione monetaria della Colonia Eritrea e problemi che ne 
derivano’, Rivista Coloniale 11, no. 9 (1916): 505. 
219  Ibid., 506. 
220  In Eritrea, the MTT as a unit of weight was called, according to colonial sources, ochia (in Amharic wäqét; 1 ochia 
≈ 28 grams = 1 MTT). The rotolo was equal to 16 ochia. See ASDMAE, AE 1037, Pesi e Misure in Eritrea 1903-1908, 
Misure varie usate sui mercati della colonia. See also table 2. 
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livestock using the obsolete scudi in the markets of Tuscany at that time.221 That is, it was Pollera’s 
opinion that it was not possible to reform the monetary system without considering the many aspects 
affected by the circulation of the MTT.222 For example, because the MTT was used by indigenous 
common law to calculate compensation payments and fees, it was impossible to simply substitute it 
with another currency without reforming the common law, and converting the value of all traditional 
fees in lire. In other words, it was impossible, according to Pollera, to change a tradition by decree. 
As confirmed by Sòrgoni, Pollera did not believe in the forced alteration of local customs.223  
The convenience of using the Maria Theresa thaler in the markets was also due to its compatibility 
with local units of measurement, such as the measures of capacity, whose conversion was simpler to 
do in thaler than in lire. In ‘Addi Wəgri, the local unit of measurement for grains equalled 2.5 litres. 
The teff (Eragrostis tef, a locally farmed grain), was then sold at two measures per MTT, which 
represents an easy conversion. If this value was to be calculated in lire, each measure should be valued 
at 1.325 lire, or 2.65 lire for two measures, which according to Pollera, represents “a difficult 
calculation for most Italian rural people, almost insurmountable for the indigenous people of the 
colony”.224 This point is particularly interesting, given the importance of problems of 
commensuration and scales in the history of African currencies, and the fact that Pollera is the only 
one to stress it in the Eritrean context.225  Another practical problem related to the local use of the 
Maria Theresa thaler was its function as a means to assay the quality and weight of metals used in 
jewellery-making, which was also, according to Pollera, a preferred way to store wealth.226 The 
familiarity of the Eritreans with the thaler protected them from frauds. Thus, Pollera suggested the 
introduction of an Italian-minted commodity-money with the same features, to allow the artisans to 
use it in jewellery-making (and in comparing weights) while avoiding the import of the Austrian 
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As we saw in the second section of this chapter, Pollera’s ethnographic attention to the local 
practices made him the only writer to see a reason for the failure of the tallero eritreo beyond its 
reduced silver content. Looking at the indigenous habit of storing value through demonetisation 
practices, Pollera described how the sudden reduction of the quotation of the MTT from 4.70 lire 
(almost equal to the tallero eritreo official value) to less than 2.50 lire allowed the new thaler to be 
used to buy almost the same amount of silver contained in a tallero eritreo at half of his price.228  
Pollera also explains the success of the subdivisions of the Eritrean thaler in the colony by the 
inclination of the indigenous people to use 1 and 2 lire coins, instead of using the value of 5 lire (1 
Eritrean thaler) in conversions. However, even the quantity of such coins in circulation was too low 
to allow the complete substitution of the Maria Theresa thaler.229  
Alberto Pollera believed, with other Italian administrators, that the circulation of the Maria Theresa 
thaler was detrimental to national prestige: the presence of a foreign coin and its quasi-legal 
acceptance in Ethiopia conveyed the message of the economic supremacy of these two nations over 
Italy.230 Nevertheless, the reason why there were so many thalers in circulation in the first place was 
the large quantity of coins introduced by the Italians during the first decades of the occupation. 
According to Pollera, the solution lay not in attempting to substitute the MTT, but rather in limiting 
it through the prohibition of its import and exercising control on the currency exchange market.231 
Every effort needed to focus on the introduction of the fixed value decimal money. The circumstances 
were then favourable, as the War had stopped the import of new thalers. Moreover, a monetary 
agreement with France and the United Kingdom, the two other European powers exercising their 
influence in the neighbouring markets, could have avoided the issuing of a new substitute of the 
thaler.232 In fact, the complete substitution of the thaler would have occurred only when its import in 
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the bordering markets was prohibited.233 In this first publication there also emerged some attention to 
the role of money as a “statement […] of sovereignty”, recalling the statements Mariani wrote in his 
report two years later. As was discussed in the previous section, in those years (colonial) money was 
becoming more of a vehicle for identity and imperial ideology, probably encouraged by the outbreak 
of the First World War and the resurgence of nationalistic sentiments.234 With Pollera, however, the 
ethnographic elements and the attention to the local consequences of the circulation of the thaler (and 
of its success) were prevalent, at least at this stage.  
A second essay by Pollera that is relevant to this analysis is titled La vita commerciale etiopica e 
la circolazione commerciale Eritrea, and was published in 1926. Pollera moved from Eritrea to 
Ethiopia in the role of a commercial agent of the Italian colonial government in 1917, first in Dessie 
and then in ‘Adwa. His essay was the first result of his studies and observations during his period in 
Ethiopia.235 The essay is a collection of notes he took while visiting Ethiopian markets. Its aim was 
to stress the importance of Ethiopian commerce for the Eritrean economy, at a moment when 
Governor Jacopo Gasparini was trying to expand the Italian economic and political influence beyond 
the colony’s borders. This essay is characterised by Pollera’s attention to the historical contingencies 
of the institutions he is describing. Even the problems related to the circulation of the thaler are 
preceded by a historical introduction about its diffusion in the region.236 Together with significant 
historical depth, his geographically broad focus also allowed him to explain the reasons and the 
consequences of the shortage of Maria Theresa thalers in the region during the First World War, and 
to formulate hypotheses about the future of monetary circulation in the region.237 The same ideas and 
proposals from his first essay are expressed in the new publication. However, the broadening of the 
geographical focus, together with the time that had passed since his last publication on the topic, 
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allowed Pollera to give an updated version of the situation of the monetary circulation in the region, 
describing the recent failure of the newly issued tallero d’Italia, the complete disappearance of the 
Eritrean thaler, and the temporary introduction of banknotes in the colony during the War.238 Pollera 
reaffirmed that “in a country with a system of payments in kind, like Ethiopia, the commodity money 
will always beat other forms of money”. However, the desired changes would arrive with time 
because “long is every ‘action’ among people whose nature is ridiculously conservative”.239 In fact, 
“in Ethiopia, where the only currency is the Maria Theresa thaler, regardless of every belief about the 
[higher] intrinsic value of the new coin, the indigenous will keep on preferring, in fact demanding, 
the old money, which they know has more purchasing power than the other in our markets”.240 With 
this publication, Pollera’s gaze had become historically and geographically wider, and took into 
account the Italian political and economic aims. It was further sustained by his recent experience as 
a commercial agent in Ethiopia.   
The final time Pollera wrote about monetary problems in the colonies was 1938, when he published 
again on the topic in another journal, the Rassegna Italiana.241 The historical context of this 
publication is completely different from that of the previous one. As we saw in the second section of 
this chapter, in 1935 Mussolini obtained the monopoly for the minting of the MTT from Austria. 
Moreover, the Italian forces had completed the invasion of Ethiopia in 1936, but without managing 
to establish firm control of the territory. The Maria Theresa thaler had been used to finance the war, 
and the problem of its unrestrained circulation came back stronger than ever, as it was now a concern 
for the entire Italian East Africa.242 Meanwhile, at the end of his career, Pollera had been appointed 
to the Government Library in Asmara. From 1937, he also worked as advisor for Governor Giuseppe 
Daodiace for the study of the political systems of Ethiopia.243 Pollera’s final article was far shorter 
than the other two analysed here, and the same historical information is summarised in the first part 
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of it. In this article, Pollera appears less involved in the collection of first-hand data and confessed 
that he did not know what the monetary plans of the government were. This was because after Italy 
had acquired the right to mint the MTT from Austria, even other European powers, such as Great 
Britain and France, had started to mint and use the MTT for their purposes.244 It can be seen in this 
article that the tropes of national prestige came back, especially with Pollera’s references to the 
ancient success of the thalers of Venice and role of Italian merchants from Trieste (which was once 
part of the Austrian Empire) in the diffusion of the Maria Theresa thaler in the Red Sea region.245 
Finally, his last proposal for a new issue of the tallero d’Italia and the gradual withdrawal of the 
Maria Theresa thaler appears surprisingly far-removed from his remarks about the impossibility of 
cancelling tradition by decree. In an optimistic (and contradictory) final remark he asked: “How 
would [the Maria Theresa thaler] persist in Italian Ethiopia, when the indigenous people realise that 
they have nothing to lose in accepting the tallero d’Italia?”.246 The several articles that Pollera 
published in the last period of his life share similar features: they are short, informative and 
educational articles in which Pollera summarised subjects that he had already extensively addressed 
in earlier work.247 This trend started after he was asked not to publish without the approval of the 
fascist regime, being a colonial officer employed by the Ministry of the Colonies.248  
The biography of Francesco Saverio Caroselli is almost the opposite of that of Alberto Pollera. 
Starting as a civil servant at the Ministry of the Colonies in 1912, he had already been chief of staff 
for Undersecretary Piero Foscari when he was sent to Tripoli for the first time in 1917. Unlike Pollera, 
he reached the highest levels of the administrative career, becoming Governor of Somalia in 1937.249 
For this reason, a top-down approach characterises his writings about the colonial monetary systems. 
Caroselli approached the colonial “monetary problem” for the first time writing about the monetary 
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system of Somalia, when he was secretary for the Governor of Somalia Carlo Riveri, in 1922. In this 
first article, he acknowledged that it was not possible to deal with the topic without taking into account 
the disruption brought by the War to the monetary system of the colony, notwithstanding the efforts 
to apply a “scientific” solution to its problems in the past.250 In another article written in 1931 in 
L’Oltremare, he concluded that the state of the monetary circulation in the colonies was not the result 
of the application of “scientific assessments or theoretical principles”, but instead dismissed it as the 
result of historical contingencies.251 However, this article already contained the seed of the 
classification of the monetary systems of the colonies that he finally systematised in a collection of 
writings he published in 1941.252 In the last year of the existence of Italian East Africa, Francesco 
Caroselli, reviewed the Italian achievements regarding monetary policies in the colonies. Caroselli 
especially emphasised the attention that the authors of the various studies and reports on the monetary 
systems of Italian east African colonies (such as Petazzi, Carboneri and Rossetti) had for the political 
aspects of the Maria Theresa thaler “problem”. According to Caroselli, the reason for the failures was 
the lack of knowledge about the development conditions of the colonies. For this purpose, he prepared 
an evolutionary ladder in the introduction of his essay. The evolutionist model was organised 
according to the “degree of evolution” of a colony monetary system, the historical past of the colony, 
and its geographical position.253 The influence of the broadly accepted racist theories of the time on 
Caroselli’s theory can be summarised in his statement that each society accepted a particular 
monetary system according to its “stage of development”. A result of this is the hasty definition of 
the Maria Theresa thaler as a “commodity money”, one step above the barter system, emphasising 
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the importance of the intrinsic value of the coin.254 According to the author, this categorisation was 
fundamental in producing any effective monetary policy in the colonies.  
In introducing his account of the history of the monetary reforms of the Italian colonies, Caroselli 
recalls and binds together the transactional costs and the ideological reasons that caused the Italians 
to attempt the substitution of the Maria Theresa thaler:  
 
For the Italian national sentiment, particularly sensitive at that time when the armed conquest 
of the country was being completed, the idea of making use of a coin bearing on the rear the 
threatening two-headed eagle was repulsing, [as it] was coined by that foreign State with whom 
we were hatefully bound because of the recent subjugation. For the (strictly bureaucratic) 
administrative traditions and the financial system that we brought from the riverbanks of the Tiber 
to the shores of the Red Sea, it could not do other than appear as heretic to record the expenses 
and manage financial statements in thalers, lacking a stable and legal value, and which was instead 
fluctuating and unstable due to the price of silver in the market.255 
 
When, on the eve of the Italian defeat in East Africa, the British started envisioning the “monetary 
problem” of the Maria Theresa thaler in the formerly Italian East Africa, the same categories once 
employed by the Italian administrators appeared in British reports. In a note penned by the British 
Secretary of the Treasury, Ernest Rowe-Dutton, we can read the same considerations made by the 
authors presented in this chapter.256 The Maria Theresa thaler had a fixed quantity of silver, and its 
value varied according to fluctuations in the price of silver. In order to economically develop Ethiopia, 
it was necessary to introduce a more stable medium of exchange. The priority consisted in finding a 
new unit of account (which Rowe-Dutton called “negus”, like the Ethiopian king, for “convenience”) 
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with “a suitable – and fixed – external link” for external transactions. The Maria Theresa thaler would 
have been used on the domestic market, free to float in terms of the new currency. As had been once 
proposed by Petazzi, Rowe-Dutton suggested pegging the value of the new currency to the pound, 
given the influence that the British currency had in regional markets. The intent of this proposal is 
perfectly summarised by Rowe-Dutton himself in a short sentence: “scrapping the anachronism of 
the [Maria Theresa thaler]”. The term “anachronism” brings to mind the Italian evolutionary models 
which dismissed the thaler as a simple “commodity money”, and hence only one step above the barter 
system. However, it would prove to be an unfitting description of the Maria Theresa thaler. The MTT 
would continue circulating in the region, sometimes as legal tender, until the 1970s. It would also 
play its part in the “silver bubble” which culminated in March 1980.257  
Recalling Stoler’s assertion that “colonial cultures were never direct translations of European 
society planted in the colonies”,258 in this chapter I sought to represent the complexity behind the 
Eritrean monetary system through the description of two compositional processes. One was the 
composition of a “colonial monetary system”, the other was the compositional construction of 
“colonial knowledge” that was necessary for Italian administrators to study this system and design a 
new one. The description of the two processes clearly shows that the “construction” of a colonial 
monetary system was not a simple imposition of a policy produced in Europe and applied in the 
colonies.  
The description of the first process was useful to show the results of the discussions that were 
presented in this chapter, their translation into policies, and the interaction of these policies with local 
and global contingencies. The description of the sequence of different monetary reforms also helps 
to shed a light on the reasons behind the failure of the various attempts at reform.  
In the second part of the chapter we saw the process of composition of a “colonial knowledge” at 
work, through the dialogue that Italian officers and scholars maintained between each other, their 
operational contexts, and broader networks of exchange of knowledge, such as the European 
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conferences about the monetary systems of the colonies. Analysing these different documents, we 
have seen how from a prevalent attention paid to the commercial networks that shaped the Eritrean 
monetary system (Alamanni and Petazzi), cultural considerations appeared with the work by 
Carboneri. The necessity of developing new tools to deal with the monetary systems of the “old 
civilization”,259 was handed down from Rossetti to Luigi Mariani, who in turn conceived the new 
coin as a “spring for political influence” with the aim to instil respect for the nation that was issuing 
it.260 The design and issuing of the tallero d’Italia materialised Carboneri’s proposal of a “mixed” 
monetary system, more suitable to the “cultural level” of the colony.261 However, it was only at the 
end of the Italian colonial empire that a systematisation of the monetary systems “ladder” was 
completed in the writings of Caroselli. Even though Pollera may have been influenced by such 
tendencies (or vaguely expressed them for political opportunity), his ethnographical attention is an 
exception. It shows that it was not possible to simply impose new institutions to guarantee the success 
of a monetary reform. His case is also interesting because his numerous publications (four of which 
were dedicated to the MTT and the monetary problems of Ethiopia and Eritrea) show how personal 
biography can represent a point of encounter of historical contingencies, personal experiences, and 
the rearrangement of previous “colonial knowledge”.
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Fighting for a “piece of bread”: Indigenous soldiers and wage 
labour in the Italian colony of Eritrea (1885-1907) 
 
2.1 Introduction: Military labour and the Eritrean ascaris 
Coins are made to be stored or exchanged by people. The monetary reforms illustrated in the 
previous chapter were not implemented in an empty space. For a coin to be accepted, it should be 
recognised as a trustable store of value, as well as a means of exchange, by the people that are meant 
to use it.1 The way people spend or save money is closely related to the regime of value that permeates 
their lives, that is the cultural and social framework in which things are assigned a specific value. The 
ascaris2 (singular “ascari”, indigenous soldiers) were the first colonial subjects to receive a wage 
from the Italian colonial government, hence they had been the first and the biggest group of people 
to be involved in the colonial monetary economy.3 Moreover, as already mentioned in the 
‘Introduction’, the Italian colonial army can be considered to be one of the most important employers 
in Eritrea at that time, as well as constituting a means for social mobility.4 The works by Alessandro 
Volterra and Tekeste Negash5 provide an indication of the extent of the enrolment of indigenous 
 
1   Natalie Swanepoel, ‘Small Change: Cowries, Coins and the Currency Transition in the Northern Territories of Colonial 
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Islam, first edition (1913-1936), ed. M. Th. Houtsma, T. W. Arnold, R. Basset and R. Hartmann. In this chapter I have 
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the singular and in the plural. For the sake of clarity, I will add an “s” for the plural (ascaris). 
3  Stefano Bellucci and Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Wage Labor and Mobility in Colonial Eritrea, 1880s to 1920s’, International 
Labor and Working-Class History 86 (2014): 89–106. 
4  Alessandro Volterra, ‘Mercenari, guerrieri, fedelissimi. Percezione delle truppe coloniali eritree’, in La conquista 
dell’Impero e le leggi razziali tra cinema e memoria, ed. Carlo Felice Casula, Giovanni Spagnoletti, and Alessandro 
Triulzi, Archivio Audiovisivo del Movimento Operaio e Democratico. Annali (Rome: Effigi, 2020), 58. 
5  Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact, Acta Universitatis 
Upsaliensis: Studia Historica Upsaliensia (Uppsala: Uppsala University; Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987), 48–51. 
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soldiers in the Italian army.6 When the Regolamento di disciplina per le truppe indigene d’Africa7 
was issued in 1893, the Italian indigenous corps8 was made up of 3,613 volunteers.9 This number 
doubled by the time of the Battle of ‘Adwa, with the establishment of four more battalions.10 It was 
reduced to 4,060 units in 1900, and again to 3,224 (four battalions) by 1902.11 Even though this 
number represents one per cent of an estimated total population of around 300,000,12 it is significant 
compared to that of the indigenous troops of much bigger colonial empires at the time. For example, 
the Nigerian regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) consisted of about 5,000 men in 
peacetime, and the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in East Africa numbered 2,440 in 1913. It was only 
during the World Wars that the colonial armies of the British and French empires reached a number 
exceeding 10,000 units.13 
These numbers also show that indigenous soldiers from African colonies have often been the 
backbone of European imperialism: from small garrisons protecting European businesses on the 
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indigenous troops. See section 2.3 in this chapter, as well as Massimo Adolfo Vitale, L’Italia in Africa: Serie storico-
militare, vol. 1 (Rome: Istituto poligrafico dello Stato, 1960), 98. 
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Angeli, 2005), 111 and note 152, p. 159. 
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La battaglia di Adua: I precedenti - La battaglia - Le conseguenze (1881-1931) (Genoa: I Dioscuri, 1988), 434–36. 
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12  In 1899, a first census reported a total of 333,000 people. A more accurate census was conducted in 1905, reporting 
274,944 people. In his presentation to the Italian Parliament, Governor Martini stressed that the data were not precise, 
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African coasts, to auxiliary troops during the Scramble for Africa, to the employment of African 
soldiers on European battlefields during the World Wars. Disease and challenging environmental 
conditions for European soldiers, together with transportation and maintenance costs, led to the 
decision to employ indigenous soldiers for the heaviest military and administrative tasks wherever 
Europeans started to lay the foundations of their overseas empires.14 With specific reference to the 
Italian colonisation of East Africa, besides diseases and the difficulties of the terrain, economic 
factors were essential in convincing the Italian government that the recruitment of indigenous soldiers 
was the best option for securing their imperial conquests.15 An ascari of the Regio Corpo Truppe 
Coloniali (RCTC)16 was paid less than an Italian soldier and, by recruiting him on the spot, the costs 
for the mobilisation of metropolitan troops were saved.17 
For this reason, focusing on the history of indigenous colonial troops is not only a matter of 
military history. Especially for Eritrea, it can be an important contribution to the history of labour. 
Moreover, as Karin Pallaver shows in her study on colonial currencies and labour relations in colonial 
Kenya, focusing on labour relations in colonial Africa can provide information about the way money 
was earned, spent and saved by African workers.18 This information can be used to clarify to what 
extent colonial governments managed to integrate their colonial subjects into colonial economies and 
financial systems, and at the same time promote the use of colonial currency. In this chapter I will 
focus on the history of indigenous colonial soldiers recruited by the Italians after their arrival in 
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of Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). For more on the economic factors leading to the 
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marzo 1902” in Angiolo Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, vol. 4 (Rome: L’Universelle, 1914), 893. 
17  See for example Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 71. Similar considerations regarding the wages of soldiers were true for 
the rank-and-file of other colonial corps as well. For example, in 1900, employing a Tiralleur sénégalais was half the cost 
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Massawa in 1885. First, I will describe the labour relations existing before Italian colonisation. I will 
then focus on how Italian authorities regulated the recruitment of indigenous soldiers, who were 
employed in the occupation of the area, and that served at the Italian defeat at ‘Adwa. Finally, the 
remainder of the chapter will focus on the ways veterans employed during the colonial occupation 
spent or saved the wealth they had accumulated during their service in the Italian army.  
In 2014, a special issue of History in Africa was dedicated to the employment of the methodology 
elaborated by the “Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations 1500–2000”19 in order 
to study labour relations in Sub-Saharan Africa.20 The aim of the issue was to stress the contribution 
of African labour history in understanding global labour history, especially because in the history of 
the continent we can observe a unique combination of labour relations. 
 In 2019, on the occasion of the centenary of the foundation of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the publication of a General Labour History of Africa made a significant addition 
to the debate.21 This book aims to move the focus to how people make and made their living beyond 
wage labour, and at the same time overcome the dichotomy between free and unfree labour, by 
looking at the history of labour in Africa as a combination of different forms of labour relations.22 As 
the volume shows, among the topics that have been overlooked by historians, is undoubtedly military 
labour.23 Joël Glasman and Michelle Moyd distinguish between “free” wage army labour and 
conscript labour of the Second World War.24 Still, as the authors underline, even where colonial 
 
19  ‘The Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations 1500–2000’ is coordinated by the International 
Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam, and aims at drafting a global inventory of types of labour relations, in 
order to analyse major shifts in the global history of labour. See <https://collab.iisg.nl/web/labourrelations/> (accessed 
31 March 2021). 
20  Karin Hofmeester, Jan Lucassen and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, ‘No Global Labor History without Africa’, History in 
Africa 41 (2014): 249–76. 
21  Stefano Bellucci and Andreas Eckert, eds., General Labour History of Africa (Boydell & Brewer, 2019), 9. On global 
labour history see, among others, Karin Hofmeester and Marcel van der Linden, Handbook the Global History of Work 
(Berlin, Boston: Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018). In that same volume, see the chapter by Bill Freund, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
63–81. For a review of the historiography of labour history in Africa, see Frederick Cooper, ‘African Labor History’, in 
Global Labour History: A State of the Art, edited by Jan Lucassen (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 91–116. 
22  Andreas Eckert, ‘Wage Labour’, in General Labour History of Africa, ed. Stefano Bellucci and Andreas Eckert 
(Boydell & Brewer, 2019), 10, 23. In the same volume see Frederick Cooper, ‘The “Labour Question” in Africa and the 
World’, 624.  
23  Glasman and Moyd, ‘Military and Police’, 333–60. 
24  Ibid., 335. 
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armies were built through voluntary enlistment, other subtle forms of coercion can be identified.25  
Even if military labour has only in part been analysed within the broader framework of labour 
history, the literature on the employment of African soldiers by European armies is quite rich.  Many 
studies offer useful insights on the social impact of colonial troops in Africa, as well as in Europe. 
The essays contained in the book Guardians of Empire deal with various topics, from gender and 
health issues to alcohol consumption and the employment of colonial soldiers in European wars. 
Edited by David Killingray and David Omissi, the book features examples from Africa, Asia and 
Latin America.26 This is the first collection on the topic to include examples from such a wide 
geographical range, even if most of the examples deal with the British Empire. In his introduction, 
Killingray emphasises that indigenous troops were not only useful to control the imperial territories, 
but also to support expansionist imperial wars elsewhere or to provide more men to fight in European 
wars.27 The employment of Indian troops like a “fire brigade” all over the British Empire, is just one 
example. In fact, after the initial expensive (and sometimes disastrous) employment of European 
troops in the first campaigns of colonial conquests, all European colonial powers resorted to the 
recruitment of less expensive indigenous soldiers.28 The chapter by Kirsten Zirkel investigates the 
German colonial troops (Schutztruppen) that have been previously overlooked by historians. Even if 
they were low in numbers (never more than 6,500), the Schutztruppen were nonetheless influential in 
German colonial policy.29 They were the most important budget item for colonial administrations,30 
and the great power of the military produced a militarisation of colonial policy.31 Eritrea remained a 
military administration for the first twelve years of Italian presence, too. This clearly resulted in a 
 
25  Ibid., 337. 
26  Killingray and Omissi, Guardians of Empire.  
27  Killingray, ‘Guardians of Empire’, 3. 
28  This was true at least until the 1930s and 1940s, when improvements in European medicine and the development of 
a transportation infrastructure made the employment of European troops in the colonies easier. See Killingray, ‘Guardians 
of Empire’, 7–8.  
29  Kirsten Zirkel, ‘Military Power in German Colonial Policy: The Schutztruppen and Their Leaders in East and South-
West Africa, 1888-1918’, in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964, ed. David 
Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 91.  
30  Ibid., 97. 
31  Ibid., 98. The burden of military expenses on local budgets and the exclusive power of the military also characterised 
the first decades of the Italian occupation of Eritrea. See for example Gian Luca Podestà, Sviluppo Industriale e 
Colonialismo. Gli Investimenti Italiani in Africa Orientale 1869-1897 (Giuffrè, 1996), 204–5, 243–44. 
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steep increase in military expenses and a limited number of investments in productive sectors. In the 
same volume, Timothy Parsons32 and David Killingray33 each employ a social history perspective 
and stress an important aspect that has largely been neglected by historians of colonial armies: the 
role of families and, in particular, of women in the life and social economy of colonial armies.34 
Parsons focuses on the family policies of the British King’s African Rifles (KAR), that, initially, were 
only lightly regulated by the colonial governments. The KAR were only “encouraged” to be “lawfully 
married”, but were free to choose any woman as their “military wife”.35 In particular, Parsons 
addresses the role of African soldiers’ children.36 As will be discussed below, Italian military 
authorities regulated the presence of soldiers’ families by creating the so-called campi-famiglia 
(“family camps”). The campi-famiglia were encampments for the ascaris where each family was 
assigned a place. The ascaris had to build a house by themselves, using materials available on-site, 
and following the model of the local hut which was defined “tucul” in Italian sources.37  
Similarly to the case study analysed by Parsons, the children of the ascaris, or diavoletti,38 grew 
up in military camps and as adults became soldiers themselves. A relevant point studied by Parsons 
(that this chapter will consider for the Italian case) is the impact of wages on social and family 
relationships in the villages from which soldiers originated. Enriched soldiers could challenge the 
power of their elders by using their resources to pay the bride-wealth price which was highly inflated 
after the Second World War.39  
 
32  Timothy Parsons, ‘All Askaris Are Family Men: Sex, Domesticity and Discipline in King’s African Rifles, 1902-
1964’, in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964, ed. David Killingray and David 
E. Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). 
33   David Killingray, ‘Gender Issues and African Colonial Armies’, in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the 
Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964, ed. David Killingray and David E Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999).  
34  Killingray, ‘Gender Issues and African Colonial Armies’, 223. 
35  Parsons, ‘All Askaris Are Family Men’, 158. 
36  Ibid., 173–74. 
37  Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, ‘From Warriors to Urban Dwellers: Ascari and the Military Factor in the Urban Development 
of Colonial Eritrea’, Cahiers d’études Africaines 175 (2004): 11. Pictures of a “tucul” can be found in Rosalia Pianavia 
Vivaldi, Tre anni in Eritrea, (Tipografia Editrice L. F. Cogliati: Milan, 1901), 34–35. 
38  Diavoletti (“little devils”) was the name Italian officers used to refer to the children of the ascaris in the campi-
famiglia. According to Pianavia Vivaldi the term comes from the translation of the Arabic word “javolet”. As suggested 
by Chelati Dirar, it is however likely that she was referring to the Arabic word “walad” (pl. awlad, boy/boys). See Pianavia 
Vivaldi, Tre anni in Eritrea, 34; Chelati Dirar, ‘From Warriors to Urban Dwellers, n. 78. 
39  Parsons, ‘All Askaris Are Family Men’, 167–68. 
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Myron Echenberg’s approach to the study of the conditions of work and life for the Tirailleurs 
sénégalais is also informed by social and labour history methodologies.40 In order to face the scarcity 
of archival sources on the personal and family lives of conscripts, Echenberg suggests reading 
between the lines to capture pieces of information regarding demography, skill levels, gender and 
family life, and wages in “an effort to understand how the African military lived”. His analysis 
encompasses all the historical phases the Tiralleurs sénégalais underwent, from their formal 
recognition in 1857 to independence, with a focus on the memories and the political role of veterans.  
The volume by Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, Khaki and Blue, offers a valuable source 
of information on British military and police forces in African colonies.41 Apart from providing some 
general information on the organisation of military forces, Clayton and Killingray provide a summary 
of British sources dealing with the everyday life of both European and African soldiers. The book, 
however, does not focus on the role of wages and pensions in shaping African soldiers’ military and 
social lives.  
The works discussed so far focus especially on the impact of recruitment and the organisation of 
colonial armies on soldiers’ lives and the societies to which they belonged.42 Another body of 
literature focuses on veterans and the impact of demobilisation, but very little is known about the  
introduction of welfare measures or subsidies in favour of demobilised soldiers in colonial sub-
Saharan Africa.43 Recent work by Carina Schmitt, however, is an exception.44 She focuses on French 
West Africa, showing how the introduction of welfare measures for veterans after War World Two 
paved the way for broader social reforms in colonial societies.  
The early history of African troops in Italian colonies bears many similarities to other colonial 
 
40  Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960.  
41  Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa (Athens, OH: 
Ohio University, 1989).  
42  See also David Killingray, ‘Repercussions of World War I in the Gold Coast’, The Journal of African History 19, no. 
1 (1978): 39–59; David Killingray, ‘Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast During the Second World War’, 
The Journal of African History 23, no. 1 (January 1982): 83–95. 
43  David Killingray, ‘Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen, and Politics in the Gold Coast, 1939–50’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 21, no. 3 (September 1983): 523–34. 
44 Carina Schmitt, ‘The Warfare–Welfare Nexus in French African Colonies in the Course of the First and Second World 
War’, Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 45, no. 2 (issue 172, 2020): 217–38. 
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armies in Africa. Initially, the Italians recruited indigenous bands of warriors (bande) as auxiliary 
troops of Italian expedition corps. Soon, however, economic and strategic advantages derived from a 
more permanent employment of indigenous soldiers led to the regularisation of those units.45 The role 
of African soldiers was predominantly that of rank and file. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were 
chosen from amongst those indigenous troops who could speak Italian.46 On the other hand, the Italian 
colonial army never saw an African officer in its ranks.47 This was also largely the case for the British 
colonies, as it was only in 1942 that the first African was appointed as officer in the British military.48 
In contrast, the French equalised the officier indigène and the officier français, with the same power 
to command lower rank French officers in battle.49 
With specific reference to Eritrea, early historians tended to treat the history of indigenous soldiers 
as only one of the many aspects of Italian colonialism.50 However, from the 1990s, studies focusing 
on the ascaris in military history,51 cultural history,52 and social history53 started to blossom and 
expand. Similarly to the studies mentioned above, these studies covered the social history of the 
ascaris and the impact of their recruitment on Eritrean society, including the impact of recruitment 
 
45  An exception is represented by the German Shutztruppen which were never officially integrated into the German 
army. See Zirkel, ‘Military Power in German Colonial Policy: The Schutztruppen and Their Leaders in East and South-
West Africa, 1888-1918’. 
46  Killingray, ‘Guardians of Empire’, 16. For the Italian case, see Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 1, 97. 
47  Even if the jus-basci rank (which was inherited from the Egyptian army) was comparable to that of a major, the Italian 
regulations worked toward complete separation of the indigenous grades from the Italian army grades, so that an 
indigenous officer could never have any authority over metropolitan troops. See Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 96.  
48  Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 160. 
49  Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, 51.  
50  Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact, Acta Universitatis 
Upsaliensis: Studia Historica Upsaliensia (Uppsala: Uppsala University; Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987). Amanuel Sahle first 
addressed the theme of the recruitment of the ascaris by the Italian colonial government and its social impact from a 
postcolonial perspective, during the Eight International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, in 1984. Even if Sahle’s brief 
overview is mainly based on published colonial sources and a few interviews, he also points at the influence that the 
enrolment in the colonial army had on Eritrean and Ethiopian oral tradition and folk songs. Amanuel Sahle, ‘A Brief 
Historical Survey of the Ethiopian Askaris (Native Colonial Soldiers)’, in Proceedings of the Eight International 
Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Volume 1, ed. Taddese Beyene (Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1988). 
51  Marco Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno: Ascari, irregolari e bande nella conquista dell’Eritrea, 1885-1911. 
52  Massimo Zaccaria, Anch’io per la tua bandiera: Il V Battaglione ascari in missione sul fronte libico (1912), 1 
(Ravenna: Giorgio Pozzi editore, 2012); Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Writing Letters from the Libyan Front’, in Themes in Modern 
African History and Culture: Festchrift Fot Tekeste Negash, edited by Lars Berge and Irma Taddia (Padua: 
libreriauniversitaria.it, 2013). 
53  Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, ‘Truppe coloniali e l’individuazione dell’African agency. Il caso degli ascari eritrei’, 41–56; 
Chelati Dirar, ‘From Warriors to Urban Dwellers’; Francesca Locatelli, ‘“Oziosi, Vagabondi e Pregiudicati”: Labor, Law, 
and Crime in Colonial Asmara, 1890-1941’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 
225–250; Alessandro Volterra, Sudditi coloniali. 
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on the urbanisation processes in the colony, the impact of the ascaris on colonial society, and their 
role in building a nationalist sentiment in Eritrea. However, none of these studies has investigated the 
impact of wage labour on ascaris’ lives, nor on the ways in which they stored their wealth. 
 Marco Scardigli reconstructs the first phases of the participation of indigenous soldiers in Italian 
campaigns for the building of a colony on the Red Sea. From the recruitment of members of the 
Egyptian garrison to the involvement of local bande and the constitution of the first indigenous 
battalions, Scardigli highlights the role of indigenous soldiers in some of the most iconic battles of 
the first decades of Italian occupation. He also discusses the political use of their military roles in 
Italian public opinion.54  
Alessandro Volterra’s work is the first systematic attempt to quantify the participation of Eritrean 
soldiers in the Italian colonial army.55 The importance of his research is enhanced by his use of 
interviews with veterans and their relatives. These interviews add complexity to the analysis, which 
he combines with archival sources from the Archivio dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito (AUSSME). 
In Volterra’s volume, light is shed on the consequences of the transition from a volunteer army to a 
conscription army—although never fully implemented in Eritrea—, the changing relationship 
between the ascaris and the colonisers after the issue of racial legislation in 1937, and the impact of 
the army on the inception of nationalistic ideals.    
Massimo Zaccaria56 has approached the history of the ascaris from the perspective of cultural 
studies, analysing the political use of the ascaris and their representations in Italy and Eritrea during 
the first years of the invasion of Libya. He focuses especially on the visit to Italy by the 5th Battalion 
of indigenous troops. They became a symbol through which Italian society built and conveyed ideas 
regarding race, gender, and the country’s colonial role. Part of Zaccaria’s research is the analysis of 
the means of self-representation used by the ascaris, such as songs, as well as the letters they were 
 
54  Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno.  
55  Volterra, Sudditi coloniali. 
56  Zaccaria, Anch’io per la tua bandiera. 
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encouraged to send back to Eritrea.57 In 2013, Zaccaria revisited the topic of ascaris’ private 
correspondence, as a way to show the diffusion of letter-writing beyond the sphere of official 
communication between local religious or political authorities and the colonial administrators.58 It is 
possible to find some examples of letters written by Eritrean ascaris—either written “by delegation” 
or by the ascaris in person—even before the Libyan expedition. As we will see later in this chapter, 
these letters provide a source of on-the-ground information regarding the impact of military labour 
on ascaris’ lives, as well as their strategies to store wealth.  
Uoldelul Chelati Dirar has studied the impact of Eritrean ascaris and their families on the colonial 
landscape, from the campi-famiglia to town planning. He shows how they were co-opted as buffer 
figures between the colonisers and the colonised. The analysis of this last aspect helps to highlight 
the role of the ascaris in the creation of a post-colonial national elite.59 Also interested in colonial 
urbanisation, Francesca Locatelli recognises the privileged position of the ascaris in the colonial 
administration, which in turn allowed the creation of an Eritrean “working class”.60 Finally, Stefano 
Bellucci and Massimo Zaccaria use a labour history approach which centres on the relationship 
between mobility and wage labour as a “fundamental aspect of the capitalist system” in colonial 
Eritrea.61 The authors state that the Italian colonial regime contributed to the spread of free wage 
labour in the colony, especially through the recruitment of soldiers. The voids left by Eritrean youths 
enrolling for the Italian campaign in Libya was, according to the authors, the primary factor that 
boosted labour migration (for both military and non-military jobs) from neighbouring areas. As the 
authors state “directly or indirectly the […] Eritrean colony […] played an important part in the 
transformation of labor relations in the Horn of Africa, through the introduction of wage labor”. 
However, as I will argue in this chapter, the transition to a wage labour system was slow and non-
 
57  Italian officers believed in the power of persuasion that the letters sent by ascaris in Libya could have on new potential 
recruits in Eritrea. See Zaccaria, Anch’io per La Tua Bandiera, 175–78. 
58  Zaccaria, ‘Writing Letters from the Libyan Front’, 218. 
59  Chelati Dirar, ‘From Warriors to Urban Dwellers’. Chelati Dirar is also the author of an overview of the 
historiography and the available sources for the study of the Eritrean ascaris; see Dirar, ‘Truppe coloniali e 
l’individuazione dell’African agency. Il caso degli ascari eritrei’. 
60  Locatelli, ‘ Oziosi, Vagabondi e Pregiudicati’. 




In this chapter, I will analyse the early history of military labour in Eritrea as the unfolding of 
“complex and shifting patterns of intersection”,62 without implying any teleological process towards 
the establishment of wage labour as the primary form of labour relations in the colony. To do so, I 
will first illustrate how labour relations in the region were configured before the arrival of the Italians. 
Then, I will introduce the policies that the Italians implemented to promote the creation and growth 
of their indigenous colonial troops, focusing on the ideas and prejudices that drove the issuing of the 
first forms of “social policies” for their indigenous troops. Finally, I will look at how a group of 
veterans of the First Italo-Ethiopian war used their wages, with special attention paid to the modalities 
and motivations for storing value.  
The aim of this chapter is to throw further light on the impact of wage labour in the Italian colony 
of Eritrea. The analysis will contribute to the general aims of this dissertation by showing that the 
increase of enrolments in the colonial army during the First Italo-Ethiopian war was not enough to 
produce a swift “monetary revolution” in Eritrea. Some veterans were able to take advantage of the 
colonial labour relations and adapt wages and subsidies to their regimes of value.  
The aim of this chapter is to throw further light on the impact of wage labour in the Italian colony 
of Eritrea. The analysis will contribute to the general aims of this dissertation by showing that the 
increase of enrolments in the colonial army during the First Italo-Ethiopian war was not enough to 
produce a swift “monetary revolution” in Eritrea. Some veterans were able to take advantage of the 
colonial labour relations and adapt wages and subsidies to their regimes of value.  
To highlight the complexity of the labour relations at work in the region, I will now describe the 
general labour context prior to the arrival of the Italians and the introduction of military wage labour, 
both on the coast and in the broader Ethiopian inland. On the coast, the nāʾib’s (local deputy of the 
Ottoman government) ruling families, working for the Ottomans, had set up a web of marriage 
alliances with the households of military commanders. The soldiers were bound to their commanders 
 
62  Frederick Cooper, ‘From Enslavement to Precarity?’, in The Political Economy of Everyday Life in Africa: Beyond 
the Margins, ed. Wale Adebanwi (Boydell & Brewer, 2017), 141. 
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through a tributary labour relation, and lived on the leftovers of the tributes collected by the nāʾib. 
On the highlands, the work of the soldier was deeply connected to the rases (singular ras; Ethiopian 
local rulers) and their ability to redistribute land and resources. In both cases, each kind of labour 
relation would change into the other according to environmental and political contingencies, and the 
boundaries between tributary and commodified labour were always blurred. In this context, the 
Italians soon realised they had to deal with cultural differences, also represented by the multiple use 
of different currencies for the payment of services and commodities. In their attempt to control the 
newly acquired territories without putting too much burden on the budget, they started to use the 
services of locally recruited soldiers, as well as those of local chiefs and their militias. In order to 
satisfy the needs of colonial expansion and to coordinate a growing number of recruits, they sought 
to integrate the indigenous soldiers into a bureaucratised military unit. At this stage, plans were not 
yet drawn for the financial colonisation of the Eritreans so as to force them into the colonisers’ 
economic system. The aim of the commanders was to attract more recruits through the provision of 
a salary, a uniform, and a gun. The promotion of national prestige also depended on the ability of the 
colonial government to guarantee a “respectable” life to the veterans. Once back in their villages, 
their high standard of living, together with their prestige as former warriors, would have attracted 
more youths for enrolment. Thus, some subsidies for certain categories of discharged soldiers were 
introduced. The intense discussions regarding these policies reveal the coexistence of two different 
prejudices regarding the ascaris: first, of their “laziness”, and second, of their inability to “put aside”, 
i.e. to save money. The events described in this chapter will show that, when a deadly series of 
calamities hit the region, the youths showed adaptability and saw in the colonial army an opportunity 
to escape starvation and to provide support to their families. 
The introduction of a waged military labour system was not only a consequence of Italian 
colonialism. It was also the slow and non-linear outcome of environmental and political 
circumstances, new opportunities, and individual strategies. In the last paragraph of the chapter, 
through the analysis of the correspondence between the ascaris and the colonial administration, we 
will see how some of the veterans chose not to bind themselves to government allowances, capitalised 
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their pensions, and invested them in farming and livestock. The letters I used to explore this topic are 
held at the Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri in Rome (the Historical Archive of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or ASDMAE), and can be found in the Archivio Eritrea. The importance 
of these documents is amplified by the scarcity of ego-documents for the history of African military 
labour. Moreover, they are particularly interesting as they tell us more about the later life of those 
ascaris who were captured and mutilated after the battle of ‘Adwa. In deciding to use these 
documents, I followed the suggestion of Irma Taddia, who was the first to draw attention to the 
existence of a substantial, even if scattered, private correspondence in Italian colonial archives.63 This 
correspondence allows “many insights into colonised people and their life […] that would be very 
difficult, and indeed impossible, to find in other available sources”.64  
Other sources used in this chapter include published colonial reports, official bulletins, Italian 
newspapers, and the war diaries of Italian veterans of the First Italo-Ethiopian War. 
   
  
 
63  Irma Taddia, ‘Ethiopian Source Material and Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century: The Letter to Menilek (1899) 
by Blatta Gäbrä Egzi’abehēr’, The Journal of African History 35, no. 3 (1994): 493–516; Irma Taddia, ‘Correspondence 
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among Eritreans in producing a more complex narrative of the relationship between colonisers and colonial subjects. 
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members of an educated elite. Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, ‘Writing WWI with African Gazes: The Great War through the 
Writing of Tigrinya-Speaking Expatriates’, in The First World War from Tripoli to Addis Ababa (1911-1924), ed. 
Shiferaw Bekele, Uoldelul Chelati Dirar and Alessandro Volterra (Addis Ababa: Centre français des études éthiopiennes, 
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2.2 Forms of military labour before the establishment of the Italian Colony of Eritrea   
In the Italian Colony of Eritrea, the ascaris can be considered to be amongst the first colonial 
subjects to receive a wage from the Italian government. Nevertheless, for some of them, this was not 
their first job experience as soldiers in the service of a foreign power. 
In February 1885, when for the first time a consistent number of Italian troops disembarked in 
Massawa, the Egyptians were still governing the port town. At the time, Massawa was the endpoint 
of the caravan routes connecting Kassala and the Ethiopian highlands to the sea.65  
The khedive had administered Massawa since 1865. However, since 1813 the Egyptians had 
alternated with the Turks in controlling the port town, exercising power through an indirect rule 
system.66 Before that, Özdemir Pas̲h̲a had conquered Massawa and Hirgigo, making them sand̲j̲aḳs 
(districts) of the Ottoman Ḥabes̲h̲ province together with Sawākin in 1557. About a century later, in 
the framework of a general decentralisation of the Ottoman power, the members of the Bäläw family 
were appointed by the Ottomans as their nāʾibs.67  Since at least the conquest by the Ottomans in the 
mid-sixteenth century, Massawa represented the most important commercial hub in the region. It 
facilitated exchange between the Ethiopian highlands, the Red Sea region, and beyond. For this 
reason, the role of the nāʾib was that of keeping security along the caravan routes. He was also in 
charge of the collection of fees and taxes from the groups occupying the area under his control, and 
from the merchants passing by the market towns along the caravan roads.68  
In order to exercise their role, and after the bulk of the Turkish army left Massawa in the late 
sixteenth century,69 the nāʾibs relied on a combination of semi-regular and irregular troops. The 
 
65  The events preceding and surrounding the Italian occupation of Massawa are narrated in the comprehensive account 
of Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale: dall’unità alla marcia su Roma (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1992), 147–
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66  Miran, Red Sea Citizens 53–63. 
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1640-1945 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 66. 
68  Miran, ‘Power Without Pashas’, 42; Miran, Red Sea Citizens, 48–51.  
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commanders of these troops were all somehow related to the Bäläw family. Limited information about 
the original organisation of the nāʾib’s troops comes from Teobaldo Folchi70 and Dante Odorizzi.71 
According to their reports, the semi-regular force was a “Turkish” one, commanded by the sirdār 
(supreme commander), a close relative of the nāʾib, and was made up by men coming from the 
different corners of the Ottoman Empire (especially Albanians and Bosniaks). Indigenous men or 
immigrants from the Red Sea region made up the other force called ‘askar, commanded by the kahya 
(quartermaster, Chechia in Folchi72). The roles of commander of both forces were hereditary, thus 
creating a military class comprised of important martial families that had developed from the 
marriages of soldiers and local women.73 According to Odorizzi,74 in order to maintain the ‘askar 
unit during the Ottoman rule, Nāʾib Idris ’Uthman (1801-1831) received a monthly stipend of 1005 
Maria Theresa thalers (MTT) from the custom administration in Massawa. In exchange, he was to 
guarantee the safety of the commercial routes toward the port town. At the same time, by controlling 
the commercial routes, the nāʾib was able to impose fees on the caravans and the travellers arriving 
and departing from Massawa. While a portion of these tributes were handed over to the custom 
administration of Massawa, the bulk was divided amongst the different branches of the Bäläw 
family.75 As long as the nāʾib managed to control larger portions of territory, the tributes were 
consistent and represented the main source of revenue for the payment of the troops. However, 
 
70  Teobaldo Folchi arrived in Massawa in 1887, when he was 40 years old, and took part in some of the most important 
battles of the First Italo-Ethiopian War. In 1898 he was appointed by Governor Ferdinando Martini for the institution of 
the administrative region of Massawa. It was in that role that he collected this information. For more information on 
Teobaldo Folchi, see the introduction to the report by Massimo Zaccaria, Le note del commissario Teobaldo Folchi e i 
cenni storico amministrativi sul commissariato di Massaua (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2009), 10–17, 36.  
71  Dantre Odorizzi arrived in Eritrea as a lieutenant in 1893. During his career he occupied different administrative and 
diplomatic roles and produced several studies about Eritrea and the southern Red Sea region. See Giuseppe Puglisi, Chi 
è dell’Eritrea: Dizionario Biografico (Asmara: Agenzia Regina, 1952), 222; Dante Odorizzi, Il Commissariato regionale 
di Massaua al 1o gennaio 1910 (Asmara: Tip. Fioretti e Beltrami, 1911).  
72  Zaccaria, Le note del commissario Teobaldo Folchi e i cenni storico amministrativi sul commissariato di Massaua, 
136. 
73  Miran, ‘Power Without Pashas’, 45; Miran, Red Sea Citizens, 44. 
74  Odorizzi, Il Commissariato regionale di Massaua al 1o gennaio 1910, 141. Different sources report different amounts. 
Captain Boeri wrote that the sum was 1200 MTT. See the Nakfa Documents, Document 81, ‘Il Capitano Boeri al 
Governatore della Colonia Eritrea’, 11 March 1891 in Anthony D’Avray and Richard Pankhurst, The Nakfa Documents: 
The Despatches, Memoranda, Reports, and Correspondence Describing and Explaining the Stories of the Feudal 
Societies of the Red Sea Littoral from the Christian-Muslim Wars of the Sixteenth Century to the Establishment 1885-
1901 of the Italian Colony of Eritrea (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), 275.  
75 Odorizzi, Il Commissariato regionale di Massaua al 1o gennaio 1910, 141.  
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Viscount Valentia, in his Voyages, reports that the sum needed for the maintenance of the Nāʾib 
Idris’s troops (‘Edris’ in the Voyages) was 1,500 MTT per month, a sum that the nāʾib could hardly 
raise through the collection of duties.76 Moreover, it would have been very difficult for the nāʾib to 
cut down on his troops as the sirdār himself was his brother, and there were marriage relations 
between his family and his commanders.77 
In 1827 the Ottomans terminated the direct financing of the nāʾib militia. This was one of the first 
actions that would lead to the demise of the nāʾib’s power, and the deployment of a more direct form 
of Ottoman rule in Massawa, with the employment of Ottoman troops for the occupation of the town. 
By 1853, the Ottoman Empire severed all official ties with the nāʾib, who became no more than a 
waged government official employed in the collection of tributes. When the Egyptians received the 
mandate from the Porte to rule Massawa in 1865, they started to impose tributes through pastoralist 
leaders. They then ceased to rely on the nāʾib military services.78 In fact, on the arrival of the Italians 
in February 1885, the Egyptians controlled about 1,000 bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ beside their regular soldiers.79 
The Turkish term ‘bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ’ first began to be used for civilian volunteers participating in the 
Crimean War. These formed irregular corps of soldiers coming from every corner of the Empire, and 
their violence and lack of discipline contributed to spreading their name with its meaning of “one 
whose head is turned”, or “scatterbrained heads”.80 In a letter written to the Ministry of War two 
months after the occupation of Massawa, General Tancredi Saletta, Commander of the Italian 
expedition corps, wrote that most of the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ were recruited from “the lowest classes of the 
 
76  George Valentia, Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, the Red Sea, Byssinia, and Egypt in the Years 1802, 1803, 
1804, 1805 and 1806, vol. 2 (London: W. Miller, 1809), 250. 
77  Valentia, Voyages and Travels, 2:54.  
78  Serels, Impoverishment of the African Red Sea Littoral, 66–67; The Nakfa Documents, Document 275, ‘Il Capitano 
Boari al Governatore della Colonia Eritrea’, 11 March 1891. 
79  Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Memoria sull’ordinamento politico-amministrativo e sulle condizioni economiche di 
Massaua: presentata alla Camera dei deputati dal Ministro degli Affari Esteri (di Robilant) nella tornata del 30 giugno 
1886 (Rome: Tip. della Camera dei deputati, 1886), 20.  
80  Clément Huart, ‘Bās̲h̲i-Bozūḳ’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition (1913-1936), 24 April 2012; Chelati Dirar, 
‘From Warriors to Urban Dwellers’, 175. According to other interpretations, the term means “leaderless”; see Harold 
Bowen, ‘Bas̲h̲i̊-Bozuḳ’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. 
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population, especially those who exercise the job of porter and the layabouts (oziosi)”.81 Most of them 
came from Sudan and the Red Sea coast, but there were also some who originated from the Ethiopic 
inland.   
In the interior highlands, where the influence of the Ethiopian Empire was stronger, the job of the 
soldier was strongly linked to the possession of land. The main features of the land-property system 
of Ethiopia were very similar to those of the area defined as Märäb Məllaš (beyond the [river] Märäb), 
which is the plateau area in the north of Ethiopia that became part of the Italian Colony of Eritrea in 
1890.82  
In Ethiopia, the organisation of the army depended on the local warrior class receiving gwǝlt – a 
grant of land from the ras or other dignitaries – in exchange for their services. Living on military land 
defined the status of a soldier as such, and the power of the commanders depended on their ability to 
allot land for military purposes. The role of the warriors was to organise the defence of the land 
against the dina (that is, “an enemy with whom blood money could not be exchanged”83). But, more 
often than not, their role was limited to the collection of tributes (gəbər) and labour from the farmers 
working the land they had been allotted.84 In fact, attached to the gwǝlt the officers could acquire a 
certain number of gäbbar (people working on the gwǝlt land and paying a gəbər). These people were 
not required to take part in campaigns, but they had to provide supplies and labour.85 
The soldiers to whom the lands were allotted would in turn recruit aškär (political or military 
followers), thus increasing their prestige. The land, together with their title and rank in the army, were 
 
81  Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito (AUSSME), rep. L7, cart. 88, ‘Lettera del col. Saletta 
al Ministero della Guerra (Segretariato Generale), Massaua, 8 aprile 1885’, as reported by Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno, 
14. According to Locatelli, the word “oziosi” is among the most frequently recurring labels for criminals in Italian colonial 
court records. See Locatelli, ‘Oziosi, Vagabondi e Pregiudicati’, 225. 
82   Irma Taddia, ‘Land Politics in the Ethiopian-Eritrean Border Area between Emperor Yohannes IV and Menilek II’, 
Aethiopica 12 (2009): 59; R. Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935 (Addis Ababa: Haile Sellassie 
University Press, 1968), 135–83; Alberto Pollera, Il regime della proprietà terriera in Etiopia e nella Colonia Eritrea 
(Rome: Tipografia nazionale Bertero, 1913). For a study of customary law and land property in Eritrea, see Irma Taddia, 
L’Eritrea-colonia, 1890-1952: Paesaggi, strutture, uomini del colonialismo (F. Angeli, 1986).  
83  The term “dina” was used for indicating the foreigners with whom the consuetudinary law of setting a price as a 
compensation for spilt blood could not be applied. Tsehai Berhane Selassie, Ethiopian Warriorhood: Defence, Land and 
Society 1800-1941, (Rochester, NY: James Currey, 2018), 8-26. 
84  Richard A. Caulk, ‘Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935’, The International Journal 
of African Historical Studies 11, no. 3 (1978): 457.  
85  Ibid., 469. 
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sometimes inherited by their sons, so that the granted land was almost indistinguishable from a rəst 
(a plot of land inherited within the family).86 Thus, the control of land was connected to the acquisition 
of military and political power, through the distribution of land grants.  
During military campaigns, the burden of the soldiers’ requests on local farmers was even heavier, 
as the troops were allowed to request tributes or even pillage the farmers along the route in order to 
acquire the necessary provisions.87 For this reason, numerous witnesses reported by Pankhurst 
affirmed that the Emperor’s troops were recruited from amongst the “worst of the people”.88 It is easy 
to see how choosing the military career could have been not only a way to climb the social ladder, 
but also a way to escape plundering by other warriors.89  
This system allowed the “externalisation” of the maintenance of the troops instead of relying 
directly on “state” resources. As the allotment of land to the military did sometimes produce unrest 
among the farmers,90 a reform of the army was attempted during the reign of Tewdros II (1855-
1868).91 The aim was to organise a “modern” waged army, maintained by the government. However, 
salaries could not be paid in currency (such as the Maria Theresa thaler), because there was not 
enough in circulation to collect a monetary tax from the population and finance the wages of the 
soldiers. At that time, the collection of a tithe was in place, and during the reign of Mənilək II (1889-
1913), a system of public storehouses was implemented for the collection of taxes in kind and the 
maintenance of the troops.92  
Most of the soldiers received a monthly supply of grain and an annual payment of silver thalers 
and, in times of peace, could survive thanks to the redistribution of the wealth of their commanders.93 
Writing in 1913, the then-Major Alfonso Maria Tancredi reported that the annual salary was 5 MTT, 
 
86  Ibid., 468; Selassie, Ethiopian Warriorhood. 
87  Caulk, ‘Armies as Predators’, 463.  
88  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 80.  
89  Caulk, ‘Armies as Predators’, 466. 
90  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 564, 577. 
91  Caulk, ‘Armies as Predators’, 463; Richard Pankhurst, ‘The Advent of the Maria Theresa Dollar in Ethiopia, Its Effect 
on Taxation and Wealth Accumulation and Other Economic, Political and Cultural Implications.’, Northeast African 
Studies 1, no. 3 (1979): 36; Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 566. 
92  Caulk, ‘Armies as Predators’, 467. 
93  Ibid., 469, 478; Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 571. 
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while the troops were still allowed to keep the war spoils, one-tenth of which was claimed by their 
Commander94.   
In this section we had a glimpse at the general features of military labour in the region before the 
occupation of Massawa by the Italians. This broad description shows the widespread presence of 
some forms of tributary labour relation before the Italian occupation.95 Even when the soldiers 
received cash, land, or commodities from their commanders, the unsteadiness and the precariousness 
of their payment did not produce a wage labour system. In the Ethiopian case, a good reason to be a 
soldier was to avoid plundering by other warriors, thus using work to pay the tribute due to the ras 
and the army. 
  
2.3 The regularisation of indigenous soldiers under Italian colonialism: From multiple-
currency wages to the introduction of subsidies    
The Egyptian irregular troops (bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ) were organised in squads (bulūk) made of 24 men 
each, led by a bulūk-bas̲h̲i̊. A company was made up of four bulūk (100 people) and was commanded 
by a jus-bas̲h̲i̊. A bim-bas̲h̲i̊ was the head of two or more companies, and a sanjac was the head of 
the troops overall.96 On 2 December 1885, the administration of Massawa was officially transferred 
to Italian hands, and the approximately 200 Egyptian regular troops prepared to leave. Almost all of 
the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ (about 1,000 people) decided to offer their labour to the Italians.97 After initial 
resistance by Italian commanders, who considered it disgraceful to recruit indigenous or non-Italian 
 
94  Alfonso Maria Tancredi, Notizie e Studi Sulla Colonia Eritrea (Rome: Casa Editrice Italiana, 1913), 75. From April 
to July 1908, Tancredi organised and took part in an expedition to Lake Tana, patronised by the Società Geografica 
Italiana (Italian Geographical Society). This information was collected on that occasion. See the entry “Tancredi, Maria 
Alfonso” in Francesco Surdich, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 94 (2019), 
<https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alfonso-mario-tancredi_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/>, accessed 31 March 
2021. 
95  According to the taxonomy prepared by ‘The Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations 1500–2000’, 
the tributary labourers are defined as “Persons who are obliged to work for the polity (often the state, though it could also 
be a feudal or religious authority). Their labour is not commodified but belongs to the polity”. See Karin Hofmeester et 
al., ‘The Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations, 1500-2000: Background, Set-Up, Taxonomy, and 
Applications’, 26 October 2015, <https://collab.iisg.nl/web/labourrelations/> , accessed 31 March 2021. 
96  Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Memoria sull’ordinamento politico-amministrativo e sulle condizioni economiche di 
Massaua, 20.  
97  Ibid., 21. 
102 
 
soldiers, more practical reasons caused the Italians to change their minds. The first consideration was 
that, with the Egyptians leaving Massawa, the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ would have been free to roam on the 
territory now controlled by the Italians. The best way to control the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ was to hire them. 
Moreover, the Egyptian irregular troops were cheaper to maintain than Italian soldiers and more 
experienced with regard to the difficult operational environment of Massawa and its surroundings.98 
For these reasons, three months after the arrival of the Italians in Massawa, the first 100 bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ, 
after passing medical and psycho-aptitude tests, were recruited. The first 100 new recruits were 
supplied with 100 Remington rifles bought from the Egyptians. Both the organisation and the names 
of the divisions of the Egyptian irregular troops remained the same under the Italians. Finally, the 
irregulars were divided in an internal horde (orda interna) with police tasks, and in an external horde 
(orda esterna), for proper military purposes.99  
From December 1885, with the acquisition of the bulk of the Egyptian irregular troops, the Italians 
had to officially deal with the multiple-currency system found in Massawa.100 The wages of the bas̲h̲i̊-
bozuḳ were previously expressed and paid in Egyptian piastres. A decree issued on 13 May 1886 
fixed the value of the Egyptian piastres in relation to the Italian lira (see Table 4). 
 
Silver piastre 0.25 lire 
Copper piastre 0.03 lire 
20- copper para piece 0.015 lire 
10- copper para piece 0.075 lire 
Table 4. Piastre-to-lira exchange rate, 13 May 1886. Source: ASDMAE, AE, pacco 31, Varie amministrative 




98  Later on, the economic argument became the most important factor in the decision to continue the recruiting of 
indigenous soldiers. See Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno, 10, 16.  
99  Ibid., 22. 
100  See chapter 1.  
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The bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ continued to be paid in piastres, still circulating in Massawa, but their wages were 
now adjusted according to the new decree.101 In virtue of this adjustment, the monthly salary of a 
bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ was 150 piastres, while the sanjak earned 1,170 piastres each month.102 Table 5 shows 
further details of salary rates for the irregular troops.  
 
Rank Piastres Lire 
Sanjak (Supreme Chief) 1,170 292.50 
Bim-basci (Vice-Sanjak) 1,000 250.00 
Jus-basci (Chief Of 100) 500 125.00 
Bluk-basci [Sic] (Chief Of 24) 300 75.00 
Basci buzuk 150 37.50 
Scribe 200 50.00 
Table 5. Monthly allowances of the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ, September 1886. Source: AE, pacco 32, Varie 1886. ‘Paghe 
che percepiscono i basci-buzuk al mese’. 
 
However, in a letter to the Civil Commissioner in ‘Asäb, General Carlo Genè suggested that the 
value of the wages rather be expressed in Maria Theresa thalers, and avoid direct comparison with 
the lira or any other currency. This would serve to “guard” the administration against any fluctuations 
in currency value.103 In his letter, Gené stated that, in Massawa, the unit of account for the fixing of 
the wages of the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ continued to be the Egyptian piastre, “being [the base] for the irregulars 
when we [the Italians] inherited them from the previous government”.104 As a matter of fact, in ‘Asäb 
there was no need to use Egyptian piastres, as it was not under the influence of the Egyptian 
Government before the arrival of the Italians. Moreover, the southern port town was under the 
 
101  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 31, Varie 1886, ‘Ragguaglio Monete, Decreto del Ministero del Tesoro’, 13 May 1886’. 
ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Al Ministro degli Esteri, Roma, il Maggior Generale 
Genè, Corso legale di alcune monete egiziane’. ASDMAE, AE, pacco 60, 1887, ‘Soppressione del Corso legale delle 
piastre egiziane’, 19 April 1887. 
102  Scardigli states that, under the Egyptian government, the wage of a bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ was 39.64 lire per month, while that 
of the sanjak was 1058.80 per month. Unfortunately, he does not include the sources for this information. Scardigli, Il 
braccio indigeno, 14. 
103  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 32, Varie 1886, ‘Maggior Generale Gené al Signor Commissario Civile di Assab, Massaua, 
30 September 1886’. 
104  Ibid. 
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influence of the Aden monetary market105 and, as a consequence, the local (and unofficial) exchange 
rate of the Maria Theresa thaler was linked to that in Aden.106   
The presence of the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ was not the only indigenous component of the Italian colonial 
army. As Killingray states, “the strength of formal colonial rule also depended on the ability of the 
colonial authorities […] to negotiate and maintain alliances with indigenous elites and interest 
groups”.107 In the first period of their occupation, because they lacked any real political control on 
the ground like the Egyptians and Turks before them, the Italians exploited existing local frictions 
and alliances between chiefs and religious authorities to control the territories surrounding Massawa. 
Far from being treaties of protection, the agreements that the Italians made with local authorities 
during those years showed the colonisers’ degree of dependency on the collaboration of local elites. 
This collaboration was obtained in exchange for money and arms.108 Access to money and arms 
supply was often the first reason for local authorities to collaborate with the Italians; financial support 
and weapons were needed to control their territories. In order to exert their power, these local chiefs 
and dignitaries managed their own militias (the bande) which, as a consequence of the agreements, 
would have fought on the Italians’ side in the event of war.  
The main difference between the Italian bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ and the bande was that the former were 
individually recruited after a medical check-up and an attitudinal test, while the latter came with the 
diplomatic agreements previously binding their chiefs, who were also in charge for the maintenance 
of their own men.109 The role of the bande was not only that of being auxiliary troops, but also serving 
as an information service. This was because most of the bande were situated in border areas, where 
 
105  When, on the 18 November 1886, the value of the MTT had been brought back to 4 lire in Massawa (due to the high 
demand for the coin), General Gené informed the Civil Commissioner of Assab to proceed with the adjustment “not in 
order to model after or conform to what we are doing in Massawa, but just to address the needs of that market”. In a 
pencilled note at the bottom of the page, the Civil Commissioner wrote that he would have waited for the rise of the MTT 
price in Aden in order to adjust the official value in ‘Asäb; see AE, pacco 32, Varie 1886, ‘Il Maggior Generale Gené al 
Signor Commissario Civile di Assab, Massawa, 17 November 1886’. 
106  This matter and its consequences for the wage of the troops will be analysed in the next chapter. 
107  Killingray, ‘Guardians of Empire’, 2. 
108  Serels, Impoverishment of the African Red Sea Littoral, 88. Serels reports the example of the agreement with the 
käntiba of the Ḥabab, signed in May 1887. The agreements guaranteed the käntiba a monthly salary of 500 MTT in 
exchange for the safety of the caravans passing through his territory. See also the Nakfa Documents, Document 2, 
‘Schema di dichiarazione da firmarsi da Käntiba Hamed, Massawa, 5 June 1887’. 
109  Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno, 35, 48. 
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the Italians could not exert direct control.110  
The first occasion for the indigenous troops to be employed in combat was a skirmish which took 
place near Zula on 1 September 1886. The banda of Ras Debeb attacked the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ, killing 
thirteen of them and their jus- bas̲h̲i̊, and injuring seventeen.111 No investigation was undertaken after 
the event, and neither the Italian press nor public opinion was shaken by the news. The death of the 
indigenous soldiers seemed to be more acceptable than that of Italian soldiers. This assumption, 
together with their low maintenance costs, convinced the Italian government of the usefulness of 
indigenous troops even more.  
After the Italian defeat in Dogali in 1887, this point became even clearer. The first famous defeat 
of the Italian Army in Africa involved a reinforcement party of 540 soldiers (40 bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ) that 
had been sent as a retaliation party after Ras Alula had attacked the Italian outpost in Sä’atị.  
Ignoring the reports of the vanguard about the strong presence of Alula’s soldiers on their route, 
Major Tommaso De Cristoforis ordered the party to continue, falling into Ras Alula’s trap.112 As 
Scardigli shows, on that occasion the indigenous irregulars were first used as scapegoats, with fingers 
pointed toward the alleged desertion of some of the bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ. Then they were forgotten, leaving 
them out of the celebratory narrative of the Italian martyrs who had bravely fought against a horde of 
thousands of Ras Alula’s troops.113  
Only after Dogali and the consequent punitive expedition led by General Alessandro Asinari di 
San Marzano114 in November 1887, the new governor, General Baldissera, started a process of 
reorganisation (and regularisation) of the indigenous troops.115 The Turkish name bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ was 
abandoned, and the new regular indigenous troops started to be called ascari. But the most important 
decision was the formal institution of the corps of the indigenous troops.116 At this point, unmarried 
 
110  The first banda, led by Cagnasmacc Agdù Ambessà, was recruited in 1885; see Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 131. 
111  Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno, 25.  
112  For an account of the battle of Dogali, see Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale, 267–309. 
113  Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno, 26–27. 
114  Del Boca, 277-96. 
115  Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 125. 
116  Regio Decreto (RD) 30 giugno 1889 n. 6215 in Angiolo Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, vol. 1 
(Rome: L’Universelle, 1914), 749. 
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recruits were still preferred, and their contract could be renewed every year.117  
The indigenous troops became more and more important in the process of rationalisation of 
expenses. This was especially true after 1890, when, after the conquest of Asmara and Kärän, the 
Colony of Italian Eritrea was officially founded. The aim of the Italian government, as well as that of 
most of the colonial powers, was that of financial independence of the colony, and military expenses 
were the most important item of expenditure. In order to decrease military expenses, metropolitan 
troops were reduced, in preparation for a consequent increase of the indigenous recruits.118 In the 
recruiting process, the new governor, Antonio Gandolfi, had to compete with the bande which still 
were an attractive opportunity for the youths, given the higher degree of relative freedom they could 
enjoy by joining them. At the same time, it was impossible for the governor to disband them, 
especially in those areas of the colony where Italians were not exercising direct control.119 The active 
presence of the bande at the side of Italian army shows the coexistence of different kind of military 
labour relation, at least in this first phase of the colony. However, the bande were also gradually 
involved in the process of regularisation, with the issuing of allowances for the chiefs and their men 
by the government.120    
The first complete reform of the indigenous troops was made by General Oreste Baratieri.121 As 
we will see, the main innovation of his reform was the attention he paid to sociocultural aspects 
together with the more technical and military aspects. The reform was based on a cultural prejudice, 
i.e. the “primitiveness” and “immaturity” of indigenous soldiers. For example, the military ranks of 
the indigenous troops were distinguished from those of the European troops, with the consequence 
that even the indigenous NCOs were always subordinate to European soldiers, regardless of their 
grade or rank.122 Cultural aspects were many, such as the numerous references to religious tolerance 
 
117  ‘Regolamento di Disciplina’, Art. 46 in Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2: 815–17. 
118  R.d. 7097, 26 agosto 1890 in Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2:134–35. 
119  Scardigli, Il braccio indigeno, 104–5. 
120  See for example ‘D.g. 1° marzo 1895 n. 185’, in Angiolo Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, vol. 3 
(Rome: L’Universelle, 1914), 353. The allowance for the men of the bande was 1 lira per day, and therefore lower than 
the allowance for the ascaris.  
121  ‘Regolamento di Disciplina’ in Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2: 776-831. 
122  Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 96.  
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amongst the troops.123 Baratieri, as well as his officers, was aware of the complexity due to differences 
among people coming from different areas of the region. The campi famiglia were the embodiment 
of this complexity. Since the recruitment of the Egyptian troops, the irregulars were allowed to bring 
their families with them. In order not to lose any appeal to the new recruits, the Italians decided to 
continue this tradition, which was regulated in 1893.124 
In the Eritrean campi-famiglia each soldier was allowed a tucul, that they had to build using locally 
procured materials, and following the instructions of the officers.125 Hospitality was regulated, and a 
senior indigenous NCO presided over the respect of the rules by all the members of the community. 
Ultimately, it was the Italian Commander who acted as administrator and judge for the camp. At the 
same time, the family members of the ascaris could benefit from the healthcare provided by the 
military doctor. Together with the advantage of attracting married recruits (now considered more 
reliable than unmarried ones), came that of the presence of the sons of the indigenous soldiers, who 
grew up used to the military discipline of the camp and could also be recruited at the age of 16 years.126 
Married soldiers were considered more reliable, keener to “put aside” and prolong their stay in the 
army. Moreover, the prospect to have a house for his family in the campo-famiglia would push young 
unmarried soldiers to get married.127   
The most explicit reference to the diverse origins of the ascaris can be found in the tables gathering 
data on the recruiting of the indigenous units. The tables list the places of origin of the ascaris, and 
sorts them by religion (Catholic Christians, Coptic Christians, Muslims, other).128 One valuable type 
of information that can be found in these tables is the number of indigenous soldiers and officers that 
 
123  These references can already be found in the first articles of the Regolamento. See for example Regolamento di 
Disciplina art. 8 § 32: “He [the ascari] should remember that God is the master of all the men and every good comes from 
him. For this reason, he should worship him according to the prescriptions of his own religion. However, he should respect 
the religion of the others, and he should not laugh at his fellow soldier worshipping in a different way.” 
124  ‘Disposizione ministeriale 20 novembre 1893, Regolamento di disciplina per le truppe indigene d’Africa, Art. 31,’ in 
Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2, 799–800; see also Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 117–20. 
125  “Tucul” is the name the Italians used to refer to the round houses with thatched roofs, built with mud. The word has 
a Sudanese-Arabic origin. See Puccioni, Enciclopedia Italiana 1937, 
<https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/tucul_%28Enciclopedia-Italiana%29/> accessed 31 March 2021.  
126  Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 119–20. 
127  Ibid., 119. On the campi-famiglia see also Chelati Dirar, ‘From Warriors to Urban Dwellers’. 
128  See for example ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152 ‘Studi e proposte, VIII, Specchi contenenti dati statistici sulle truppe 
indigene’, 17 June 1893.  
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fought in a banda before being recruited by the Italian army. We can see that, from the data collected 
following a request by Governor Baratieri by the Commander of the Royal Troops, Colonel Giuseppe 
Arimondi, less than one-fifth of the indigenous troops were enrolled in a banda before joining the 
Italian army (691 ascaris and 31 officers, from a total of 3,613). In the notes to the detailed table for 
the 1st Company of the 3rd Battalion,129 we discover that five NCOs and three ascaris had served in 
the Egyptian army before the Italians occupied Massawa. Furthermore, the table concerning the 1st 
Company of the 4th Battalion130 refers to thirteen people (including seven officers) who served with 
the Egyptian Army, two with the British, one with the French (in Obok) and eleven that were amongst 
the first Egyptian bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ. Finally, Captain Ruffillo Perini131 reported five ascaris who fought 
for the Egyptians, one Somali ascari who fought for the British, sixteen soldiers who previously 
fought for the bande on the payroll of the Italians, and also sixteen soldiers who had previously fought 
with the Mahdī in Sudan. On the one hand, this data highlights the continuity between the previous 
military labour configurations and the Italian regular army. On the other hand, it shows that enrolment 
now interested a larger portion of the indigenous population, beyond those with prior military 
experience. Unfortunately, this sort of detailed information is sporadic. At his stage, it is not possible 
to know for certain how many ascaris and officers in total served in the Egyptian army before being 
employed by the Italians. However, from the notes which sometimes enrich the tabled data that does 
exist, we can deduce other relevant aspects regarding the Italian’s perception of the cultural diversity 
of their colonial troops. This information underlines how the Italian army was now putting together 
men who came from different parts of the region, and hence had different cultural backgrounds. In 
an appended note, Captain Perini, as most of the captains did, proudly exalted the harmony that 
characterised life in the villages of the ascaris, and a sense of belonging that developed despite the 
diverse origins of the men:  
 
129  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘Studi e proposte, 3° Battaglione indigeni, 1a Compagnia’, 15 June 1893.  
130  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘Studi e proposte, 4° Battaglione indigeno 1a Compagnia, Dati sui graduati e gli ascari 
della suddetta Compagnia’, Sä’atị, 13 June 1893. 




… to be part of the same Company establishes a heartfelt military brotherhood tie among the 
ascaris, which stays alive even among the discharged, which is revealed by the frequent visits 
paid by those to the Company and vice-versa, regardless of homeland, blood, or religion. In the 
Company […] there are never any arguments about religious matters, and the few quarrels and 
litigation that has occurred only happened among people of the same country [place of origin] 
and the same religion.132 
 
Some notes appended to the data table by Captain Perini record the existence of mutual help 
strategies amongst the soldiers:  
 
On another occasion, on the death of a Christian muntaz, all the ascaris organised a 
collection in support of the mother of the dead [soldier], and the result […] was that the 
Muslims were more generous than the Christians.133   
 
The Captain of the Company concludes by saying that he was sure that “these primitive ascaris, 
being Muslims and Christians, Arabs or Abyssinians, Assaorta [Saho] or Bilen, [are convinced] to be 
all equal before the law, discipline, and justice”, and that 
 
reminding these ascaris that they are essentially Italian soldiers whatever their religion and 
nationality, instructing and especially educating them in the holy name of Italy, any racial 
prejudice is muted in them […], this being so, tomorrow, the result of the good will among the 
elements of the company is to forgive their [reciprocal] racial faults.134  
 
132  Ibid.   
133  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘Studi e proposte, 4° Battaglione 4a Compagnia, Dati vari sui militari indigeni della 
suddetta Compagnia’, Gindaʾ, 13 June 1893. 




Examples of mutual help among the troops are also reported by the commanders of other 
companies. The then-Captain Giovanni Battista Ameglio reports, as an example of peace and synergy 
among the troops, the fact that wounded animals were offered to fellow ascaris of a different religion 
in order to be slaughtered before they would die.135 This fact was related to the religious tenet which 
forbade to Muslim soldiers from eating animals that had been previously injured in certain ways, or 
not properly slaughtered.136 Another example is described by the Captain of the 3rd Company of the 
3rd Battalion.137  He stated that, during religious celebrations, the indigenous officers would make a 
gift to the ascaris of different religion, who would then share these gifts. According to the Captain, 
the only two nuisances that occurred were during the first phase of the recruitment of “Abyssinian” 
soldiers, and on one occasion when both Orthodox and Muslim religious authorities were temporarily 
allowed in the villages.138 The presence of Christian and Muslim spiritual leaders alongside the troops 
became permanent during the expeditions to Libya, where they offered spiritual support to the soldiers 
while they were far from home.139   
On the contrary, most of the Italian officers agreed that “the synergy among the elements of the 
company, different for race and religion, is essentially the result of the behaviour of the Italian officers 
towards all the ascaris, Arabs or Abyssinians, Muslims or Christians”.140  
Some examples of less well-integrated groups of soldiers can also be found. According to Captain 
Francesco Carchidio Malavolti, Commander of the 2nd Squadrone Cavalleria Indigena “Keren” 
(Indigenous Cavalry Squadron), the “Hadendoa” people were usually isolated, allegedly due to 
 
135  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘Studi e proposte, 1° Battaglione 2° Compagnia, Dati sui graduati e ascari della suddetta 
Compagnia”, 10 June 1893. 
136  For example, verse 5:3 of the Qurʼān says:  “Prohibited to you are dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine, and that 
which has been dedicated to other than Allah, and [those animals] killed by strangling or by a violent blow or by a head-
long fall or by the goring of horns, and those from which a wild animal has eaten, except what you [are able to] slaughter 
[before its death], and those which are sacrificed on stone altars”. As cited in Armanios Febe and Ergene Boğaç, Halal 
Food. A History (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 89.  
137  ASMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘Studi e proposte, 3° Battaglione Indigeni 3° Compagnia’, Massaua. Another example of 
conviviality during festivals is offered in ASDMAE, AE, pacco, 152, ‘Studi e Proposte, 4° Battaglione Indigeni 4° 
Compagnia’, 13 June 1893. 
138  ASMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘Studi e proposte, 3° Battaglione Indigeni 3° Compagnia’, Massaua. 
139  See Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 120–22. 
140  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e proposte, ‘1o Battaglione Indigeno 2° Compagnia’, Arkiko, 10 June 1893.   
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communication problems. The recruits from Ḥamasen, Akkälä Guzay, Ṣəra‘, Təgre and Dembelas 
had to be preferred among the others, especially if well trained. On the contrary, the Amhara were 
“inferior in respect of the proper Abyssinians”. The “Baria”, meanwhile, were considered good 
soldiers, but “after a while in the army […] they go back to farming”.141  
This kind of analysis was carried out within the scope of the identification of the so-called “martial 
races”, i.e. specific groups of people that could guarantee a steady supply of recruits, and whose 
choice was made most of the time as a matter of loyalty to the colonial power. The first use of the 
analytical term “martial races” can be found with reference to the Gurkhas, in Cynthia Holden Enloe’s 
book Ethnic Soldiers.142 As shown by Glasman and Moyd, the fictitious nature of the “martial races” 
was evident when colonial armies were desperate for manpower. The individuation of the “martial 
races” in the colonial representations of the colonised is important in explaining both the exposition 
to a “disproportionate level of coercion” and the “relative position of authority” of certain indigenous 
groups.143 
The attempt to identify “racial races” among the ascaris is particularly evident in the notes of 
tenant Giuseppe Galli, who evaluated the different groups of his Company according to the “degree 
of synergy” with the government.144 The motives behind the definition of “martial races” in the Italian 
army are even clearer in the case of the indigenous artillery battalions. As we can see from the table 
pertaining to the 1st Battaglione di Montagna (Artillery Battalion), Sudanese recruits represented the 
majority, with 71 of the total of 116 being Sudanese.145 In the 2nd Battaglione di Montagna, the 
Sudanese were the majority group as well, with 46 recruits out of 115.146 The reason for the 
prevalence of Sudanese in those battalions was stated in the 1893 regulations and ascribed both to the 
 
141  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e Proposte, ‘Squadrone Cavalleria Keren, Dati sui graduati e gli Ascari dei reparti 
indigeni’. Similar considerations are expressed by other commanders about the “Arab people of the coast” and the Somali 
people, which however represented a small part of their companies. See ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e proposte, ‘2a 
Batteria da Montagna’; ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e proposte, ‘1° Battaglione 3° Compagnia’, Arkiko, 7 June 1893; 
ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e proposte, ‘3° Battaglione, 4° Compagnia’, Arkiko, 10 June 1893.  
142 Cynthia Holden Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). 
143 Glasman and Moyd, ‘Military and Police’, 341–42; see also Killingray, ‘Guardians of Empire’, 14-16. 
144  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e proposte, ‘3° Battaglione, 4° Compagnia’, Arkiko, 10 June 1893.  
145  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e proposte, ‘1° Batteria da Montagna’, Kärän, 8 June 1893. ASDMAE, AE, pacco 
152, Studi e proposte, ‘2° Batteria da Montagna’, Massawa. 
146 ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e proposte, ‘2a Batteria da Montagna’. 
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“kind” of people they were (“physically more fit”) and the necessity to entrust the precious cannons 
to a group of people with the most possible differences and hostility to the Ethiopians, so as to mitigate 
the risk of desertion and changing of side. These assumptions were based on the long history of 
Ethiopian raids suffered by the Sudanese and the other groups of the lowlands. Moreover, Islam, 
which was popular among these groups, represented another hostile trait in relation to the Christian 
Orthodox Ethiopians.147 
The new set of rules prepared by Baratieri was not only intended to promote the greatness of the 
“Motherland and the King”, respect for the law, and the Italians. Together with a resizing of the 
authority of the jus-basci rank in front of the Italian recruits, a reform of the punishments was 
planned.148 The “abuse” of corporal punishments was restricted in order not to arm the ascaris 
permanently. More importantly, however, special attention was given to pecuniary punishments. The 
withholding of wages was a common disciplinary measure. However, the deduction of money from 
an ascari’s salary could cast suspicion among the troops of an illegitimate theft by the officers for 
personal (mis)use of a legitimately earned wage. In order to avoid such misunderstandings, the 
regulations ordered the transparent use of the confiscated wages for the benefit of the company. These 
kinds of measures prove two points: the need for the Italian officers to keep army labour appealing 
for the youths, and the high level of awareness among the latter about their rights.  
Another important point of discussion between the Governor and the Minister of War, Luigi 
Pelloux, was about the introduction of a “pension” system (also advocated by the former governor 
General Baldissera) as opposed to a system of end-of-service bonuses. This point is particularly 
important for this study, as the choice between bonuses and pensions is at the core of the discussion 
about the strategies employed by the some of the former ascaris for the management of their wealth.  
According to General Baratieri, a pension system encouraged an “idle life”: the retired soldiers 
would never start a family and live “properly”.149 In contrast (according to the General) “eight times 
 
147  Jonathan Miran, ‘A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea’, Die Welt Des Islams 45, no. 2 (2005), 184–85. 
148  ASDMAE, AE pacco 152, Studi e Proposte, ‘Regolamento disciplina truppe indigene, Baratieri al Ministro della 
guerra’, Massawa, 15 January 1893.   
149  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e Proposte, ‘Baratieri al Ministro della Guerra’, Massawa, 4 April 1893.  
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out of ten” the recipient of a bonus would invest his money to build a tucul and buy some livestock. 
Moreover, the influence that a former ascari had on his community would allow him to become 
notable, especially if he had been wounded in battle.150 In addition to this argument, which was mostly 
based on prejudicial views regarding the apparent “laziness” of Africans, Baratieri’s proposal was 
also financially driven. Both the pensions and the bonuses were a burden on the finances of the 
colony. For this reason, the Minister of the War, after consulting the old governor, General Baldissera, 
offered Baratieri a compromise solution, showing his willingness to place the responsibility of the 
expenses on the Ministry.151 The Minister’s proposal was to grant a pension to the jus-bascis (the 
highest grade now allowed for indigenous soldiers), if discharged or declared unfit after 25 years of 
service, and all the soldiers discharged or declared unfit due to being wounded in action.  
 Minister Pelloux believed that indigenous soldiers were not able to make financial plans, and were 
instead rather keen to deplete their assets rapidly. For this reason, a pension was necessary so that  
 
[the discharged soldiers] might never make a spectacle of themselves, [which would be] so 
unflattering for the welfare and the generosity of the Government, and such a bad and 
discouraging example for the youths willing to be enrolled, or those already enrolled, to whom is 
inculcated the duty to give their life when circumstances demand it.152  
 
In the final draft of the 1893 Regulations, a pension valued at half the sum of the last wage for the 
jus-bascis after 25 years in service, was approved. A pension was also conceded to the indigenous 
soldiers that had been wounded in battle, and who were then discharged and declared unfit for 
work.153 The jus-basci with less than 25 years of service but more than ten would receive a pension 
 
150  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e Proposte, ‘Baratieri al Ministro della Guerra’, Massawa, 4 April 1893.  
151  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e Proposte, ‘Ministro della Guerra a Baratieri’, Rome, 18 March 1893.  
152  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, Studi e Proposte, ‘Ministro della Guerra a Baratieri’, Rome, 18 March 1893. 
153  “Art. 46. Trattamento di congedo. §181. I ius-basci riformati o comunque licenziati di autorità hanno diritto: ad una 
pensione vitalizia uguale alla metà della paga giornaliera ultima percepita, esclusa dal computo ogni indennità o assegno 
eventuale o straordinario, se contano 25 o più anni di servizio militare nelle truppe indigene; […] § 182 I militari indigeni 
riformati per ferite riportate in combattimento per conseguenza delle quali siano divenuti completamente ciechi od 
abbiano perduto l’uso delle mani o dei piedi, ovvero di due di questi membri, ovvero da una commissione nominata dal 
comandante delle regie truppe siano riconosciuti incapaci di dedicarsi nella Colonia ad un lavoro manuale proficuo, 
all’esercizio di un’arte, od a guadagnarsi comunque il necessario sostentamento per la vita, hanno diritto, qualunque sia 
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equal to an eighteenth of the annual wage for every year of service. Discharged soldiers who had not 
been declared unfit received a one-year wage bonus if they served for less than ten years, and a one-
month wage bonus more for every additional year. The wife of a deceased soldier received a sum 
equal to nine months of the husband’s wage (which was to be shared with any other wives the soldier 
might have had). It is worth noting that all pensions could be capitalised after five years, allowing the 
recipient to collect it as a one-time bonus in cash, on request.154  
No study has specifically focussed on the granting of “pensions” or end-of-service subsidies to 
indigenous soldiers of the Italian colonial army, a fact mostly related to the lack of sources regarding 
the life conditions of the African colonial soldiers once they retired.155 More evidence can be found 
regarding the issuing of subsidies for the families of those who died in battle, especially during the 
Italian invasion of Libya.156  As anticipated in the first section of this chapter, very few studies focus 
on the introduction of welfare measures for veterans in a much later historical period.157 This fact is 
certainly also due to the absence of any structured welfare system for the African colonial subjects 
until the 1930s. At the beginning of European colonial rule, there was no interest in guaranteeing 
some form of subsidisation for indigenous workers, as waged labour was seen as a temporary form 
of employment for a mostly agrarian population to meet some limited cash needs.158 Even when the 
first forms of welfare policy were finally implemented in the colonies, they were used as a way to 
reinstate the legitimacy of colonial governments in the face of growing pro-independence political 
 
la durata del servizio prestato, ad una pensione vitalizia pari alla metà dell’ultima paga percepita”. ‘Regolamento di 
Disciplina, Art. 46’ in Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2: 815–16. 
154  ‘Regolamento di Disciplina, Art. 46’ in Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2:815–17. As we will 
see in the last paragraph, the consequences of the decision to introduce bonuses and pensions revealed themselves after a 
decade, when the period of service requested to the jus-basci ended, and especially among the veterans of the First Italo-
Ethiopian war. 
155  Killingray, ‘Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen, and Politics in the Gold Coast, 1939–50’.  
156  See, for example, the granting of 150 subsidies to the wives and relatives of the ascaris who died in Libya. A single 
one-time bonus ranged from a minimum of 360 lire to a maximum of 1440 lire. ‘D.g. 11 novembre 1913 n. 1868’, 
Bullettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea 46, 13 November 1913.  
157  Carina Schmitt, ‘The Warfare–Welfare Nexus in French African Colonies in the Course of the First and Second 
World War’. 
158  Ben Scully and Rana Jawad, ‘Social Welfare’, in General Labour History of Africa, ed. Stefano Bellucci and Andreas 
Eckert (Boydell & Brewer, 2019), 555; Anthony G. Hopkins, ‘The Lagos Strike of 1897: An Exploration in Nigerian 
Labour History’, Past & Present 35, no. 1 (1966), 146. 
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movements.159 Before the 1930s, the only social protection measures in Africa had been granted to 
poor white workers, such as the Afrikaner miners in South Africa.160 Another form of “social 
security” open to indigenous workers promoted by a colonial government was that of the societé de 
prévoyance, in French West Africa and Algeria.161 These were cooperative associations meant to 
operate communal granaries in case of a bad harvest.162 These institutions were very similar to the 
informal credit institutions that will be described in the second section of the next chapter, and that 
were also present in the Horn of Africa at that time. After all, even in nineteenth century Italy, mutual 
aid associations were the only forms of social protection for private sector workers.163 Starting from 
the introduction of the first thorough policy of social insurance by Otto von Bismark’s Germany in 
1883, various forms of state-run initiative for workers spread across Europe.164 In Italy, a compulsory 
insurance against accidents at work, to be paid by the employer, was introduced in 1898, but a pension 
system for civil servants and the military had been handed down from the Kingdom of Sardinia to the 
Kingdom of Italy after 1861.165 
The subsidies introduced by the Regolamento of 1893 were clearly not inspired by any intent to 
introduce social welfare measures in Eritrea. They were more similar to propaganda tools, aimed at 
“awarding” veterans that had served for a long time and those who were injured in battle, to show 
prospective recruits that the Italian government would not have abandoned them once they returned 
to their villages.  
The 1893 Regulations served as the foundation for any further colonial military reforms until the 
1936 reform, when the Italian East African Empire was founded.166 After the issuing of the 1893 
 
159 The first acknowledged colonial government to set up a pension scheme was Belgian Congo in 1956; Scully and 
Jawad, ‘Social Welfare’, 559–561. 
160  Ibid., 558–559. 
161  Ibid., 556–557. 
162  Gregory Mann and Jane I. Guyer, ‘Imposing a Guide on the Indigène: The Fifty-Year Experience of the Sociétés de 
Prévoyance in French West and Equatorial Africa’, in Credit, Currencies and Culture: African Financial Institutions in 
Historical Perspective, ed. Endre Stiansen and Jane I. Guyer (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 125. 
163  Maurizio Cinelli, Diritto Della Previdenza Sociale, 14th edition (Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore, 2018), 30. 
164  Ibid. 
165  Ibid., 31; ‘Testo unico delle leggi sulle pensioni civili e militari. 21 febbraio 1895’, Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno 
d’Italia, Rome, 23 March 1895. 
166  Vitale, L’Italia in Africa, 98. 
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Regulations, the wages due to each respective class of soldiers also changed. Wages were raised and 
lowered according to the rate of availability of new recruits, which was often related to the general 
state of the colony’s economy and, therefore, the availability of soldiers. For example, in 1894, wages 
and allowances were slightly lowered (See Table 6). As we will see, this was a consequence of 



















































Jus-basci 5 5 3.50  4.10  6 6 150 100 
Buluc-basci 2.70 2.70    3.50 4.10 4.10 40 15 
Muntàz 2.20 2.20 2.35 2.35 2.50 2.50     
Ascari 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.60 2   30 25 
Zaptiè167 1.85 1.60 2.05 1.85 2.25 2.10     
Table 6. Daily allowances in lire. Source: Regio decreto 11 dicembre 1892 tab. III, Assegni per i militari 
indigeni; 168Regio decreto 18 February 1894, art. 121, Quadro degli assegni spettanti ai militari truppe 
indigene. 169  
 
Another change introduced by the 1893 Regulations was the explicit prohibition of claiming goods 
from civilians unwilling to give or sell.170 This rule was intended to curb the soldiers’ habit of looting 
civilians and their property to support military campaigns. However, as will be described below, this 
part of the Regulations was violated by the Italian officers themselves during the expedition to ‘Adwa 
which led to the Italian defeat. The difficulties in getting provisions pushed Italian soldiers, members 
of the bande, and ascaris to all raid local farmers.  
The introduction of wages, bonuses and fixed rations represented the transition to a more 
 
167  Zaptiè was the name given to the indigenous soldiers of the Carabineers Corps (Carabinieri), an Italian gendarmerie 
force. The name comes from the Turkish “zaptiye”, (policeman), from the Arabic “ḍabtīyah”. See WordReference 
Random House Unabridged Dictionary of American English, 2021, <https://www.wordreference.com/definition/zaptiah> 
accessed 31 March 2021. See also Sahle, ‘A Brief Historical Survey of the Ethiopian Askaris (Native Colonial Soldiers)’, 
254. 
168  Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2: 590.  
169  Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 3: 88. 
170  ‘R.d. 18 febbraio 1894, Art. 8 par. 33’, p. 94 in Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea 3: 80.   
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bureaucratised army. At this stage, the main aim of Italian military governors was to build a 
disciplined indigenous corps and attract more recruits into its ranks. These goals were reached by 
building the ascaris’ confidence in their officers, for example through transparency in the 
management of the funds of the battalion, the promotion of the peaceful interaction among culturally 
different groups, and improvements in the living conditions of the veterans. This last point was 
debated by the Governor of the colony and the Minister of War. The first stressed the apparent innate 
laziness of the African troops, the latter their inability to save and manage money.171  
In the last section of this chapter I will present the correspondence that some of the recipients of 
subsidies and “pensions”, introduced by the 1893 Regulations, held with the colonial administration. 
Most of the letters I will analyse were sent by a specific and peculiar category of retired ascari, 
eligible for pension: the veterans of the battle of ‘Adwa, that had had their right arm and left leg 
amputated after they were captured on the battlefield. These cases are not only relevant because they 
show the existence of some limited social welfare measures in Eritrea at the beginning of the twentieth 
century; more importantly, in the scope of this dissertation they offer us a glimpse into the way in 
which some of the veterans saved and spent the money they received from the government. 
 Before analysing these cases, it will be necessary to introduce the historical context that led to the 
battle of ‘Adwa, the role of environmental factors in promoting the enrolment of the ascaris in the 
Italian army, and Italian reactions to the defeat, focussing in particular on the fate of the ascaris that 
were captured during the battle by Mənilək’s generals.     
 
2.4 Environmental crisis, Ethiopian victory, and the fate of the captured Eritrean ascaris 
At the time of the Italian landing in the commercial port town of Massawa, most of the territories 
of the future Italian Colony of Eritrea were inhabited by agriculturalist and pastoralist people.172 For 
both groups, livestock (especially cattle) were of vital importance. The pastoralist people of the 
 
171  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘Studi e Proposte, Baratieri al Ministro della Guerra’, Massawa, 4 April 1893; ASDMAE, 
A, pacco 152 ‘Studi e Proposte, Ministro della Guerra a Baratieri, Rome’, 18 March 1893. 
172  Taddia, L’Eritrea-colonia, 94. 
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lowlands traded in hides and butter, while cattle were essential for agricultural works in the 
highlands.173 Moreover, it was not uncommon for the Saho people of the lowlands to offer their 
temporary services to the people of the highlands to graze their cattle in exchange for milk, used for 
the production of butter.174 Among the Təgre-speaking populations, cattle also represented a means 
of legitimation of power, and were used to reinforce the power of the hegemonic groups of the Bet-
Asgede over the subaltern groups of serfs. A long list of obligations forced the serfs to give livestock 
and livestock products, such as butter, to their masters on particular occasions (such as funerals) and 
on a regular basis (for example at the changing of the season or once per year).175   
Given the importance of cattle for social and economic life, the long series of environmental 
catastrophes that affected the region starting from the end of 1887, represented one of the worst 
environmental and economic crises to have ever occurred before.176 The crisis was triggered by the 
spread of rinderpest (locally called gulhai177), a cattle disease probably introduced by the Italians at 
the time of the punitive expedition of General San Marzano, after the battle of Dogali.178 On that 
occasion, infected livestock was imported from India by Italian contractors, introducing the disease 
to the colony.179 By 1888 the disease had reached Ethiopia, and in less than two years about 90% of 
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Ethiopian cattle had perished.180 Rinderpest continued to spread southward in the following years, 
reaching South Africa by 1895.181 Because livestock was essential for preparing the land for 
agriculture, the absence of oxen made it even more difficult to recover the losses that occurred after 
a period of drought, which was compounded by poor harvesting due to the locusts that invaded the 
region in 1891 and 1892-93.182 Taken together, these calamities caused a rise in the price of goods, 
which was also exacerbated by hoarding and speculation. Pankhurst, relying on missionary sources 
and reports by European explorers, discusses the occurrence of a “price revolution” in the region, 
with the cost of grain rising by 200% in just one year in the interior regions of Ethiopia. These price 
increases led people to prefer to be paid in kind rather than with cash.183 As is reported by Pankhurst, 
this “price revolution” also affected family relationships: the rising price of livestock increased the 
price for matrimonial transactions, making the creation of new alliances and family bonds more 
difficult for the youth.184 Serels shows that local mechanisms of mutual assistance had been already 
heavily compromised by previous calamities, together with a shift of the source of political power 
from local patron-client systems to exogenous factors. The different colonial powers that tried to gain 
control of the region (the Turks, Egyptians, Ethiopians, British, and Italians) had financed local elites 
for this purpose, that in turn became less dependent on a tributary labour system, and thus avoided 
the redistribution of resources to their subordinates in cases of calamity.185  
Given these difficult economic conditions, the wages offered by the Italian Government to the 
recruits presented an opportunity for the youths of the highlands, heavily hit by the consequences of 
famine as well as of a cholera epidemic that hit the region in 1889-1892.186 To curb the migration of 
Ethiopians into Eritrea, Ras Mängäša of Təgray issued a decree in 1889 prohibiting the peasants of 
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his region from crossing the border and enrolling in the Italian army, but with little success.187  
In Ethiopia, Mənilək II completed his accession to power as the new Emperor of Ethiopia in the 
midst of the worst historically recorded famine of the region. The catastrophe occurred in the period 
surrounding the death of Emperor Yoḥannəs IV, who was killed in battle in 1889 while fighting the 
soldiers of the Mahdi.188 Being the Ras of the Šäwa region, and backed by the Italians through the 
diplomatic action of the explorer and diplomat Pietro Antonelli, Mənilək took advantage of this 
moment to supplant Yoḥannəs. Thanks to his third wife, Ṭaytu, he had been able to exert a nominal 
power on the northern provinces, given that she was from the Səmen province. His only internal 
opponents were Ras Mängäša, who had been earmarked by Yoḥannəs to be his heir, and his lieutenant 
Alula. However, Mənilək’s army was the only one in Ethiopia that could compete with that of the 
late Emperor, as it was supplied with rifles from his Italian and French allies.189 
 The economic situation hindered the supply of the Italian troops during military campaigns on the 
plateau: because of the famine, the occupation of Asmara by Italian troops was in fact postponed to 
August 1889.190 Around this time, Ras Mäkwännən of the Harär’ Province of Ethiopia had been sent 
by Mənilək to Italy to officiate at the signing of the Treaty of Wəčạle.191 The occupation of Asmara 
took place without any fighting: the Italians justified the move with the necessity for the troops to be 
housed in a place cooler than Massawa.192 However, the timing of the occupation was significant. It 
happened just before the signing of an Additional Convention to the Wəčạle Treaty by Mäkwännən 
in Naples. This Additional Convention allowed the Italians to keep the recently occupied territories.193 
According to Pankhurst, it was at this time, while observing the fields temporarily abandoned during 
the famine in the highlands, that the Italians started to plan the expropriation of land and the launching 
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of a settlement programme.194 The idea was developed by Baron Leopoldo Franchetti, who was put 
in charge of the Ufficio per la colonizzazione (Colonisation Office) in 1891. The project involved 
giving free land and rural credit to unemployed Italian peasants who were willing to move to Eritrea. 
This was also considered an effective way to limit the emigration of millions of Italians to foreign 
countries, in order to avoid a loss workforce and military recruits.195  
As reported by the journalist Vico Mantegazza,196 these expropriations caused Däǧǧazmač Bahta 
Ḥagos to rise up against the Italians.197 Later on, after the defeat of Ras Mängäša by General Baratieri 
in Senafe (January 1895), documents were found in his camp allegedly proving the active backing of 
the Bahta Ḥagos uprising by Mängäša and Mənilək.198 Furthermore, the Italian expropriation policies 
of the 1890s had been a crucial destabilising factor on the plateau at the border with Ethiopia, leading 
to the Italian defeat in ‘Adwa on 1 March 1896.199  
During the campaign, the difficult economic conditions of the region made the supplying of the 
troops the most pressing problem for both parties. Even if the Italians had been able to import 
sufficient grain from Indian merchants for the entire duration of the famine period, the almost total 
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absence of roads further hampered the supply of the troops.200 The decision to proceed toward ‘Adwa 
stretched the line of operations, making it even more difficult to supply troops at the front, where 
provisions needed to take no less than a week to arrive.201 On 27 February 1896, Captain Mario Bassi 
wrote that the ascaris were being paid with “useless” thalers (because it was not possible to find any 
food to buy), and that they were eating sear barley to survive.202 The then-Captain Alessandro Sapelli 
wrote in his Memorie d’Africa:  
  
Clearly the logistic services were not working regularly, and provisions started lacking after a 
brief stay in Mai Gabetà. Indeed, the Command ordered [the payment of] the usual ration of flour 
in cash. The amount was surely well accepted; but the nourishment ended as it is not possible to 
eat cash and it’s not possible to convert it into goods, if goods are lacking.203    
 
For this reason, Sapelli was forced to allow the men of the bande to plunder local cattle, thus 
adopting the Ethiopian army custom, and therefore “avoiding confiscation by the Emperor”, but 
regularly paying “with some of [their] men’s lives”.204  
The logistical situation was no different for Mənilək’s troops. The rejection of the Wəčạle Treaty 
in 1894 stopped the supply of weapons from Italy, while the French had accepted the termination of 
their supply to Mənilək in exchange for the Italian acceptance of their protectorate on Tunisia. When 
Mənilək mobilised his troops on 17 September 1895, his soldiers brought their old rifles together with 
a ten-day food ration. Because of the difficult economic conditions prevailing in Ethiopia, Mənilək 
planned to allow his troops to raid the farmers once they arrived in the Təgray region.205  
Accounts of the events which led to the most important defeat of the Italians are numerous, as are 
strategic and tactical analyses about the reasons of the defeat itself. Nicola Labanca argues that, even 
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since the very early years after the battle of ‘Adwa, it was considered a watershed moment in African 
history. Its immediate recognition as a momentous event was doubtlessly because it was the first time 
that an African army had defeated a European expeditionary force in a large battle.206 Even though 
Italian publications initially underplayed the consequences of the defeat, the political outcomes were 
important, as the disaster in ‘Adwa provoked the fall of the Government of Francesco Crispi in Italy 
and a resurgence of anti-colonial protests.207 The “colonial historians” of the Fascist era, using the 
refrain of the “unfortunate day”, tried to downplay the role of ‘Adwa in the history of Italian 
imperialism, celebrating Crispi’s colonial vision instead, and thus supporting the regime’s 
propaganda programme.208  
Del Boca counted fatalities of 289 Italian officers, 4,600 soldiers, and about 1,000 dead ascaris. 
The injured amounted to 1,500.209 After the defeat for the Italians, Mənilək and his generals were 
able to capture about 2,700 prisoners. About 1,900 Italian captives were used to back Mənilək’s 
retreat to Addis Abäba.210 The last group of Italian prisoners were repatriated to Italy in May 1897.211 
Their liberation came after intense negotiations, which led to the payment of a ransom of 1,000,000 
lire disguised as a refund of the expenses incurred by Mənilək for the hosting of the prisoners.212 
Worries about the fate of the prisoners ignited a global fundraising campaign organised by different 
communities of the Italian diaspora.213 However, there was a further event that strongly upset Italian 
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public opinion. Soon after the day of the battle, Italian newspapers reported that the ascaris captured 
by the Ethiopian army had their right hands and left feet mutilated. An article, which appeared in the 
Corriere della Sera, reported that  
 
[the] captive ascaris, all with the right hand and left foot amputated, arouse a sense of piety. 
The Negus held them almost free for three days, then suddenly, incited by the Abuna, ordered the 
amputations together with the menace of [the] death penalty for those who would have treated 
them.214  
 
Abunä Matéwos, the head of the Ethiopian Orthodox church, had not been the only one to solicit 
Mənilək’s rigour in treating the ascaris this way: the decision was backed by the Emperor’s wife 
Ṭaytu, Ras Alula, Ras Mängäša, and other generals.215 The reasoning was that the ascaris were to be 
considered traitors and thieves rather than enemies. Therefore, the act of cutting their hands and feet 
was a matter of compensation. It was reported that many “died from haemorrhage or gangrene: those 
who are alive number 300; that is, half of those who underwent the operation”.216   
Morruronas Nedue, an ascari of the 8th Battalion, reported in an interview that the ascaris that 
had been mutilated were about 500.217 Another article reports that “the amputations were executed 
roughly, close to the joints, without any anatomical care”.218 The stumps had to be operated on again 
when the amputees came back to Eritrea.219  
A Red Cross mission was involved in treating the amputees on their return, and was led by the 
military physician Luigi Ferrero di Cavallerleone, with the collaboration of Dr Tommaso Fiaschi, an 
Italian orthopaedic surgeon from Australia.220 The dismay aroused by the event ignited a new wave 
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of Italian donations.221 By 10 October, aided by these donations, 350 ascaris had received artificial 
limbs. Spare parts for the artificial limbs were provided by the Red Cross, and a fund for the limb 
maintenance was established.222  
As we have seen in this section, environmental contingencies strongly influenced the chain of 
events that lead to the Ethiopian victory in ‘Adwa. According to Mənilək himself, if the Italians had 
managed to maintain their position longer before attempting their attack, he would himself have been 
forced to retreat for lack of supplies.223 At the same time, we have seen that the disastrous economic 
situation of the region, badly hit by rinderpest, drought, famine and cholera, pushed many youths to 
enrol in the Italian army. The relationship between economic and environmental conditions on the 
one hand, and an increase in the number of enrolments in colonial corps on the other, has been studied 
for other East African regions as well. For example, a series of famines during the 1930s pushed large 
numbers of young Kamba men to leave behind their cattle and villages to join the KAR, contributing 
to their emergence as a “martial race” in British East Africa.224  
In the next section, we will look ahead eleven years, in order to investigate the subsequent living 
conditions of the veterans of the First Italo-Ethiopian War, and, more importantly, how they spent 
and managed the money they earned while in the army and on discharge.  
 
2.5 Working for bread and working for land: The saving strategies of Eritrean veterans of the 
First Italo-Ethiopian war  
On 26 October 1896, a peace treaty with Ethiopia was signed. It defined the borders of the Italian 
colony as the Märäb-Belesa-Muna rivers line, and effectively terminated the Treaty of Wəčạle.225 The 
heavy defeat caused an earthquake in Italian politics, and impacted subsequent Italian colonial 
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strategy. One of the consequences of the defeat was the appointment, at the end of 1897, of the first 
civilian Governor of the colony by the new Italian Prime Minister, Antonio Starabba di Rudinì. The 
new Governor, Ferdinando Martini, was a member of the Parliament and a writer, and hence a quite 
different personality when compared to previous military governors. Once an anti-colonialist, he had 
visited Eritrea in 1891 as a member of the commission investigating the Livraghi case.226 That journey 
completely changed his attitude towards the Italian colonisation of Eritrea, as is testified in his 
Nell'Affrica italiana and in the over 6,000 pages of diary entries he recorded throughout the entire 
period of his government in Eritrea.227 In 1907, at the end of his nine-year mandate, he had 
reorganised the colony’s administration, with a sharp separation between civil and military powers, 
through a set of rules contained in the Ordinamento della Colonia Eritrea. These rules remained in 
force until a new set was issued in 1934.228  
On 24 July 1907, Martini’s successor Giuseppe Salvago Raggi sent a letter to the directors and 
managers of all the administrative offices of the colony. This letter ordered them to prefer the 
employment of those he defined as “deserving” ascaris wherever and whenever any vacancies 
occurred in their offices.229 According to the Governor, the best indigenous elements to be employed 
in the colonial administration had to be chosen from amongst those retired ascaris that had “served 
well and for long, […] especially those that, according to their records, can guarantee good 
service”.230 Before Salvago Raggi’s letter, the colonial administration had received applications 
from discharged ascaris asking to be employed by the colonial administration as members of the 
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militia, scribes, members of the Forestry Corps, captains of road maintenance teams, linemen, prison 
guards, watchmen, and sentries. The administration followed up on these job applications by 
requesting the collection of more information on the applicants, and returning such information to 
the Regional Commissioner or the Command of the RCTC. The outcomes of these enquires show 
that the “deserving” ascaris were those who had not been recipients of any disciplinary action during 
service and had not been discharged for disciplinary reasons. This information-gathering process 
allows us a glimpse into the life of discharged indigenous soldiers and, occasionally, to collect 
information about the way they managed the subsidies they received from the Government when 
they left the army or were declared ineligible for service. In the Archivio Eritrea of the ASDMAE, 
it is possible to find hundreds of letters sent by former ascaris asking for jobs or subsidies, some of 
which are accompanied by further information about the applicant. Of course, job applications were 
not the only kind of letter received by the colonial administration. Requests for subsidies represent 
an important and frequent item of correspondence, especially requests from those former ascaris 
that were declared unable to work due to injuries received during service. Among such 
correspondence we can find the pleas of the ascaris captured in ‘Adwa, who were mutilated by order 
of Mənilək.   
The letters considered in this section are part of a group of 52 pleas sent between May and 
November 1907. This group of letters is an important source for analysing the wealth-storage 
choices made by some of the first ascaris recruited by the Italians. Two of the letter writers in 
question served with the Egyptian bas̲h̲i̊-bozuḳ; one was part of the bande in Senafe and ʿ Addi Kwala. 
Almost half of the writers were veterans of the First Italo-Ethiopian War, and fourteen had been 
captured and mutilated after the battle of ‘Adwa. These veterans represent only a small part of those 
who participated in, and returned from, the battle of ‘Adwa. By analysing their cases, the present 
author does not intend to produce a general model that represents the choices of all the former 
Eritrean ascaris that took part in the First Italo-Ethiopian War. Nor do I wish to give a 
comprehensive representation of the living conditions of all the retired Italian ascaris in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. While the exact number of indigenous troops taking part in the 
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battle of ‘Adwa has not been calculated with certainty, Angelo Del Boca reports that about 7,000 
indigenous soldiers participated.231 Among these, around 1,000 were killed and 800 captured. Of the 
captives, only 406 managed to get back to Eritrea, and most of these suffered amputations. However, 
given the limited sources available, the documents I am analysing here offer a unique occasion to 
delve into the lives of the first veterans of the Italian colonial army, and, in particular, shed light on 
the ways in which former soldiers used the money they earned during and at the end of their service. 
As Killingray points out, it is usually difficult to find information about the life of colonial soldiers 
after they retired from service.232 Hence, these sources are important in adding depth to the analysis 
of the changing labour conditions in the colony, and the degree of integration of indigenous people 
in the colonial economic and financial system.  
Of the 52 request letters discussed here, 19 are job applications, 19 subsidy applications, and the 
remainder are requests for pay raises. As we will see, the analysis of these documents reveals some 
patterns in the life choices of the ascaris and in the way they dealt with colonial wages, subsidies, 
and with the general colonial labour system. Most of the veterans that were eligible for that had 
declined the pension offered by the Italian government, instead opting for a one-time bonus at the 
time of discharge. Most of the ascaris had invested their money in land and cattle. However, many 
of these investments were destroyed by a new series of calamities, such as the return of rinderpest 
and another invasion of locusts.  
The job application sent by Esman Abbé, who served in the indigenous corps for three years, is 
quite representative in this sense.233 Esman Abbé fought at ‘Aq̱ordät as an attendant of Tenant 
Benassi, and in Kwä‘atit and ‘Adwa, as an attendant of Captain Artale. He was discharged on 13 
January 1907, without any bonus. At that time, his only belongings were some livestock and a plot 
of land: the livestock had been killed by “the disease”, whereas his harvest had been eaten by the 
locusts. Between 1904 and 1905 a new outbreak of rinderpest occurred, killing about 100,000 head 
 
231  Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale, 651. 
232  Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 163. 
233  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Lettera di Osman Abbè al 
Governatore Salvago Raggi’, Asmara, 12 May 1907. 
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of cattle in Eritrea.234 This disaster was followed by an invasion of locusts that destroyed crops.235 
For these reasons, Esman Abbé decided to send a letter to the Governor to ask for a job to earn “a 
piece of bread [tozzo di pane]”236. A letter sent by the Commander of the Carabinieri, Lieutenant 
Luigi Artuffo, to the Secretary of the Governor on 11 July 1907, states that Esman Abbé was finally 
hired by the Regional Commissioner in Kärän as a member of the Forestry Corps.237  
The general pattern of refusing the pension, investing the lump-sum bonus in land and livestock, 
and the subsequent loss of wealth due to calamities, is particularly evident in the cases of the 
amputees of the Battle of ‘Adwa. According to a letter sent by the Commissioner of the Ṣəra‘ region, 
Paolo Teodorani, to the Secretary to the Governor, Giuseppe Cavalli, on 1 August 1907, most of the 
amputees of ‘Adwa were in the same situation: “All those amputees who choose the one-time bonus 
renouncing the pension, are, today, in the same miserable conditions”.238   
As mentioned above, 19 of the 52 letters analysed here are requests for subsidies. The subsidy 
was a form of economic aid that was issued “una tantum” by the Regional Commissioner, and 
excluded any further claims by the petitioner. Due to limited resources, the Government was explicit 
in its request that the subsidies were granted only to those cases that were “really deserving”, in 
order to preserve the Treasury funds that were dedicated to this purpose.239. For this reason, there 
were limits placed on the value of each subsidy, thus ensuring the fulfilment of the highest number 
of requests possible.240 
Most of the applications for subsidies came from the amputees of the Battle of ‘Adwa. As the 
veterans had been deprived of their right hands and left feet, it was impossible for them to find a 
 
234  Serels, Impoverishment of the African Red Sea Littoral, 102. 
235  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 220–22. 
236  This expression appears in many of the letters I have analysed for this chapter, hence my decision to incorporate it 
into the chapter’s title. In the Italian language, the idiomatic expression “to work for a piece of bread” means working for 
a meagre salary. See <https://dizionario.internazionale.it/parola/per-un-tozzo-di-pane>, accessed 7 November 2020. 
237  ASDME, AE pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Risultato di indagini di 
informazioni’, Asmara, 21 September 1907. 
238  ASDMAE, AE pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Lettera di Teodorani a 
Cavalli’, ʿAddi Ugri, 1 August 1907. 
239  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale Indigeno, Lettera al Segretario del Governo della Colonia Cavalli’, Asmara, 2 
May 1907. 
240  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Concessione di stipendio 
all’ex ascari mutilato Ibrahim Abdalla, Asmara’, 9 August 1907. 
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normal job in the colonial administration. However, common to all those who requested a subsidy 
was that they had renounced the pension after the end of their service, in favour of a one-time bonus. 
The value of the end-of-service bonus for claimant ascaris varied between 420 lire to about 400 
MTT (one MTT being valued at about 2.50 lire at the turn of the twentieth century).241 All applicants 
discussed here declared that they had depleted their bonuses, and this fact was confirmed by the 
reports compiled by the commissioners.  
I will now present some of the most representative pleas, each containing elements that we can 
find in almost all the other pleas sent to the government.  
In July 1907, Ilssai Ghebresghi sent a letter to the Governor, written in a shaky handwriting, from 
Sebaa in the Ṣəra‘ region, asking for help.242 The former ascari wrote that the shaky handwriting 
was due to the fact that he “had the foot and hand cut”. On 23 July, Commissioner Teodorani wrote 
to the Secretary of the Governor, asking him to provide further information about the claimant.243  
 
Figure 6. Letter written by Ilsai Ghebresghi to the Governor of the Colony. Source: ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, 
Da Ilssai Ghebresghi al Governatore, allegata a Domanda di Sussidio, Commissario del Seraè alla Segreteria 
di S.E. il Governatore’, ʿAddi Ugri, 23 July 1907. 
 
241  ASDMAE, Archivio Storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana (ASMAI), posizione 22/1, ‘Circolazione monetaria 
tallero di Maria Teresa 1900, Richiesta di talleri di M.T.’, Asmara, 11 February 1900.   
242  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Da Ilssai Ghebresghi al 
Governatore, allegata a Domanda di Sussidio, Commissario del Seraè alla Segreteria di S.E. il Governatore’, ʿAddi Ugri, 
23 July 1907.  
243  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Domanda di Sussidio, Commissario del Serae alla Segreteria di S.E. il Governatore’, 




According to the subsequent report, Elsai “Gabresghi”244 had been an ascari of the 5th Company 
of the 1st Indigenous Battalion, and had declined the pension six years before, opting instead for a 
one-time bonus of 270 lire.245 With that sum, he bought some cattle, which then perished due to the 
gulhai between 1903 and 1904. For this reason, to farm the land he had in Sebaa, he was forced to 
seek help from his fellow countrymen. At the time of the petition, he had a wife and three children, 
and owned only one cow. In order to help him, the Commissioner gave him a subsidy of 50 MTT, 
provided that he would use them to buy a pair of oxen to work the land.246  
Despite Teodorani’s advice, Ilssai Ghebresghi was allowed only 30 MTT.247 Unfortunately, we 
do not know how Ilssai Ghebresghi spent the sum. What we do know is that the average price of an 
ox in 1905 was 25 MTT,248 and so Teodorani’s original proposed subsidy of 50 MTT would have 
enabled Ilssai Ghebresghi to buy a pair of oxen for his fields. On 1 August 1907, the same proposal 
of a 50 MTT subsidy was advanced by Teodorani for the former ascari of the 4th Batallion, Tesfa 
Ghedai.249 Being a rəstäñña (rəst owner), a pair of oxen would have helped him to farm his land. 
Even in this case, only 30 MTT were granted to Tesfa Ghedai. Indeed, 30 MTT was the highest sum 
granted as a one-time subsidy. The only exception that could be found for this study forms part of a 
group of older requests, and concerns the case of Bescir Agos, ascari of the 1st Company of the 5th 
Batallion. In 1895, he was injured during the battle at Mai-Maret and was subsequently declared 
unfit and discharged without any subsidy.250 He had previously sold a mule on credit to Major Pinelli 
for 48 MTT. Pinelli, however, died at the Battle of ‘Adwa without paying his debt. Being unfit for 
 
244 I have retained the spelling of the ascaris’ names as they were reported in the documents.  
245  Elsai Gebresghi had declined the pension and instead opted for a one-time bonus in 1901, five years after the battle 
of ‘Adwa, as was allowed by the 1893 Regulations. See ‘Regolamento di Disciplina, Art. 46’ in Mori, Manuale di 
legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 2: 815–17. 
246  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Commissario del Serae alla 
Segreteria di S.E. il Governatore’, ʿAddi Ugri, 23 July 1907.  
247  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Segreteria del Governo della 
Colonia a Commissario regionale di ʿAddi Ugrì’, 9 August 1907.  
248  Marchi, Studi sulla pastorizia della colonia Eritrea, 17.  
249  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Istanza di Tesfà Ghedai, 
Commissariato Regionale del Seraè alla Segreteris di S.E il Governatore’, ʿAddi Ugrì, 1 August 1907.  
250  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Domanda di sussidio, alla 
Segreteria del Governatore della Colonia’, Asmara, 4 October 1906.  
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work, Bescir Agos’s six children were raised by his brother Mohammed Agos, an ascari himself, 
who was still in service. Colonel Pecori-Giraldi, Commander of the RCTC, made an enquiry that 
confirmed Bescir Agos’s story, and the Government granted him a subsidy of 48 MTT, which was 
the amount due for the mule.  
Ibrahim Abdalla had lost all his cattle to the gulhai, and subsequently wrote a letter to the 
Government in July 1907.251 An ‘Adwa amputee, his countrymen gave him land to farm in order to 
be able to support his family. He had a wife and five children. Being unfit for work, he hired a farmer 
to work his land using his brother’s oxen, setting aside a quarter of the produce for himself. The 
Residente252 of the Märäb province proposed giving him 25 MTT to buy “some small livestock”. 
The government settled on granting a subsidy of 20 MTT,253 given that the price of a sheep was 
around around 2 MTT at that time.254 
Most of the cases I have analysed also bring to light the existence of forms of mutual help between 
the members of the veterans’ communities. The amputees were clearly unfit for work in the fields 
and found help in their kin and fellow countrymen. Other two pleas I have analysed here come from 
two former comrades in arms of the same company (3rd Company, 8th Battalion), both living in the 
small village of Zeban Debri (in the Ṣəra‘ region).255 Maru Agos, son of Agos and Lelit Ragua, was 
45 years old and farmed a communal land with the help of the other villagers to earn a living for 
himself, his wife, and his four children. His oldest son, who was 11 years old, worked as a servant. 
Having renounced the pension, he had depleted the 210 MTT bonus he received from the 
 
251  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Istanza Ibrahim Abdalla, 
Residenza del Mareb a S.E: il Governatore della Colonia (Segreteria)’, 22 July 1907. 
252  The role of the residente was first defined by Governor Ferdinando Martini, during his administrative reorganisation 
of the colony in 1898. A residenza could be established an administrative unit smaller than a region, and the residente 
was the representative of the governor of the colony for that portion of territory. See Decreto governatoriale n. 44, 29 
June 1898, in Angiolo Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, vol. 4 (Rome: Tip. dell’Unione, 1914), 71. 
253  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Concessione di sussidio 
all’ex ascari mutilato Ibrahim Abdalla, Segreteria del Governo a Residenza del Mareb’, Asmara 9 August 1907. 
254  The average price of a goat was 1 ½ MTT. See Marchi, Studi sulla pastorizia della colonia Eritrea, 17. 
255  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni. Mutilati. Informazioni. 




government when he retired, and was granted a 8 MTT one-time subsidy.256 His former comrade, 
Brahanù Uoldehannes, born in Enda Alia Semiel (Ṣəra‘ region) about 30 years before, was also 
living with his wife and his three children on the products of a field harvested by his fellow 
villagers.257 He was also given 210 MTT after he opted out the pension, and received 8 MTT from 
the government in response to his petition.258  
Also present are some exceptions, regarding veterans with no access to land, who nevertheless 
refused the pension. Adakanin Ghebru (elsewhere Adamon), a former zaptiè, was born in Ad 
Teclesan. He took shelter in a “tucul” in Eliberet (Ela Behred, near Kärän)259 with his wife and two 
children, “living on charity” after the 425 lire he received by the government as an alternative to the 
pension was all gone.260 After a 4-day journey on foot, he reached Asmara to deliver his petition to 
the governor himself during June 1907: “I have no wealth,” he wrote, “[in the form of] goats, cattle 
etc.”. The governor allowed him a 5 MTT subsidy.261  
Not all of the investigations ended well for the applicants, and some requests were rejected. The 
former ascari of the Customs Office, Abbai Burrù, wrote to the Government asking for a job in 
Asmara to earn money in order to help his sick mother.262 Enquiries into the merits of his case led 
to the discovery that he had been sentenced for three charges, including theft and fraud, which caused 
him to be expelled from the army on 19 February 1907. Even though he could write and read Italian, 
Arabic, Amharic and Təgre, anybody interested in hiring him was discouraged to do so by the 
Commander of the Carabinieri Artuffo.263  
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Besides his condition as an amputee, tuberculosis made Ali Mohammed unable to “earn a piece 
of bread”, after he had spent the 525 lire he received from the government due of his illness. He 
played the card of his poor health, together with an appeal to his family’s plight and a very emotional 
writing style (“with tear-soaked eyes and a pounding heart”) to get a subsidy.264 However, after a 
background check, the government discovered that his wife and children had long since left him; 
thus, they decided to refuse him any subsidy at all to punish him for his lie.265 This last case is also 
interesting because it reveals that not all the Italian officers agreed with the subsidisation policy. 
According to Commissioner Vittorio Fioccardi, who had made the inquires on Ali Mohammed’s 
case, “as a matter of principle, the granting of subsidies to those who renounced the pension should 
be avoided”.266 Ironically, Fioccardi’s enquiries showed that Ali Mohammed was being supported 
by another amputee, who, on the contrary, had opted for the pension.267 
On other occasions, the personal conditions of amputee helped, despite of bad references or 
records of bad behaviour. The story of Garanchiel Uorché of the 3rd Company of the 4th Batallion, 
is a good example.268 Garenchiel Uorché, born in Zeban Debri, had four children and took part in 
some of the most important battles the Italian colonial army had fought. As an attendant for Major 
Toselli, Garenchiel Uorché fought in the Battle of Kassala269 and the Battle of Amba Alage. For the 
latter action he received a letter from Major Toselli recommending him for a silver medal. Injured 
at the right hip, he was captured by the enemy. Once freed, he sought safety at the fort of Mäqälä, 
then under siege by Ras Mäkwännən. During the Battle of ‘Adwa, he was injured in the head and 
captured again. Together with his fellow ascaris, his right hand and his left foot were amputated. 
On 16 September the Government agreed to grant him 25 MTT (“him being more disgraced than 
 
264  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni. ‘Illustrissimo Sig. Marchese 
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265  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 831, Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni. ‘Il Commissario Fioccardi 
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266  Ibid. 
267  Ibid. 
268 ASDMAE, AE 831, ‘Personale vari indigeni e pratiche varie riguardanti indigeni, Garenchiel Orché [sic] al 
Commissrio di Adi Ugri’, Asmara 7 September 1907.  
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his fellows”270) which he collected in Asmara.271 After that, he went back to ‘Addi Wəgri, and tried 
to cheat the Government with a new application for a subsidy with Commissioner Teodorani. The 
Government had not informed him that Garenchiel Uorché had already received a subsidy. However, 
when the deceit was discovered, Teodorani decided not to punish Grenchiel Uorché given that “he 
is a poor amputee”.272 
These examples bring to surface the existence of common patterns and motivations, which can 
help to shed light on the choices of the ascaris. First of all, most of them had joined the army in the 
wake of the catastrophic economic and environmental crisis brought by the rinderpest epizootic. 
Second, they renounced the pension, and used their bonuses to buy cattle and to put them in use 
working their lands. A similar strategy is identified by Jean and John Comaroff in South Africa, in 
the case of the Tswana converting currency to buy back the cattle they had lost during a rinderpest 
epidemic in 1896.273 In both these cases, cattle were preferred to a regular pension by the colonised 
subjects as a way to store wealth. This is particularly relevant in the case of the amputees of ‘Adwa, 
as they were clearly unfit for work, and, from the colonial government’s point of view, would have 
benefitted from the pension.  
 In his report of the survey on pastoralism in Eritrea conducted in 1907, the zootechnician Ezio 
Marchi wrote that  
 
[the] Eritreans find in cattle the basis of their life and their wealth […]. These people feel the 
necessity of cattle so much, that when they have some thalers available they invest it in cattle; it 
is not uncommon that some ascaris, not having enough money to buy a cow, come together to 
buy it in partnership. And this is logical: there are no factories there, there is no better way to 
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transform wealth into an asset. Livestock are the only tools to transform into goods those things 
that are not goods, and cannot become goods in other way.274  
 
Unlike his peers, Marchi had understood the importance of cattle as a store of wealth in that 
particular regime of value. In fact, after losing their livestock again because of the second wave of 
rinderpest, many of the veterans resorted to the Government of the colony to ask for cash, and then 
reinvested that cash into cattle. After all, they had seen the vulnerability of the colonial system when 
it almost crumbled; all but crushed under the weight of its ambitions in ‘Adwa. Hence, they reverted 
to the moral solidity of their regime of value. It would take the occurrence of another series of 
environmental calamities to convince some of the ascaris to turn again to the Italian Government to 
earn a living, or, using the phrase so frequently found in their letters, to earn “a piece of bread”.
 









Credit institutions and the impact of Italian monetary policies 
in Eritrea since the outbreak of the First World War  
 
3.1 Introduction: The economic and financial effects of the First World War  
As we have seen in previous chapters, when the Italians arrived in Massawa in 1885, they were 
confronted with a multiple-currency monetary system. By looking at the report compiled by Ennio 
Quirino Alamanni in 1891 it can be seen that, in addition to the Maria Theresa thaler (MTT) and 
Egyptian piastres, Indian merchants traded with Indian rupees, and several other "commodities", such 
as cotton cloth and salt bars called amolé, were still used as money on the Red Sea coasts and in 
Ethiopia.1 The first attempt to introduce a new Italian silver coin into the colony, the tallero eritreo, 
did not change the situation. Even though the 5 lire coin did not substitute the MTT, some subsidiary 
coins (especially the 1 10⁄  thaler coin, issued with a 0.50 lire value and the 0.05 and 0.10 lira bronze 
coins) were successful in local markets, as they performed the task of lower-denomination MTT coins 
(the MTT had previously circulated without any metallic lower denominations). Some banknotes had 
also circulated in the colony since 1886, but they were usually used by wholesale traders and rarely 
by ordinary Eritreans.2 Rather than a colonial monetary system, a multiple currency system endured 
in the colony, and the local buyers and sellers adapted the Italian subsidiary coins into it. The Indian 
merchants continued to use the rupee on the coast, and the Maria Theresa thaler continued to be the 
only universally accepted silver coin in the colony and across its borders. For this reason, it was 
important that a sufficient quantity of Maria Theresa thalers circulated in the region, to facilitate inter-
regional trade. However, at the outbreak of the First World War, the Austrian mint stopped issuing 
MTT. Therefore, a short supply of MTT became one of the most dramatic consequences of the First 
 
1  Ennio Quirino Mario Alamanni. La Colonia Eritrea e i Suoi Commerci (Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1891) 275, 705; 
Richard Pankhurst, ‘“Primitive Money” in Ethiopia’. Journal de La Société des Africanistes 32, no. 2 (1962): 213–48; 
Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935 (Addis Ababa: Haile Sellassie University Press, 1968), 
460–68. 
2  Arnaldo Mauri, Il Mercato Del Credito in Etiopia (Milan: Giuffrè, 1967) 144.  
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World War on the Eritrean economic system, as well as for the trade network of the Red Sea region.3  
In this chapter, the exceptional effects of the First World War will allow us to shed light on the 
role of the MTT in local markets, highlight its importance for the Eritrean economy, and position our 
discussion of the Italian colony in a broader context. This will be achieved by tracing the circulation 
of the silver coin at this time.  
The historical period from the eve of the First World War to the interwar years represents a turning 
point for the colony. Any idea of an agrarian settlement colony had been abandoned, but the 
transformation of the colony into a commercial hub was just beginning.4 The railway connecting the 
port town of Massawa, on the Red Sea, to the capital, Asmara (2,200 metres above the sea level), was 
completed in 1911. Around this time, the first bank branch had also just opened.5 After the War, a 
period of strategic transformation of the colony began. A more aggressive political and commercial 
strategy will make its influence felt in both Ethiopia and on the opposite shores of the Red Sea.6  
The importance of the impact of the First World War in Africa, and the “diversity of its 
experiences”, was acknowledged in a special issue of the Journal of African History.7 Subsequent 
work has focused on the contributions that African colonies brought to the First World War,8 
 
3  Before the outbreak of the war, in his overview of the monetary systems of the Red Sea region, Carlo Rossetti 
acknowledged that the MTT was widely circulating in Ethiopia and in the Arabian Peninsula, too. Carlo Rossetti, Il 
regime monetario delle colonie italiane (Rome: Tipografia dell’Unione Editrice, 1914), 36. See sections 1.2 and 1.4 in 
this thesis.   
4   Podestà, Gian Luca. Il mito dell’Impero. Economia, politica e lavoro nelle colonie italiane dell’Africa Orientale 1898-
1941. (Turin: Giappichelli, 2004), 172–76. 
5  Colosimo, Gaspare. Relazione al Parlamento sulla situazione politica economica ed amministrativa delle colonie 
italiane. (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1919), 108. 
6 Podestà, Il mito dell’Impero, 177. 
7 Rathbone, Richard. ‘World War I and Africa: Introduction’. The Journal of African History 19, no. 1 (January 1978): 
1–9. The book curated by Melvin Page collects more contributions about the participation of Africans in the First World 
War, either as soldiers or labourers. See Page, Melvin E, ed. Africa and the First World War. (Houndmills Basingstoke: 
Macmillan), 1987. Another milestone for the study of the impact of the First World War in Africa is Crowder, Michael. 
‘The First World War and Its Consequences’. In General History of Africa. Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-
1935, ed. A. Adu Boahen, (California: Heinemann, 1985), 283–311.  
8 For a general introduction of the events of the First World War that occurred in Africa, see Hew Strachan, The First 
World War., vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), 495–643; Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
141 
 
especially in terms of soldiers,9 labourers,10 and other economic efforts.11 Less attention has been 
dedicated to the impact of the War on colonial finances and monetary circulation.12 During the First 
World War, the gold standard system collapsed, leaving world currencies free to float.13 The rising 
prices of precious metals on international markets and the high demand for currency in Europe 
itself—a result of rising volumes of industrial production supporting the war effort—caused a lack of 
currency circulation in most European colonies.14 In a recent special issue of the journal Afriche e 
Orienti focussed on the economic impact of the First World War in Africa, Karin Pallaver shows that 
the lack of currency in British East African colonies caused difficulties in paying carriers and soldiers 
coming back from the front.15 In West Africa, the lack of circulating currency caused a significant 
part of the indigenous population to revert to the use of commodity money, such as cowries.16 
Moreover, the currency crisis led to the formulation of new monetary policies that, together with the 
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57–83; David Killingray, ‘Repercussions of World War I in the Gold Coast’, The Journal of African History 19, no. 1 
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The First World War from the South’, Radical History Review 2018, no. 131 (1 May 2018): 13–35. 
10  See, for example, the role of porters in Michael Pesek, ‘The War of Legs. Transport and Infrastructure in the East 
African Campaign of World War I’, Transfers. Interdisciplinary Journal of Mobility Studies 5, no. 2 (2015): 102–20. 
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post-War trade depression, produced turmoil among the indigenous population and colonial settlers.17 
As Wambui Mwangi shows in her work on the consequences of the policies issued following the 
foundation of the East African Currency Board in 1919, the study of currency crises is a tool to 
analyse how power is renegotiated among colonial subjects, and between them and colonial 
governments.18 For these reasons, the study of the consequences of the First World War can be a 
workbench in analysing the functioning of the Eritrean monetary system, and studying the manner in 
which different actors positioned themselves in relation to it and to colonial monetary policies.  
No war action occurred in Eritrea, but some recent studies have described the economic impact of 
the War on the Italian colonies. Italy has never deployed indigenous troops on European fronts;19 
however, the war effort for the invasion of Libya had put major pressure on the labour reserve in 
Eritrea, causing an increase in regional migration flows of labourers to be recruited into the army or 
as salaried workers in Eritrea.20 In a recent volume, the impact of the First World War on north-east 
Africa is analysed by an examination of the effect of the War on the balances of power, at the level 
of changing colonial strategies and local agencies.21 The aim of this book is to go beyond the nation-
state division by including inter-regional connections in the analysis, as well reframing the classical 
1914-1918 periodisation of the War so as to look at the complexities present before and after the War. 
Among the various scholarly contributions to this volume, Massimo Zaccaria focussed on the 
economic impact of the War on Eritrea through the history of the first canned meat factory in the 
 
17  Karin Pallaver, ‘A Currency Muddle: Resistance, Materialities and the Local Use of Money during the East African 
Rupee Crisis (1919–1923)’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2019, 1–19. 
18  Wambui Mwangi, ‘Of Coins and Conquest: The East African Currency Board, the Rupee Crisis, and the Problem of 
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19  A number of reasons were enumerated to justify this decision. Amongst these were the harshness of the winter weather 
in Europe for Libyan and Eritrean soldiers, the “convenience” of deploying colonial troops in a patriotic war against 
Austria, and also the matter of the reliability of indigenous soldiers. See Alessandro Volterra, ‘Askaris and the Great War: 
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Tripoli to Addis Ababa (1911-1924), ed. Shiferaw Bekele, Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, and Alessandro Volterra (Addis 
Abbeba: Centre français des études éthiopiennes, 2018). For the numbers of indigenous soldiers employed in the Libyan 
campaign, see Alessandro Volterra, Sudditi coloniali: ascari eritrei 1935-1941 (Milano: F. Angeli, 2005), 48–49, 52–55. 
20  Stefano Bellucci and Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Wage Labor and Mobility in Colonial Eritrea, 1880s to 1920s’, 
International Labor and Working-Class History 86 (2014): 89–106. 
21 Shiferaw Bekele et al., eds., The First World War from Tripoli to Addis Ababa (1911-1924) (Addis Ababa: Centre 
français des études éthiopiennes, 2019). 
143 
 
colony.22 The Torrigiani factory had signed a contract with the Italian Ministry of War before the 
outbreak of the First World War, for the provision of 1.2 million cans of tinned meat per year, for 
nine years, to the Italian army.23 The war effort brought the total request to 24 million cans by 1921-
1922.24 This order put unbearable pressure on the local cattle reserve, which had been already reduced 
by the rinderpest. As a consequence of that and of the naval blockade that impeded the import of 
livestock from Yemen, the colonial government was forced to impose a quota system on local cattle 
in order to meet the needs of the factory.25 The obstacles in obtaining enough food supply, the 
shortage of circulating currency and the rise of prices, together with the request for cattle at reduced 
prices, provoked a protest in the Akkälä Guzay region.26 
In another paper, Zaccaria analyses Italian attempts to enhance the agricultural production of the 
Italian colonies in order to support the war effort.27 Through the analysis of “what was attempted 
unsuccessfully”, Zaccaria intends to show how the effort to achieve self-sufficiency in the colonies 
had a disruptive impact, notwithstanding poor results in terms of Italian expectations. In the case of 
Eritrea, the colonial government asked the indigenous population to revert to the production of 
cereals, potatoes and other staples, to be sent to Italy. The result was that not even self-sufficiency in 
the production of foodstuffs was achieved, and government demands were received with a general 
popular protest.28    
As we will see, from 1916 the colonial government assigned to the recently opened agencies of 
the Bank of Italy a monopoly of money-changing activity in the colony, thus attempting to control 
the circulation of the MTT and curb speculation. The opening of the bank also represents an important 
opportunity for historical research. The surveillance activity of the bank on local monetary circulation 
 
22  Massimo Zaccaria, ‘Feeding the War: Canned Meat Production in the Horn of Africa and the Italian Front’, in The 
First World War from Tripoli to Addis Ababa (1911-1924), ed. Shiferaw Bekele, Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, and Alessandro 
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provides important documentary evidence that sheds light on the financial landscape of the colony. 
Few studies describe the history of the banking activities in the Italian colony of Eritrea. Arnaldo 
Mauri focusses on the history of the banks in Ethiopia, providing some information about the history 
of banking in Eritrea too. His works also describe the colonial monetary system in Eritrea, but they 
are mostly grounded in colonial publications on this theme.29 In a publication promoted by the Bank 
of Italy, Ercole Tuccimei presents the activities of the Bank of Italy in the colonies, from its first 
indirect participation in colonial activities in Benadir (1889) to the closure of its ex-colonial branches 
(1948).30 Charles Schaefer offers an insightful description of the Ethiopian banking system and of its 
interaction with the “informal” credit networks managed by Indian merchants.31 
The Eritrean monetary system during Italian colonialism is described in a few publications by 
Richard Pankhurst.32 Recently, Steven Serels has made an overview of the colonial monetary systems 
in the Southern Red Sea Region, encompassing Italian, French and British colonies.33 In this paper, 
Serels does not specifically focus on the First Word War currency crisis, but instead on the unintended 
instability brought on by the introduction of colonial currencies in the area, which provoked a loss of 
wealth amongst indigenous people.34 Pallaver, on the other hand, specifically analyses the 
consequences of the First World War on the monetary system of the Italian colonies of Somalia and 
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Eritrea.35 In particular, Pallaver focusses on the (failed) Italian attempts to substitute the Maria 
Theresa thaler with new silver coins issued by the Italian mints. According to Pallaver, the Italian 
failures were the result of a lack of understanding of the functioning of the local monetary system and 
of the role of the MTT. In this respect, Akinobu Kuroda provides an explanation of the success of the 
MTT in the region and the difficulties colonial powers encountered in attempting to get rid of it. 
Analysing colonial reports and quantitative data about trade volume and exchange rates in the period 
from 1935 to 1941, Kuroda shows that the MTT operated as a “buffer money” in connecting different 
market levels. In a triple-layer system, the MTT facilitated the “vertical” conversion between smaller 
denomination coins to international trade currencies like the pound sterling.36 At the same time, the 
inter-regional circulation of thalers allowed the “horizontal” connection between different local 
markets.37 By comparing data from different periods when the value of the MTT remained stable, 
Kuroda also managed to demonstrate the influence of the quantity of circulating thalers in the 
adjustment of commodity and foodstuff prices.38 A shortage of thalers disrupted the connection 
between markets, causing a reduction in the volume of collected commodities and producing a rise 
in prices.39  
The efficacy of Kuroda’s explanation lies in the concept of the complementarity of different kinds 
of money in a multiple currency system, like the one of the Red Sea region: “the complementary 
relationship among monies means that no money works independently, but a combination of monies 
can do what a single money cannot”.40 It is because of this “non-substitutability among monies” that 
colonial policies did not manage to eliminate the Maria Theresa thaler from circulation.41 
By analysing an earlier period from that of Kuroda’s work, this chapter will add a contribution to 
 
35  Karin Pallaver, ‘Da moneta straniera a moneta nazionale: Prima Guerra Mondiale, politiche coloniali e circolazione 
monetaria in Eritrea e Somalia’, in Africa. Storia, Antropologia, Economia, Migrazioni, ed. Donatella Strangio (Roma: 
Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2018), 95–124. 
36  Akinobu Kuroda, ‘The Maria Theresa Dollar in the Early Twentieth-Century Red Sea Region: A Complementary 
Interface between Multiple Markets’, Financial History Review 14, no. 1 (2007): 101. 
37  Ibid., 107. 
38  Ibid., 106. 
39  Ibid., 107. 
40  Ibid., 109. 
41  Ibid., 107. 
146 
 
the history of the financial impact of the First World War in the Italian colony of Eritrea, by describing 
the effect of the War on the local monetary system and the Italian policies implemented to deal with 
the shortage of currency. In this chapter, I will describe the local effects and reactions to these policies. 
The representation of the consequences of the MTT shortage and of the colonial policies will clarify 
the reasons for the success of the MTT in the region (and of the failure of the attempts to substitute 
it).  
This chapter is organised in two parts. In the first part, I will describe some forms of credit services 
in Eritrea before the opening of the first bank branch. This will allow an examination of the way in 
which some actors managed to position themselves at the junction of different monetary networks 
and take advantage of them. I will then introduce the proposal made before the opening of the agencies 
of the Bank of Italy and conclude with a brief description of the history of the banks in Eritrea. This 
will serve to introduce the role that the Bank of Italy had in dealing with the shortage of MTTs during 
the First World War, in the scope of Italian monetary policies. In the second part of the chapter, I will 
describe these very policies. By prohibiting negotiations in MTT in the markets first and abolishing 
the use of the MTT later, the colonial government attempted to cut off the local market prices of 
commodities and foodstuffs from the fluctuating value of the MTT. Through the reports of Regional 
Commissioners, we will see that the policies were not accepted by indigenous people. This resulted 
in the disruption of the local goods transport system, which had previously functioned thanks to 
payments in MTT. At the same time, those who had been included in the colonial economic system 
through the payment of wages in lire faced the greatest difficulties, as the lira progressively lost value 
over the entire period of the War, and the value of the MTT continued to rise. This situation reminds 
of that described by Mahir Şaul in colonial Haute Volta, where, by refusing money issued by the 
government and continuing trade with cowries, woman traders, merchants and elders managed to 
maintain more economic independence compared to wage labourers.42 I will then go on to describe 
the effects of the introduction of two monetary “devices” by the colonial government in the attempt 
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to confront the shortage of currencies. On the one hand, taking advantage of the shortage of circulating 
MTT, a new silver thaler, the tallero d’Italia, was introduced by the Italians in a failed attempt to 
supplant the MTT in local and inter-regional commerce. On the other hand, banknotes had been 
introduced to aid internal circulation, but were not widely accepted in local markets.  
At the end of the chapter, I will broaden the focus of my analysis, looking at the effect of the War, 
the currency shortage and the Italian policies on caravan trade with Ethiopia. Finally, the reports 
prepared by the agents of the Bank of Italy will help to offer a clear representation of the broader 
circulation of the MTT in the Red Sea region. As a whole, this analysis will aid us in having a look 
closer to the ground, so as to see Kuroda’s model of the complementarity of currencies at work.  
Many of the primary sources I will employ in this chapter have been collected at the Archivio 
Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE) (Archivio Eritrea, AE, and Archivio Storico del 
Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, ASMAI), and the Archivio Storico delle Banca d'Italia (ASBI). The 
exceptionality of the period in terms of the monetary history of the colony is also shown by the new 
research tools offered by the opening of the Bank of Italy in the colony, and its role in the (attempted) 
control of the circulation of the MTTs. For this reason, in the next section I will briefly introduce the 
events that led to the opening of the first agencies of the Bank in Eritrea.  
 
3.2 Banking in the colony and local credit institutions 
During the first years of occupation, the military administration did not need credit institutions 
because there were no concrete development projects or plans for investment in productive activities. 
The only financial service running alongside the treasury in the occupied territories, were those 
provided by the postal offices. The network of postal offices allowed officers and soldiers to transfer 
money to and from Italy safely, but also to make international money orders (vaglia).43 The vaglia 
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became a very important tool to rapidly transfer money inside the colony, especially from 1903, when 
it became possible to make money orders in MTT.44 A maximum of 1,200 MTT could be sent between 
Massawa and Asmara (and 400 MTT towards the other offices of the colony). The amount could be 
retrieved only in MTT once it reached its final destination.45 This measure contributed to making the 
money order a useful tool for Eritreans as well. In fact, as shown by Massimo Zaccaria, the instrument 
was used by Eritrean ascaris during the Italian invasion of Libya (starting from 1912), to send 
remittances back home.46 
The vaglia was very useful for the sending of remittances, but the service was not meant to finance 
the activity of traders and commercial agents. In order to provide credit for the buying of commodities 
and the financing of productive activities (such as pearl fishing), European and local traders had to 
turn to a network of local intermediaries and credit providers. Towards the end of the 19th century, in 
Massawa most of the money lenders and financial agents were “banyans”.47 Even if most of the 
colonial documents refer to them as “banyans”48 (in Italian, baniani), this name describes people 
originating from different parts of the Indian subcontinent, mostly of (but not limited to) Hindu 
religion.49 According to William Gervase Clarence-Smith, most of them came from Gujarat but had 
different geographical origins and cultural identities.50 A common trait of the so called “banyans” 
was their belonging to networks encompassing the whole Indian Ocean, and their general business 
organisation. In fact, most of them used to arrive in Africa as apprentices in partnership with their 
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investors or business treasurers, to become treasurers themselves or open their own firm after several 
years. Apart from managing their family business, they were often members of larger firms based in 
India.51 At the same time, they could partner with local and Arab business families, who represented 
an essential link for their activities in the Red Sea.52 In fact, people originating from the Ḥaḍramawt 
region of Yemen constituted a “translocal community” that proved to be very successful in 
commercial and political activities in the Red Sea region.53 Jonathan Miran points out that the use of 
the term “banyans” has often overshadowed the presence of Muslim Indians too, that integrated into 
the cosmopolitan community of Massawa, and sometimes even inter-married with non-Indian local 
and Ḥaḍrami families.54 Being amongst the most successful traders in Massawa, the Indian merchants 
often participated in local productive activities as creditors. For example, the Italian geologist and 
pearl expert Arturo Issel, during an expedition in the Dahlak Archipelago in 1870, described the role 
of the “banians” in the local pearl fishing industry. The owner of the boat used to pay the fishermen 
at the end of the fishing season with the product of their work, minus one third plus the sum of the 
anticipated expenses for their provisions.55 The “banians” financed the expeditions, thus securing the 
right to purchase the pearls at a discounted price.56  
Moreover, thanks to their commercial networks, the Indian merchants were fundamental in 
providing financial services in Massawa at the end of the 19th century, when European credit 
institutions had not been opened yet. Ennio Quirino Alamanni clearly describes the functioning of 
the local credit network in his essay on commerce in the Italian colony of Eritrea:  
 
A European firm, with an agent in Massawa, would ask a London firm with relations with a 
trading house in Bombay to open a line of credit for the agent in Massawa. The London firm 
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would request the credit in pounds sterling, the Bombay firm would calculate it in rupees and 
supply a chequebook to the agent. When the European agent would be in need of cash, he could 
sell the cheque to the banyans that would repay it in MTT and send cheque to Bombay to be 
refunded in rupee... the trader in Massawa would issue a bill of exchange for his London firm to 
pay back the Bombay firm, charging the [European trader] cheque account. In this way, with the 
participation of three intermediaries, and with the balancing of three different currencies, a credit 
operation is achieved.57  
 
These kinds of activities allowed Indian merchants to operate speculations.58 Their commercial 
network and their knowledge of the exchange rate of the different currencies circulating in the port 
town, allowed them to earn “marginal gains”, for example by waiting for the right moment to operate 
the conversions, especially given the fluctuating value of the Maria Theresa thaler.59  
Indian merchants did not only operate credit activities for inter-regional and transnational trade. 
In colonial archives, we can find some evidence of their activity as money lenders inside local 
markets. Information about local credit institutions in Africa is usually fragmentary. Some 
information has been gathered about the so-called “informal” credit institutions and their relationship 
with formal banking system in Ethiopia, from the 1960s and 1970s.60 The most widespread kinds of 
credit institution were the iddir and the iqqub, which are still practised in Ethiopia today. Richard 
Pankhurst and Endreas Eshete first described these institutions in an article in the Ethiopian Observer 
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in 1958. The iddir can be described as a funeral association, whose aim is to provide economic 
assistance to the family of the deceased to organise the funeral rites.61 However, economic assistance 
can also extend to the maintenance of the family of the deceased for a limited period of time.62 The 
iqqub has the features of the rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA):63 a fixed amount of 
money is deposited periodically by a group of people, and the winner of a “lottery” is called at every 
meeting of the association. Alternatively, the members can ask for the money in case of need. Given 
the need for a steady monetary income to participate in these kind of credit institutions, it is possible 
that these systems spread in urban areas after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.64 Talking about the 
iddir, Alula Pankhurst provides evidence of its existence before Italian occupation. However, the 
process of urbanisation, together with the disruption of social bonds based on the authority of local 
chiefs, led to the formalisation of these mutual help institutions. They were also boosted by the 
process of monetisation of the Ethiopian economy.65 As we saw in the second chapter of this thesis, 
there were some forms of mutual help in rural areas, especially for destitute farmers. For example, 
the amputees of ‘Adwa were helped by relatives or members of their communities to farm their land 
through the lending of cattle or workforce.66 These kinds of non-monetary rural mutual help 
institutions are also described by Pankhurst and called dabo and jige.67  
In Italian colonial archives, it is possible to find evidence of the existence of monetary credit 
activity amongst colonial subjects in the markets of the colony. A few examples can be found in the 
transcriptions of some commercial quarrels in the market of Asmara in 1912. These kinds of 
 
61 Alula Pankhurst, ‘The Emergence, Evolution and Transformations of Iddir Funeral Associations in Urban Ethiopia’, 
Journal of Ethiopian Studies 41, no. 1/2 (2008): 145. 
62  Richard Pankhurst and Endreas Eshete, ‘Self-Help in Ethiopia’, Ethiopia Observer, 1958. 
63  A similar institution in West Africa is called esusu; see Gareth Austin, ‘Indigenous Credit Institutions in West Africa, 
c.1750 - c.1960’, in Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750 - 1960, ed. Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sughiara 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), 102. 
64  Pankhurst and Eshete, ‘Self-Help in Ethiopia’, 355; Pankhurst, ‘The Emergence, Evolution and Transformations of 
Iddir Funeral Associations’, 147; Alula Pankhurst and Damen Haile Mariam, ‘The “Iddir” in Ethiopia: Historical 
Development, Social Function, and Potential Role in HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control’, Northeast African Studies, 
Special Issue: HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia, 7, no. 2 (2000), 39. 
65  Pankhurst, ‘The Emergence, Evolution and Transformations of Iddir Funeral Associations’, 147–53. 
66   See section 2.5. 
67  In the 1950s, these institutions were present in the Šäwa, Wälläga, Käfa and Illubabor areas of Ethiopia. See Pankhurst 
and Eshete, ‘Self-Help in Ethiopia’, 361–62. 
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documents are quite exceptional, because litigations occurring in the market were usually solved 
thanks to the mediation of the indigenous market chiefs, without being registered by the Regional 
Commissioner.68 In June 1912 the Regional Commissioner of Asmara, Giuseppe De Rossi, received 
formal complaints from two “banyans” of Asmara against the local market-chief, Lig Belai uod 
Cantiba Desta (“son of Cantiba Desta”).69 Both the complaints regarded the way in which the market 
chief had supervised some litigations regarding unpaid debts. The “banyan” Gorden Curgi from 
Bombay went to the market-chief to complain about an unpaid debt of 100 MTT by an Eritrean called 
Chidane. The intervention of the Regional Commissioner was the result of the misbehaviour of the 
market-chief in managing the case. In fact, following the indigenous consuetudinary law, he asked 
Gorden Curgi to present a guarantor. The role of the guarantor was that of personally taking 
responsibility for the execution of the sentence.70 However, Gorden Curgi refused as “according to 
his people’s tradition, this was not allowed”. At that point, the market-chief held him in custody until 
the intervention of the “chief of the banyan community, Cangi Dossa”. In reply to the Indian 
merchants’ protests, the market-chief asked them, “why don’t you want to follow our law? Are you 
not black like the rest of us?”71 For not having respected the Indian merchant’s will, the market-chief 
Lig Belai Desta was condemned to pay 6 MTT to Cangi Dossa, plus a 6 MTT fine to the government. 
Finally, he was removed from his office.72 
 
68  Civil cases involving a colonial subject and a so-called “assimilato” (“Arabian, Egyptian and Indian foreigners”), had 
to be judged by a regional commissioner. On the contrary, the indigenous market-chief could mediate in any litigation 
“regardless of the race of the parts”. See ‘Articolo 98, Decreto Governatoriale 11 luglio 1908, n. 756, Regolamento 
giudiziario per l’Eritrea’ in Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, vol. 6 (1914), 273. For the administration 
of justice in the colony, see also Isabella Rosoni, La Colonia Eritrea: la prima amministrazione coloniale italiana: (1880-
1912) (Macerata: EUM, 2006); Massimo Zaccaria, ‘“TU HAI VENDUTO LA GIUSTIZIA IN COLONIA”: Avvocati, 
Giudici e Coloni Nell’Eritrea Di Giuseppe Salvago Raggi 1907-1915’, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale di Studi e 
Documentazione dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 61, no. 3/4 (2006): 317–95; Francesca Locatelli, ‘“Oziosi, 
Vagabondi e Pregiudicati”: Labor, Law, and Crime in Colonial Asmara, 1890-1941’, The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 225–250; Alessandro Volterra, ‘La Giustizia Coloniale in Eritrea Tra Diritto Comune 
e Diritto Consuetudinario’, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale di Studi e Documentazione dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e 
l’Oriente 63, no. 1 (2008): 82–107.  
69  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 645, ‘Provvedimenti per sistemare il mercato di Asmara’, 28 June 1912. 
70  ‘Art. 124 e Art. 130 Decreto Governatoriale 11 luglio 1908 n. 756, Regolamento giudiziario per l’Eritrea’ in Angiolo 
Mori, Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, vol. 6 (Rome: Tip. dell’Unione, 1914), 277–78. For a general 
introduction to customary law in Eritrea see Irma Taddia, L’Eritrea-colonia, 1890-1952: paesaggi, strutture, uomini del 
colonialismo (F. Angeli, 1986), 160–67. 
71  A witness, Carsandas Kalidas, later reported that the market-chief had asked “are you white or black?”. ASDMAE, 
AE, pacco 645, ‘Provvedimenti per sistemare il mercato di Asmara, Udienza civile del giorno 13 giugno 1912, decisione 
n.186’. 
72  Ibid. 
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Ennio Quirino Alamanni was also the first to recommend, in writing, the opening of an Italian 
bank in the colony.73 According to him, an Italian credit institution was necessary to increase the 
“fame, reputation and trade [volume]” of Massawa, and “raise and strengthen the influence of the 
homeland on a profitable and respectable basis”.74 Moreover, the opening of a bank would have 
stopped “the vicious, expensive and humiliating circle, that the national traders need to follow […] 
to open a credit in Massawa and the markets of the Red Sea”.75 Alamanni continues: “[the opening 
of the bank] would reduce the purchasing costs and […] the prices of the commodities, as the Italian 
trader, or rather his company, will not have to pay three different commissions and quite substantial 
interests”.76 The first concrete proposal for opening a bank in the colony did not come from an Italian 
institution. Hassan Mussa el-Akad was an Egyptian exile banished to Massawa after he had supported 
the 'Urabi revolt against the European influence in Egypt.77 In January 1886 he sent a proposal to the 
Military Governor, Carlo Genè, regarding the opening of a bank in Massawa. The proposal was 
considered with interest by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Carlo Felice Nicolis, Conte di 
Robilant, being “a private enterprise aiming at developing the commercial life in our new 
dominions”.78 After some investigations were carried out in Cairo, the proposal was rejected, due to 
Mussa el-Akad “being judged a very dangerous person”.79 In 1887, another proposal by Mussa el-
Akad to the government gives us a clue about his ability to exploit the multiple currency system at 
work in Massawa, working “in the margins”. The Egyptian government announced the 
demonetisation of the copper piastres by May 1888, requiring them to be exchanged at the rate of 18 
copper piastres to 1 silver piastre. Mussa el-Akad asked the Italian government for authorisation to 
collect the soon-to-be debased piastres from the population on behalf of the Italian military command, 
 
73  Alamanni, La Colonia Eritrea e i suoi commerci, 287. 
74  Ibid., 287–88. 
75  Ibid., 287. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Miran, Red Sea Citizens, 310 note 109. “Chi sarebbe Hassan-Mussa-El- Akkad”, Corriere della Sera, n. 85, 26 marzo 
1887. M., ‘I traditori di Massaua’. 
78  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, posizione 22/1, ‘Progetto di Istituzione Bancaria per Iniziativa di Musa Al Acad, Il Ministro 
degli Esteri Di Robilant al Generale Genè’, Rome, 10 January 1886.  
79  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, posizione 22/1, ‘Progetto di Istituzione Bancaria per Iniziativa di Musa Al Acad, Il Ministro 
degli Esteri Di Robilant al Generale Genè’, Rome, 15 February 1886.  
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in order to exchange them at a discounted price in Cairo.80 The Italian government refused his 
proposal because Egyptian piastres had ceased to be legal tender in the Italian territories since 21 
April 1887. Therefore, the Italians did not have any interest in taking part in their demonetisation.81 
However, for the same reason, they could not prevent Mussa el-Akad from collecting the piastres and 
exchanging them in Egypt. The only Italian initiative along these lines was to issue a notice about the 
deadline for exchanging the coins in Egypt to prevent the public engaging in agiotage, “which would 
be detrimental for poorer people”.82 In 1890, Hassan Mussa el-Akad hit the headlines in Italy when 
he was unjustly accused of “plotting with the enemy”.83 When his name was finally cleared, he had 
accumulated a debt of 325,000 lire during the time he spent in prison. As is reported by Jonathan 
Miran, the list of his creditors is illuminating in terms of the financial sector in Eritrea at that time. 
28 out of Hassan Mussa el-Akkad’s 45 creditors were Indians, who together claimed over 50 per cent 
of his debts.84 Among the claimants was also Ali Abdalla Dossal, a prominent Indian Muslim residing 
in Massawa, operating as an agent for several British shipping companies.85  
However, Hassan Mussa el-Akkad’s proposal of opening a bank in the colony was not the only 
 
80  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 60, 1887, ‘Piastre di Rame Egiziane, Il Maggior Generale Saletta al Signor Segretario per gli 
Affari Indigeni’, Massawa, 31 July 1887.  
81  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 60, 1887, ‘Soppressione del corso legale della piastra egiziana, Il Maggior Generale Genè al 
Signor Segretario degli Affari Indigeni’, 19 April 1887. 
82  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 60, 1887, ‘Piastre di Rame Egiziane, Il Maggior Generale Saletta al Signor Segretario per gli 
Affari Indigeni’, Massawa, 31 July 1887.  
83  Hassan Mussa el-Akad was one of the protagonists of the chain of events that led to the breaking of the “Livraghi 
scandal” (see note 211, chapter 2). The Egyptian exile, together with Käntiba Hamed Hassan, was sentenced to death by 
the Military Court in Massawa for allegedly “plotting with the enemy”. After the “Livraghi scandal” was unveiled, Hassan 
Mussa el-Akad’s sentence was reversed. He later sued the government for the losses his business incurred during the 
process, but he was not compensated, as the laws allowing an individual to sue the government had not yet been issued 
in the colony. See Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale, 436–37. Cass. Roma 39 aprile 1894, ‘Said Hassan Mussa El 
Akkad - Commissariato Militare’, 540. See Chapter 2, note 226. 
84  Miran, Red Sea Citizens, 141; ASDMAE, AE, pacco 152, ‘1892 Repertorio n. 24, Atto di transazione, n. 843 registro 
atti notarili, Patrimonio Akad’, 11 February 1892.  
85  Miran, Red Sea Citizens, 141–42. On 30 January 1892, Ali Abdalla Dossal obtained a concession from the Italian 
administration for the export of 3,000 tons of salt from the colony in order to sell it in Bombay and “activate the trade of 
sea-salt produced in the colony”. See ASDMAE, AE, pacco 154, ‘Colonia Eritrea, Dogana di Massaua’, 30 gennaio 1892.  
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one. In 1890, another proposal arrived from a certain T. Gandolfi,86 who described his desire of 
opening a bank in Eritrea as being “driven by the desire to be useful for his own country and at the 
same time act in the interest of his associates”.87 The conditions proposed for the opening of the bank 
were a pre-emption for the opening of new branches in the colony, a free concession of land for the 
building of the bank and the warehouses, a tax exemption, the concession of the dock of the port of 
Massawa, and the management of the treasury of the colony.  As we will see, some of the conditions 
are identical to those put forward by the Bank of Italy for the opening of an agency, but no bank 
branch was opened in the colony until 1914.88  
During the first Colonial Congress, organised in Asmara in 1905, the opening of a bank in Eritrea 
was one of the discussed topics.89 In his report, Eteocle Cagnassi proposed the creation of a credit 
institution in Eritrea to revive trade in the colony, by helping private enterprises and public initiatives, 
following the example of other imperialistic powers.90 In addition to the more common functions of 
a bank (namely loans, discounts, wire transfer, money exchange, and so on), Cagnassi proposed that 
the bank should issue fiat-money in the colony, in the form of banknotes or at least silver coins, using 
 
86   Unfortunately, I was not able to further identify T. Gandolfi. Someone named Tertulliano Gandolfi published a memoir 
about his life in Eritrea in 1910, criticising the exploitative and violent behaviour of the Italians in the colony. However, 
it is almost certainly not the same T. Gandolfi, as the author was then a labourer who had arrived in Eritrea in the steerage 
of a Navigazione Generale’s ship in 1889; see Tertulliano Gandolfi, I misteri dell’Africa italiana (Rome: Tertulliano 
Gandolfi Editore, 1910), 9, 177. A more affluent Gandolfi was the founder, together with the engineer Costanzo Bonetti, 
of the Gandolfi & Co. business, which was very active in the industrial and infrastructural development of Eritrea from 
1887. However, this man’s first names were Primizio Remigio, and hence he could not be the T. Gandolfi that was 
proposing the opening of the bank in the colony. See Giuseppe Puglisi, Chi è dell’Eritrea: Dizionario biografico (Asmara: 
Agenzia Regina, 1952), 140.  
87  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 98, ‘Tasse, Monete e Varie 1890, Banca Eritrea Italo-Africana’.  
88  Other news about the imminent opening of credit institutions, especially by foreigners, continued to appear in the 
press, sparking a debate about the opportunity to open the branch of an Italian bank in the colony. In 1893, for example, 
rumours circulated about the intention of two Greek investors (whose surnames were “Akrossi-Kalenos”) to open a bank 
in Eritrea. See ‘Cronaca Africana’, in Bollettino della Società Africana d’Italia, Anno XV, Fascicolo 2, Marzo-Aprile 
(1895), 71. 
89  Interestingly, the director of the Bank of Italy, Bonaldo Stringher, was invited but did not participate. See Alberto 
Acquarone, ‘Politica estera e organizzazione del consenso nell’età Giolittiana: Il Congresso dell’Asmara e la fondazione 
dell’Istituto Coloniale Italiano’, in Dopo Adua: Politica e Amministrazione Coloniale (Rome: Ministero per i beni 
culturali e ambientali, 1989), 255–410. See also chapter 1, note n. 217 in this thesis.  
90  Eteocle Cagnassi, ‘La fondazione di un istituto di credito per l’Africa italiana e lo sviluppo economico della Colonia 
Eritrea’, in Atti del Congresso coloniale italiano in Asmara settembre-ottobre 1905, ed. Carlo Rossetti, vol. 1 (Rome: 
Tipografia dell’Unione cooperativa editrice, 1906), 53. 
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the Eritrean thalers still held by the treasury.91  According to Cagnassi, indigenous people were not 
used to banknotes, as they used to hoard money underground (the “customary indigenous safe”) or 
put the silver aside through jewellery-making.92 Two obstacles stood in the way of the opening of a 
bank in the colony: the need to secure enough profit for the bank, and the greater operational risks in 
the colony. The first problem would be solved by laying the economic ground for the flourishing of 
industries and commercial activities.93 The second, which was a serious problem for a bank that was 
also an issuing body, was to give the bank a special regulation, different from that of the banks in the 
homeland, in order to allow the colonial agencies to participate in lucrative (but risky) enterprises.94   
In the wake of the discussions at the Colonial Congress about the opening of the bank, the 
Direzione Centrale degli Affari Coloniali (Central Administration of the Colonial Affairs) of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned to the Bank of Italy, testing the waters for the opening of an agency 
in the colony.95 The proposal involved the assignment of the management of the treasury of the colony 
to the bank, in order to amortise the opening expenses.96 Moreover, the bank was to issue agricultural 
loans. The bank replied by organising a survey in the colony to assess the feasibility of the project. 
In order to evaluate the economic conditions of the colony, Niccolò Introna, who would later become 
the director of the Bank of Italy, was sent to the colony together with Secretary Mario Mioni.97 The 
results of the survey were presented in a seventy-five page report that Introna wrote for the director 
of the Bank of Italy, Bonaldo Stringher. The report encompassed different aspects regarding the state 
of the colony, climatic and environmental features, administrative organisation, demographic 
 
91  In British West Africa, import and distribution of silver coins was the main reason that led to the opening of a bank 
in Nigeria; Uche, ‘Foreign Banks, Africans, and Credit in Colonial Nigeria, c. 1890-1912’. For the introduction of formal 
banking services in a context of multiple currencies in French West Africa, see the research by Toyomu Masaki, ‘Multiple 
Monies in Senegambia (1815–1901). Indian Cotton, Silver Coin, and Paper Money.’, Discussion Paper Series (Institute 
of Human and Social Sciences: Kanazawa University, 2015), http://toyomumasaki.w3.kanazawa-
u.ac.jp/papers/Paper20150727.pdf. Accessed 30 March 2021. 
92  Cagnassi, ‘La fondazione di un Istituto di credito per l’Africa italiana e lo sviluppo economico della Colonia Eritrea’, 
56. 
93  Ibid., 67. 
94  Ibid., 58, 61. 
95  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, posizione 34/3, ‘Pro-memoria, Banca in Eritrea’.  
96  At that time, the treasury was issuing an average of 9 million lire per year, and collecting 3 million lire per year. See 
Mauri, Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, 149. 
97  Tuccimei, La banca d’Italia in Africa, 60. 
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information, the expenses and revenues of the colonial government, a description of the infrastructure, 
and details on the economic activities carried out by the indigenous people. Describing the trade 
volume in the colony, Introna stated that most imports came from India, wherefrom cotton fabrics, 
dura,98 rice, sugar, tobacco, dates, tea, metalware, animal products and chemicals were imported.  
Most of this kind of trade, according to the report, was carried out by “banyans” in Massawa, most 
of them being agents of Bombay firms.99 Introna described them as “vegetarians, capable of living of 
just a little rice and some dates. Very able and smart in commercial matters”.100 Moreover, Introna 
wrote that the Indian merchants used to send their remittances in rupees or pounds sterling to India 
every Sunday, by means of international money orders or cheques issued by private companies. 
Bombay was the final destination of half of the international money-orders sent from the colony.101   
Indian merchants (together with “Greeks” and “Arabs”) also practised internal trade and retail, 
while the goods sold by any given single indigenous merchant barely reached the value of one 
MTT.102 Finally, analysing the state of financial institutions in the colony, Introna declared that the 
exchange of the MTT was a lucrative affair for the “banyans” that operated as money-changers, and 
identified Ali Abdalla Dossal as one of the “most dangerous usurers”, asking for up to 60 per cent 
interest on a loan.103 On 15 February 1906, the Board of the Bank of Italy decided it was time to open 
a branch in Eritrea. However, any project for the opening of an agency of the Bank of Italy in the 
colony was suspended in 1908, and the opening to the public of the first branch in Asmara only 
 
98  From the Arabic “dhurrah”, Sorghum durra was the staple food of the Horn of Africa.  
99  The figures of import trade from Italy came just after those from India. The most important items were: wine, cotton 
fabrics, metalware, construction timber and machinery, flour, pasta, grain, citrus fruits, soap, leather goods, paper, woollen 
and silk yarns. See ASBI, Affari coloniali – Pratiche 305, Relazioni Asmara ‘Relazione sulla Colonia Eritrea sull’impianto 
di una agenzia della Banca d’Italia in Asmara, Cav. Introna (1906)’, 36. The main export items were: pearls, mother-of-
pearl, and hides. Other products were imported through caravan trade with Ethiopia, whose statistical data are less reliable. 
The products were: hides, honey, wax, cattle, horses and other livestock, butter, ivory, gold, indigenous cloths, rubber, 
ostrich feathers, and coffee. The caravan trade volume was periodical, as it was absent during the rainy season. A rise in 
the export of hides in 1905 was due to the rinderpest epidemic. A fall in exports of ivory was due to the prohibition of the 
elephant hunt after the signing of the Brussels Convention in 1900. The main export items of caravan trade were: cotton 
fabrics, silk waste, oil, Indian rice, Italian pasta, iron ploughshares, polished metalwares, glasses, medicines, perfumes, 
mattings, and liquors (especially absinthe). See ASBI, Affari coloniali – Pratiche 305, Relazioni Asmara, ‘Relazione sulla 
Colonia Eritrea sull’impianto di una agenzia della Banca d’Italia in Asmara, Cav. Introna (1906)’, 39-40. 
100  ASBI, Affari coloniali – Pratiche 305, Relazioni Asmara, ‘Relazione sulla Colonia Eritrea sull’impianto di una 
agenzia della Banca d’Italia in Asmara, Cav. Introna (1906)’, 37-38. 
101  Ibid., 47 
102  Ibid., 44. 
103  Ibid., 52-53. 
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occurred six years later.104 The reason for the delay was that, together with the assignment of the 
treasury management, the bank had also advanced other expensive requests.105 One example is the 
request for a free concession of a building for the opening of the offices. Another reason for the failure 
of initial negotiations was that the internal rules of the Bank of Italy and the banking law in force in 
Italy did not allow an issuing body like the Bank of Italy to operate certain kinds of risky credit 
transactions. For these reasons, the government of the colony decided that the investments requested 
for the opening of a bank agency were not worth the mere management of the treasury by the bank 
and the few other permitted operations.106 The Italian Government then reverted to the Bank of Rome 
(Banco di Roma) for the opening of an agency in the colony.107 That was not the first time that the 
Banco di Roma was involved in Italian enterprises in East Africa. From 1884, the bank was a creditor 
of the Filonardi Company, operating in Zanzibar.108 Moreover, in 1893, on the occasion of the 
concession of the Benadir region (which later became part of the Italian colony of Somalia) to 
Vincenzo Filonardi, the bank conceded to Filonardi a credit of 216,000 lire for the administration of 
the outpost.109 However, the Italian government could not reach an agreement for the opening of a 
branch of the Banco di Roma in Eritrea, as the Ministry of the Treasury did not agree to assigning the 
management of the treasury to a private institution, as was requested by the Bank of Rome.110 The 
bank, instead, was the main actor of what was called “peaceful penetration strategy” in Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania, from 1907. The fact that it was not a “state bank” was used to reassure the Turkish 
authorities who controlled those territories of the lack of political intention in the bank’s activities.111 
 
104  Tuccimei, La Banca d’Italia in Africa, 57. 
105  Ibid., 61. 
106  Ibid., 61–62; ASDMAE, ASMAI I, posizione 22/1, ‘Circolazione monetaria 1885-1913, Salvago Raggi, Copia di 
Rapporto in data 25 gennaio 1908 n. 113/3308/29’; ASDMAE, ASMAI I, posizione 22/1, ‘Circolazione monetaria 1885-
1913, Memoriale, Direttore di Finanza in Eritrea (Del Corso) a Ministero degli Affari Esteri’, 10 September 1908.  
107  ASDMAE, ASMAI I posizione 22/1, ‘Circolazione monetaria 1885-1913, Ministero Affari Esteri (Ufficio Coloniale) 
a Pacelli (Banco di Roma)’, 27 November 1908. 
108  Luigi De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, vol. 1 (Rome: Banco di Roma, 1982), 89. 
109  De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, 117. For the events that led to the Italian occupation of the Benadir, see Nicola 
Labanca, Oltremare: storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana (Bologna: Il mulino, 2007), 85–94; Angelo Del Boca, Gli 
italiani in Africa orientale: dall’unità alla marcia su Roma (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1992), 413–34. 
110  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, posizione 34/3, ‘Pro-memoria, Banca in Eritrea’. See also Tuccimei, La banca d’Italia in 
Africa, 63; Mauri, Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, 151. 
111  De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, vol. 1, 259. 
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The reason why the Banco di Roma was considered the best financial agent for Italian economic 
penetration in Libya was that it was the only Italian bank with international branches at that time. 
Moreover, the vice-president of the bank, Romolo Tittoni, was the brother of Tommaso Tittoni, who 
had served as the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister almost without interruption between 1903 and 
1909.112 After the opening of the first branch in Tripoli and an agency in Benghazi, the bank expanded 
its activities in Libya until 1911, with the opening of more agencies and participation in different 
commercial and industrial enterprises.113 The only other role that the Banco di Roma had in the 
development of the Italian colonies in East Africa before the 1930s was its participation in the 
financing of some infrastructural works connected to the construction of the Massawa-Asmara 
railway. The Bank of Italy pushed for this investment after favouring the involvement of the Banco 
di Roma in the foundation of the Bank of Abyssinia.114 
Emperor Mənilək had started to test the waters for the opening of a bank since 1903. His aim was 
to open a credit institution to assist his government with financial matters. He explicitly sought to 
involve actors from different countries in the project and managing of the bank, thus avoiding 
excessive interference of a single foreign country in Ethiopia's politics and financial management.115  
Due to similar limitations to those that prevented the opening of a branch in Eritrea, the Bank of Italy 
could not directly participate in the Bank of Abyssinia project. Nonetheless, Stringher agreed to help 
the Italian government organise a consortium of different Italian banks, among which the Banco di 
Roma.116 In the end, Italian credit institutions contributed one quarter of the capital of the Bank of 
Abyssinia; being British most of the capital employed in the operation, it was invested through the 
 
112  Ibid., 241–242. 
113  Ibid, 265–266. The activities of the bank and the suspicious obstructionism of the Turks provided a pretext for the 
Italian military intervention, as was later admitted by Giacomo De Martino, then-secretary general of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in a memorandum. The activities of the bank in Libya were put on hold during the Italo-Turkish War 
(1911-1912), and the role of the bank was essentially that of offering logistical support to the Italian troops (the bank also 
owned warehouses and commercial ships). After the War, the Banco di Roma had to renounce to its non-banking activities 
to curb the losses caused by the war. However, the role of the bank remained important for the expansion of Italian 
political influence in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean Sea; Luigi De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, vol. 2 (Rome: 
Banco di Roma, 1983), 21–24, 27, 248.  
114  De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, vol. 1, 193. 
115  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 496. 
116  The other banks involved were the Banca Commerciale, the Credito Italiano and the Società Bancaria Italiana. Mauri, 
Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, 21. 
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National Bank of Egypt.117   
The Bank of Abyssinia was opened on 15 February 1906. It acted more as a Ministry of Finance 
than as a national bank, being involved in all matters regarding financial administration in the empire. 
This included monetary issues, such as the attempt to supplant the MTT.118 However, the Bank of 
Abyssinia was not met with the desired success. Loans continued to be issued by private agents at a 
minimum interest rate of 10 per cent per month, and Ethiopians continued to prefer investing in land 
rather than depositing their wealth in the bank.119 Although one of the functions of the bank was that 
of custody of the treasury of the state, most of the revenues were still hoarded in the Emperor’s 
palace.120 In 1911, as rumours were circulating about the Bank of Abyssinia wanting to open a branch 
in Eritrea or in the bordering region of Təgray, the government reconsidered the opportunity of 
involving the Bank of Italy. The Italian Government could not allow the new branch’s opening, 
because the Bank of Abyssinia was not an exclusively Italian project.121 Moreover, new calls for the 
opening of a credit institution in the colony came from Italian entrepreneurs.122 Thanks to the 
proclamation of the Regio Decreto (Royal Decree) no. 1367 of 10 December 1911 and the 
modification of the internal rules of the Bank of Italy, the first agencies were opened in the recently 
occupied territories of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.123 The decree allowed the issuing bodies of the 
Kingdom of Italy to open new agencies in the colonies. The new internal rules of the Bank of Italy 
expanded the scope of the issuing body, allowing the agencies to conduct banking operations in the 
colonies.124 The opening of the agencies in Libya (where the Banco di Roma had already opened its 
 
117   The Bank of Italy had been also involved in the issuing of a loan to Ethiopia, as planned by the Additional Convention 
to the Wəčạle Treaty (1889). The worsening of the relationship between Italy and Ethiopia led to an early settlement of 
the debt by Ethiopia in May 1897. See Tuccimei, La Banca d’Italia in Africa, 47, 52. 
118  Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 496. 
119  Ibid., 494, 497. 
120  Ibid., 497. 
121  ASDMAE, ASMAI I, posizione 34/3, ‘Pro-memoria, Banca in Eritrea’. See also Mauri, Il mercato del credito in 
Etiopia, 148. 
122  See G. E. Boselli, ‘Della opportunità di creare nelle nostre colonie istituti di credito, come mezzo efficace a procurare 
e sollecitarne l’incremento economico’, in Atti del Secondo Congresso degli Italiani all’estero, by Istituto Coloniale 
Italiano, vol. 1, Parte 3 (Roma: Tipografia Editrice Nazionale, 1912), 1299–1310. 
123  The Italian government aim in Libya was to create a settlement colony, so the presence of a bank was necessary for 
the supply of credit to Italian settlers. Tuccimei, La Banca d’Italia in Africa, 64, 67–68, note 4; Mauri, Il mercato del 
credito in Etiopia, 159. 
124  See ‘Regio Decreto 10 dicembre 1911, n. 1367’. 
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branches in 1906) set a precedent, and resulted in the opening of the first agency in Eritrea. The 
opening of the branches in Eritrea was approved by the Regio decreto no. 1111 of 15 August 1913, 
which extended the decree for the opening of the branches in Libya to Eritrea. The first branch was 
opened in Asmara on 2 February 1914, followed by another branch in Massawa on 15 April 1914.125 
As was planned since the first enquires in 1906, the government of the colony also assigned the Bank 
of Italy the management of the treasury, starting from 16 March 1914, and, as we shall see, the 
management of the purchase and exchange of MTT.126 
After the opening of the branches of the Bank of Italy, other credit institutions started operating in 
Eritrea and the Bank of Italy itself promoted new private credit institutions, operating as a central 
bank in the colony.127 For example, in 1915 the Banca Cooperativa Popolare Eritrea was opened in 
order to operate small credit operations, while the Banca per l'Africa Orientale, founded in 1917, 
focused on financing international trade.128 Even if the first managed to overcome the 1921 post-War 
crisis, these initiatives never succeeded in fostering important credit operations in the colony.129 
Agriculture was one of the most important economic sectors in the colony, so agricultural credit was 
one of the operations the promoters of the new bank wished to develop. However, the lack of 
collaterals prevented agricultural credit development. This was especially true for indigenous farmers, 
 
125  The first director of the Asmara branch was Luciano Cristoforis; the first director of the Massawa branch was Silvio 
Pacetti. In 1917, new branches were opened in Kärän, ʿAddi Qäyyəḥ and ‘Asäb. The Kärän branch was opened due to 
the important trade volume of that market (1 million MTT out of the 6 million total trade volume in the colony) and its 
director was Luigi Bernascioni. See Mauri, Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, 161–63, 165; Tuccimei, La Banca d’Italia 
in Africa, 89–91, 94 note 16. 
126  Mauri, Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, 163. The minister of Italian Africa, Gaspare Colosimo, invited the director 
of the Bank of Italy, Bonaldo Stringher, to open a branch in Italian Somalia as well. This branch would have the same 
features and functions as the Eritrean branches. Stringher’s reply was cautious, as trade was still slack in the colony, and 
infrastructure was almost totally lacking. The bank’s decision to take the first steps in Somalia came in October 1917, in 
order to anticipate other institutions’ initiatives. However, the first bank branch in Somalia opened only in November 
1919, due to the difficult monetary situation in the colony. See Tuccimei, La Banca d’Italia in Africa, 110, 112–113; as 
well as ‘La Banca d’Italia nella Somalia Italiana’, in Bollettino della Società Africana d’Italia, 36, no. 5, (1917), 190-
191.  
127  Ibid., 165. 
128  Ibid., 168–71; Tuccimei, La Banca d’Italia in Africa, 92. 
129  The Banca Cooperativa Popolare Eritrea was devalued by 75 per cent due to an accumulation of bad loans in 1931. 
After changing its name to the Banca del Littorio, it was liquidated in 1933. The Banca per l’Africa Orientale suffered 
the consequences of its overexposure to risky businesses and the 1921 collapse of the Banca Italiana di Sconto, which 




who continued reverting to usurers.130 A section of the Bank of Italy dedicated to agricultural credit 
was only opened in 1932, when it was also envisioned that there would be an opportunity to issue 
credit in kind (tools, livestock, seeds and fertilisers) for local farmers.131 From 1935, the preparation 
for the invasion of Ethiopia offered Italian banks new opportunities to expand their activities in the 
colonies. The arrival of soldiers and labourers from Italy and the starting of new infrastructural works 
to facilitate the invasion of Ethiopia attracted the Banco di Roma, the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
and the Banco di Napoli, which opened new branches in Eritrea.132 Until June 1938, the Banco di 
Roma held a quasi-monopoly in Ethiopia (only shared with the Bank of Italy branches), due to 
previous agreements with the Fascist government.133 However, the Banco di Roma’s role was mainly 
restricted to the collection of the savings of Italian labourers and soldiers, the issuing of loans 
guaranteed by the government to the companies involved in infrastructural works, and, together with 
the Bank of Italy, money changing.134 An analysis of the data regarding the remittances sent to Italy 
by Italian labourers shows that a significant amount of money earned in Italian East Africa was 
transferred to Italy and was not locally invested.135 The presence of more banking institutions in 
Italian East Africa did not produce a significant impact on the industrial development of the 
territories, as the banks had delegated these kinds of operations to centralised organisms, such as the 
 
130  Tuccimei, La Banca d’Italia in Africa, 59–60. Some initiatives for European farmers and landowners were 
unsuccessfully experimented with, starting in 1922. See Taddia, L’Eritrea-colonia, 1890-1952, 286–90.  
131  In 1932, the Cassa di Credito Agrario was also founded for the issuing of agricultural development credit, but it was 
closed at the outbreak of the Second World War. Mauri, Il mercato del credito in Etiopia, 181–83. 
132  Fernando Santagata, ‘Il credito africano e l’Italia. Parte 1. Cap. 1’, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale di Studi e 
Documentazione dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 9, no. 11 (1954), 307; Fernando Santagata, ‘Il credito 
Africano e l’Italia. Parte 1. Cap. 2’, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale di Studi e Documentazione dell’Istituto Italiano per 
l’Africa e l’Oriente 9, no. 12 (1954), 335–36. According to the official figures, 21,000 officers, 443,000 rank-and-file, 
and 97,000 labourers arrived in East Africa at the beginning of the Italo-Ethiopian War. See Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio 
dell’impero: gli italiani in Etiopia, 1936-1941 (Rome-Bari: Editori Laterza, 2019), 10.  
133  After branches opened in Massawa (23 December 1935) and Asmara (29 January 1936), the Banco di Roma opened 
15 agencies in Italian East Africa. Gabriele De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, vol. 3 (Rome: Banco di Roma, 1983), 
147–148. 
134  Ibid., 144. For the role of the Banco di Roma in supporting Italian monetary policies in Ethiopia, see the ‘Conclusion’ 
to this thesis.    
135  The Banco di Roma alone had transferred (to Italy) 2,27 billion lire out of a total 5,219 billion lire of remittances from 
Italian East Africa by 1938. Ibid., 145–146. 
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Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI, Institute for Industrial Reconstruction).136  
In the first part of this section, we saw how some local actors were able to exploit their inter-
regional networks and knowledge of the monetary system to position themselves at the border 
between monetary layers, and provide credit for most of the commercial operations in the colony. 
The opening of the first branches of the Bank of Italy offered the Italian Government of Eritrea new 
tools to attempt to control the local monetary system. As will be detailed below, in order to curb 
speculation over the rising value of the MTT the Government would assign the Bank of Italy the 
office of the Gestione Talleri, which constituted a monopoly on money-changing services. However, 
the local markets continued operating using the MTT as a unit of account, and the Indian merchants 
continued to make a profit thanks to their ability to deal with conversions on inter-regional and 
transnational markets.  
 
3.3 Italian monetary policies during the First World War and their consequences 
on currency circulation 
In 1913, with a seventy-five page report, the new director of the Asmara branch of the Bank of 
Italy, Luciano Cristoforis, described the colony’s situation to Bonaldo Stringher, director of the Bank 
of Italy. This report updated the information collected by Introna in 1906.137 Seven years after 
Introna’s report, Cristoforis confirmed the importance of the MTT, not only for the local monetary 
circulation, but for commercial exchanges encompassing the Red Sea region and the Indian Ocean. 
Moreover, he stated that the MTT was “the base for every negotiation” and that its import from 
 
136 Ibid., 143–144; Alessio Gagliardi, ‘Moneta e istituzioni nell’Africa Orientale Italiana’, in Una moneta per l’impero. 
Pratiche monetarie, economia e società nell’Africa Orientale Italiana, ed. Karin Pallaver and Gian Luca Podestà (Milan: 
FrancoAngeli, 2021, forthcoming). The IRI was a state holding company that had been founded in 1931 in order to take 
over any heavily compromised industrial assets belonging to the Italian banks, especially those with strategic relevance. 
Despite being created as a temporary measure to face the Great Depression crisis, the IRI held almost half of the capital 
share in Italy by 1934, eventually acquiring the capital of the banks themselves. In 1936, a new banking law was issued 
to limit the industrial engagement of Italian banks. See Gianni Toniolo, The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy 
since Unification (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 59.  
137  ASBI, Affari coloniali – Pratiche 305, Relazione Asmara 1913-1925, ‘Relazione 1913, Cristoforis al Direttore 
Generale della banca d’Italia Bonaldo Stringher’, 16 September 1913.  
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Austria was on the rise.138 Given the importance of the MTT for local and inter-regional commerce, 
he stated that placing the control of its circulation in the hands of the Bank of Italy’s agencies was 
necessary in fighting speculation.139 However, in February 1914, given the insufficient knowledge 
that the agents of the Bank of Italy had at this point about the circulation of the MTT and the relative 
unpredictability of its market, Stringher asked the director of the branch in Asmara not to employ 
MTT accepted in Bank deposits for speculative activities.140 
The situation changed after the outbreak of the First World War, when the agencies of the Bank 
of Italy in Eritrea were requested to have a more active involvement in the management of the MTT 
circulation in the colony. One of the first consequences on the monetary circulation of the colony was 
reported by the director of the Massawa branch of the Bank of Italy, Silvio Pacetti. On 21 August 
1914, he wrote to the director of the Asmara branch that  
 
The exodus of the thalers to Aden and Bombay has started, and it is supposed to last, till the 
[War] events allow the circulation of our steamships and of those bearing the British or Egyptian 
flag in these seas [i.e. the Red Sea]. This is the only means the Banyans have to send the payments 
for their purchases. For now, these shipments don’t have a significant effect on the market, 
because the thalers they have sent till now had already been hoarded by them; but, in the long 
term, it is believed here that [the shipments] will produce a substantial increase in the price of this 
coin.141 
 
The price of the Maria Theresa thaler was destined to rise even sooner than Pacetti predicted. Due 
to the need to protect precious metal reserves, the coinage of new MTTs by the Austrian mints was 
totally interrupted, and new imports of MTTs from Trieste into the Italian colony became 
 
138  Ibid., 20-21. 
139  Ibid., 20-21. 
140  ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca 110, Tallero di Maria Teresa 1913 – 1916 – 1918, ‘Direzione Generale 
a Direttore della filiale di Asmara’, 13 February 1914.  
141  ASBI, Sottofondo Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca 110, Tallero di Maria Teresa 1913 – 1916 – 1918, 
‘l’Agente, filiale di Massaua, al Direttore, filiale di Asmara’, Massawa, 21 August 1914. 
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impossible.142 Governor of the colony Giuseppe Salvago Raggi was concerned about the impact that 
a shortage of MTT could have on Eritrean trade. On 5 September 1914, in order to stop the outflow 
of MTT and speculation, Salvago Raggi issued a ban on the export of the MTT by sea.143 This measure 
was not enough to stop speculation. In a letter to the director of the Asmara branch, the Massawa 
agent of the Bank of Italy reported that the bulk of MTT in Massawa was concentrated in only a few 
hands, who were waiting for the right moment to sell.144 In fact, the banyans were still able to control 
the MTT market, also provoking temporary drops in the price of MTT when in need of other 
currencies.145  
For the first year of the First World War Italy maintained a neutral position.146 Even if its alliance 
with the Central Powers had been confirmed seven times since 1882, the recent war effort in Libya 
and the lack of interest in Austria’s aims led Italy to suspend its intervention. After one year of 
diplomatic and economic pressure by the British, Italy decided to timidly enter the conflict by 
declaring war on Austria on 23 May 1915. Soon after, the British requested a more active involvement 
by Italy against the Ottoman Empire, including Italian participation in a blockade in the Red Sea, as 
the Arabian coasts of ʿAsīr and Ḥid̲j̲āz were controlled by the Turks and the Germans.147 A partial 
blockade only started to be officially implemented from November 1915. It would eventually be more 
strictly enforced from May 1917. Even though the blockade helped the Italians to control the flow of 
thalers leaving the colony by the sea, it was also the cause of worsening economic conditions in the 
colony during the War. As Zaccaria as shown, not only was the supply of sorghum from India 
reduced, but the local canned meat factory (the only real factory in Eritrea at the time) struggled to 
 
142  Adrian E. Tschoegl, ‘Maria Theresa’s Thaler: A Case of International Money’, Eastern Economic Journal 27, no. 4 
(2001), 448. 
143  ‘Decreto Governatoriale, 5 settembre 1914 n. 2049’, see Bullettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, Supplemento al 
n. 42, Asmara, 24 October 1916.   
144  ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca 110, Tallero di Maria Teresa 1913 – 1916 – 1918, ‘Direzione filiale 
di Massawa a Direttore della filiale di Asmara’, 14 November 1914.  
145  ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca 110, Tallero di Maria Teresa 1913 – 1916 – 1918, ‘Direzione filiale 
di Massawa a Direttore della filiale di Asmara’, 21 August 1915.  
146  For an analysis of the reasons for the stance of neutrality and the subsequent intervention of Italy on the side of the 
Entente, see Stefano Marcuzzi, ‘A Machiavellian Ally? Italy in the Entente (1914-1918)’, in Italy in the Era of the Great 
War, ed. Wanda Wilcox (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018), 99–121. 
147  British Library, India Office Records (IOR), L/PS/10/466, ‘German War, Turkey, Jeddah War Supplies, Italy, Trade 
and Treaty, Foreign Office to Sir. R. Rodd (Rome)’, 3 March 1915, no. 253. 
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meet the requirements of the Ministry of War, being the main supplier of canned meat to the Italian 
army.148   
By the beginning of 1916, the scarcity of MTT started to affect the management of the treasury. 
In April, the Government asked the agents of the Bank of Italy to buy at least 100,000 MTT on the 
internal market, as the reserve had significantly reduced.149 By the end of the month, the director of 
Financial Affairs for the colony, Giovanni Del Corso, envisioned the interruption of money orders in 
MTT inside the colony, given the rising price of MTT and the reduction of the reserve.150  
Finally, with the worsening of the monetary situation, the government of the colony decided to 
employ some more drastic policies. On 1 July 1916, the first decree was issued by the regent of the 
government, Cerrina Feroni, in order to hinder the rise of the prices of goods on Eritrean markets. 
The decree prohibited merchants from fixing the price of goods in MTT, and banned negotiations in 
MTT in public marketplaces.151 In order to ensure the reception of the new rules by the indigenous 
population, an announcement in Arabic and Amharic was prepared and sent to the regional 
commissioners of the colony. The announcement had a strong instructive nature, with the presence 
of practical examples explaining the consequences of the decree for commercial transactions:  
 
[…] the price of goods should not be fixed in MTT as you used to do before. For example: if you 
want to buy or sell a product you should not say “how much is that in thaler” or “it’s … thalers”. 
[…] If the buyer does not have this money [lire or Italian-issued Eritrean thaler subdivisions] he 
can ask the seller if he accepts thalers [fixing the price of the goods in lire]. If the seller does not 
accept thalers […] the buyer will go and change his money with the money-changers. […] In this 
way the money-changers will provide their services as usual; once, they used to change a lot of 
 
148  Zaccaria, ‘Feeding the War’, 203–6. 
149  ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca 110, Tallero di Maria Teresa 1913 – 1916 – 1918, ‘Direzione di 
Finanza a Direttore della filiale della Banca d’Italia di Asmara’, 11 April 1916.  
150  ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca 110, Tallero di Maria Teresa 1913 – 1916 – 1918, ‘Direzione di 
Finanza a Direttore della filiale della Banca d’Italia di Asmara’, 27 April 1916. 
151   ‘Decreto Governatoriale 1 luglio 1916 n. 2589’; see ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, “Circolare. Cerrina Feroni ai 
Commissariati Regionali,” Asmara, 1° luglio 1916.   
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thalers, now they will change a lot of lire.152  
  
In order not to undermine inter-regional trade, the ban on MTT negotiation spared only the caravan 
trade. In explaining the reason for his decision, Governor Cerrina Feroni stressed that the new rules 
would push local trade to employ legal tender in transactions, instead of indulging in the use of a non-
legal one.  
However, the reactions of the regional commissioners to the new measures were far from 
reassuring.153  
One month after the issuing of the decree, the regional commissioner Paolo Teodorani wrote from 
Massawa that “many MTTs pass to the Arab coast and Aden, where there is a high demand of them 
and they can be sold at high rates”. The continuous outflow of thalers was allegedly aided by big 
trade companies, smuggling the thalers out of the colony. Paolo Teodorani was a supporter of the 
government decree, considering it as a “first step towards that radical monetary reform […] which 
represents an act of true and final colonial conquest”.154 However, in a second report sent on 16 
September 1916, he was forced to acknowledge the adjustment of every commercial transaction to 
the MTT value.155 Moreover, he confirmed that the “banyans, as usual” gathered as many thalers as 
they could in order to export them to India, where the demand for silver continued to rise. To do this, 
the Indian merchants continued to import goods whatever the price, knowing that they could earn 
significant margins through the use of MTT in payments and money-exchange.156 
In order to curb speculation in the colony, the commissioner in Massawa proposed a series of new 
measures to Cerrina Feroni: 
 
152  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Traduzione di bando, Addi Caieh, 2 Hamle 
1908’, 2 July 1916. 
153  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Cerrina-Ferroni ai Commissari tutti’, 6 July 
1916.  
154  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissariato Regionale di Massaua a Governo 
della Colonia Eritrea’, 30 July 1916.  
155  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissariato Regionale di Massaua a Governo 
della Colonia Eritrea’, September 1916. 
156  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissariato Regionale di Massaua a Governo 




1) the establishment of a fixed compulsory exchange rate; 
2) the requisition of hoarded thalers;  
3) an improved border and customs control to prevent the exodus of MTT;  
4) the implementation of a strategy to attract more thalers from the neighbouring regions;  
5) the minting of a new silver coin to substitute the MTT.  
 
As was discussed in the first chapter,157 in the same year Alberto Pollera published his first article 
about the Maria Theresa thaler problem in the Rivista Coloniale. According to Pollera, the solution 
to the free circulation of MTT in the colony (and to speculation) was the takeover of the monopoly 
of MTT exchange by the government, through the post offices. However, the selling of Italian lire in 
exchange for MTT was to be allowed only to those operating in inter-regional trade, or to jewellers 
that used to melt the MTT. Moreover, the official exchange rate was to be set by a commission 
appointed by the government.158 In the same article, Alberto Pollera explained that close to any 
military camp, on pay day, the money-changers depleted their MTT reserve. The ascaris were very 
anxious to exchange their salary from lire to MTT, and the money-changers would quickly bring their 
earnings back to the post offices in lire to send remittances. For this reason, Italian lire (lower 
denominations of the tallero eritreo) were soon removed from circulation, while the money-changers 
were the ones who gained the most, selling thalers at a high price.159 The influence that this money-
changing had on monetary circulation translated into an influence on the local MTT quotation too. 
On 25 July 1915, in a letter sent by the Massawa agent of the Bank of Italy, Silvio Pacetti, to the 
Asmara branch, it was reported that the quotation of the thaler was being sensibly influenced by the 
requests of a group of ascaris operating in Benadir that were temporally stationed in Massawa. The 
sudden growth of the requests for MTT by the soldiers for their daily expenses brought the quotation 
 
157  See section 1.6. 
158  Alberto Pollera, ‘Il Tallero Di Maria Teresa Nella Circolazione Monetaria Della Colonia Eritrea e Problemi Che Ne 
Derivano’, Rivista Coloniale XI (1916), 519. 
159  Ibid., 516–17. 
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from 2.40 to 2.48 lire per MTT.160 
Part of Alberto Pollera’s proposals were included in a new set of rules issued by the new governor, 
Giacomo De Martino, on 24 October 1916.161 De Martino had been the governor of Italian Somalia 
at the time of the monetary reform which introduced the Italian rupee there. In that occasion he had 
already put efforts into to the curbing of speculation operated by Indian and Arab merchants.162 The 
new decree issued by De Martino in Eritrea prohibited any kind of payment with MTT, and declared 
a fixed exchange rate for government fees (at 2.50 lire per MTT) and payments (at 2.65 lire per MTT). 
The fixed exchange rate for the government fees was applied to the hiring of transportation services 
by camels and porters too.163 However, the most important change was the concession of a monopoly 
of money-changing services to the Bank of Italy, that, from that date, opened the office for the 
Gestione Talleri.164 Negotiations in MTT were still allowed for foreign trade (namely, Ethiopia and 
Arab Peninsula), and the MTT could be exchanged by the agencies of the Bank of Italy and the post 
offices. The exchange rate for this kind of transaction was periodically set by a commission 
nominated by the government of the colony.165 However, every money exchange was to be authorised 
by the regional commissioners. The buyer was to deliver to the agency of the bank (or the post office) 
 
160  ASBI, Filiale Asmara – pratiche, Ramo Banca 110, Tallero di Maria Teresa 1913 – 1916 – 1918, ‘Direzione filiale 
di Massawa a Direttore della filiale di Asmara’, 25 July 1915. 
161  ‘Decreto Governatoriale 24 ottobre 1916 n. 2653’ in Bullettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, Supplemento al n. 42, 
Asmara, 24 October 1916.  
162  Giacomo De Martino, La Somalia Italiana nei tre anni del mio governo (Rome: Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, 
1912). 29-30, 105-109. For a thorough analysis of the monetary reform in Somalia during De Martino’s administration 
see: Claudio Sessa, ‘Colonialismo Monetario. L’esperienza italiana in Somalia e la difficile transizione (1905-1950)’, 
PhD thesis (Università degli Studi di Genova, 1920), 91-103. For an analysis of the efforts Governor De Martino made 
in Eritrea to boost its economic self-sufficency during the First World War, see Zaccaria, ‘Not a Hectare of Land Shall 
Remain Uncultivated This Year!”. Food Provisions for Italy and the Role of the Colonies, 1917-1918’,  
163  ‘Decreto Governatoriale 24 ottobre 1916 n. 2653’ in Bullettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, Supplemento al n. 42, 
Asmara, 24 October 1916. 
164  ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo banca 137, Gestione talleri 1916 – 1918. ‘Gestione Cambio talleri M.T., 
Direzione Finanza a Direttore della Banca d’Italia (Asmara)’, 24 October 1916.  
165  The members of the commission were: Camillo del Camillis (President), Giovani Battista del Corso, Alessandro 
Allori (Director of the Civil Affairs of the Colony), Enrico Macchia (Chief of the Customs Service), the newly appointed 
director of the Asmara branch of the Bank of Italy, Giovanni Millner, and a secretary, Ernesto Dotti. See ‘Bullettino 
Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, n. 42, 19 ottobre 1916’. The Commission was also in charge for the definition of the price 
of the demonetised Maria Theresa thalers to be sold to jewellers. See ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo banca 137, 
Gestione talleri 1916 – 1918,’ Governo della Colonia Eritrea’, 9 November 1916. In a side note to the news regarding the 
institution of the Commission in the bulletin of the Società Africana d’Italia (African society of Italy), l’Africa Italiana, 
the editorial board expressed surprise for the absence of Alberto Pollera from that Commission. Società Africana d’Italia, 
‘Istituzione di una Commissione per lo studio del tallero di M.T.’, L’Africa Italiana. Bollettino della Società Africana 
d’Italia, 1916, 316. 
170 
 
a form signed by the commissioner reporting the quantity of MTT requested, the reason for the 
exchange, and the amount of goods intended to be bought with the MTT (see Figure 7).166  
 
 
Figure 7. Example of a form for the buying of MTT. Source: ASBI, Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo banca 
137, Gestione talleri 1916 – 1918. 
 
Most of the regional commissioners were sceptical about the impact that these measures would 
have on curbing of speculation, which was producing a sizeable devaluation of the lira in relation to 
local prices. One of the most negative reactions to the new regulations came from the brother of 
Alberto Pollera, Ludovico Pollera, then commissioner of the Bārkā region.  
The Bārkā region and the bordering region of the Gaš-Setit were poor in infrastructure, and were 
mostly inhabited by pastoralist people who would often cross the borders of Ethiopia and Sudan with 
their herds and keep their savings in MTT. The ban on negotiations in MTT produced a burdensome 
premium for the exchange of MTT by the indigenous population, “for the exclusive benefit of the 
 
166  Bollettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, 42, Supplemento, 24 October1916. 
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money-changers”.167 As a consequence of this, some of the people of these regions, “not having any 
Eritrean money [Eritrean thaler subdivisions and lira coins], cannot buy dura”.168 Ludovico Pollera 
pointed out that the presence of circulating MTT was essential to the import of dura from Ethiopia, 
the silver coin being the only one accepted beyond the borders of the colony.169 Another concern for 
Pollera was represented by the effect of the regulations on the fundamental services of the Bǝni ‘Amǝr  
camel-drivers towards different markets.170 In fact, the fixed exchange rate of 2.50 lire per thaler 
constituted a loss for the camel-drivers, as the price of MTT continued to rise throughout the War 
period, disrupting the only reliable transportation system in the region. 
Similar concerns relating to the combined effect of the new regulations and unreliable 
transportation services were expressed by the commissioner of Asmara, Giuseppe Cavalli. An 
interruption of the rail service from Massawa, together with ongoing negotiations in MTT in the 
market, caused a rise in the price of dura from 10-12 MTT to 14-16 MTT.171 According to the 
commissioner, the retailers in the markets used to plan the amount of money they wanted to earn 
according to the daily exchange rate of the MTT. At the end of the day, they would buy as many 
thalers as they needed to pay the näggadras (the heads of the caravans). For this reason, the sellers 
were forced to fix the price of the products according to the amount of MTT they needed to earn to 
finance their businesses.172 Moreover, according to Commissioner Cavalli, the new regulations, 
together with the shortage of MTT due to the halting of new imports from Austria, produced concern 
in the population. Those who had Maria Theresa thalers tended to hoard them, which represented “a 
 
167  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissario Gasc-Setit a Governo Asmara, 
Agordat 2’. 
168  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissario Gasc-Setit a Governo Asmara, 
Agordat’, 3 July 1916. 
169  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissario Gasc-Setit a Governo Asmara, 
Agordat’, 2 July 1916. 
170  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-192, ‘Commissariato Regionale del Barca, al Governo 
della Colonia, Agordat’, 26 July 1916. 
171  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissariato regionale di Asmara’, 16 August 
1916. 
172  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Governatore dell’Hamasien a Direttore Affari 
Civili, Asmara’, 17 August 1916.  
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new psychological-economical factor” worsening the state of monetary circulation.173 This situation 
fostered the activity of the speculators “to the detriment of those who, being paid with the Italian 
currency (and among these especially those working for the colonial administration that once used to 
be paid in thalers), are forced to pay more those goods that experience an artificial rise in their MTT 
price [on the market], while the [wholesale] price has not changed”.174 In fact, the situation was 
particularly tough for wage labourers, especially since, in 1905, the government of the colony 
established that every payment from the administration should be executed in Italian lire or Eritrean 
thalers (and their subdivisions).175  
A report from the regional commissioner of the Dancalia region, Dante Odorizzi, further explains 
how the new measures indirectly affected wage labourers, while also giving us a clue about the way 
in which Indian merchants could get marginal earnings from the conversion.176 The commissioner 
reported that ever since the new regulations were in force, the price of the MTT in the market had 
gradually risen from 2.50 lire to 3.00 lire. Local merchants kept calculating the price of goods on the 
basis of the thaler, thus causing the rise in prices. A bag of dura worth 12 MTT, when the value of 
the thaler was at 2.50 lire, was sold at 36 lire when the value of the thaler hit 3.00 lire. And this, 
according to the commissioner, happened without any variation in the supply of dura, within three 
days: “On the Red Sea shore, the dura is like gold […] the amount of money needed to buy it changes 
according to exchange rate”. The new regulations, which forced the fixing of the prices in lire, 
involuntarily facilitated this kind of speculation. Moreover, with the trade in the port town of ‘Asäb 
strongly being dependant on the market of Aden, the price of the MTT was determined by the Aden 
quotation. For an Indian merchant who knew the exchange rate of the MTT on the market of Aden, 
it was quite easy to calculate the profits he could obtain by exploiting differences in exchange rates. 
 
173  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Governatore dell’Hamasien a Direttore Affari 
Civili, Asmara’, 17 August 1916.  
174  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Governatore dell’Hamasien a Direttore Affari 
Civili, Asmara’, 17 August 1916.  
175  ‘Avviso 4 febbraio 1905, Pagamenti da farsi in carta od in moneta eritrea dalla regia Tesoreria e dagli uffici postali 
della colonia’ in Bullettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, 4 February 1905, n. 5. 
176  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissariato regionale della Dancalia, risposta 
alla circolare 7 agosto 1916 all’Uff. Governo Affari Civili, Assab’, 1 September 1916. 
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In Aden, the exchange rate of the MTT was calculated in relation to the rupee, with a fixed rate of 15 
rupee to the pound. Moreover, at that time, the lira was still in the Latin Monetary Union. The Latin 
Monetary Union was an agreement, signed by four countries in 1865, establishing the use of 0.835 
silver for the minting of coins, thus equalising the exchange rate of the national currencies.177 For this 
reason, in the market of Aden, the quotation of the franc represented all the other currencies of the 
Union. Given the fixed exchange rate of the rupee, the Indian merchants simply needed to keep up-
to-date with the daily exchange rate of the MTT in Aden, expressed in rupee, and that of the pound, 
expressed in francs. When Odorizzi was writing, 100 MTT was valued at 153 rupee, and one pound 
was valued 29.80 francs (or lire). Therefore, the exchange rate used by the Indian merchants in ‘Asäb 
was 2.93 lire per MTT.178 This value was slightly higher than the official exchange value the 
government used for the payments of the wages, which was 2.65 lire per MTT.179 As a consequence 
of this, the situation was particularly heavily felt by those employed by the government. Most of these 
were the ascaris. The low ranks were earning a wage of 1.00 to 1.25 lire per day, and when the MTT 
reached the exchange rate of 3 lire per thaler at the end of August 1916, they had effectively lost 
almost a third of their purchasing power, because the prices in the markets were still handled in 
MTT.180 Major Alberti, commander of the 3rd Indigenous Battalion, wrote to the government to 
emphasise the difficult conditions inflicted on the Eritrean ascaris; the ascaris being “[those] who 
are more affected among the indigenous people”.181 However, at first, the Government of Eritrea did 
not help to solve the problems affecting its indigenous wage labourers. Cerrina Feroni’s replies appear 
to show annoyance toward requests to adjust the salaries in line with rising living costs. According 
 
177  The first four countries to sign the agreement were France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. Greece joined in 1867 
and several other countries informally adopted the agreement later on. See Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A 
History of the International Monetary System - Third Edition, 2019, 14. 
178  Commissioner Odorizzi reported the formula in this way: “L. 28.80:15X153:100=2.93 L.”; 1 pound = 15 rupee = 
29.80 francs (lire) so 1 rupee = 1.92 lire; 100 MTT = 153 rupee, so 1 MTT = 1.53 rupee. To calculate the price of the 
MTT in lire according to its price in rupee, it was sufficient to solve this calculation: 1.53 × 1.92 = 2.93 ca. See ASDMAE, 
AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissariato regionale della Dancalia, risposta alla circolare 
7 agosto 1916 all’Uff. Governo Affari Civili, Assab’, 1 September 1916. 
179  Ibid. 
180  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissario Regionale dell’Hamasien al 
Governo della Colonia’, 23 August 1916.  
181  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Comando del Regio Corpo di Truppe Coloniali 
dell’Eritrea, Assab’, 24 August 1916. 
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to Cerrina Feroni, approval of such a proposal would have been proof that “[the Government was] 
regulating the wages according to the quotation of the MTT, which, instead, should not have any 
influence on the Eritrean monetary system anymore”.182  
As Zaccaria showed in his article about the history of the Torrigiani canned meat factory, the 
soldiers were not the only ones to complain about the government’s measures regarding MTT 
circulation. One reason for protests that broke against the imposition of the quota system on local 
cattle was the government ban on the MTT.183  
However, the commissioners were blamed for the price escalation, for not having improved 
surveillance in the markets in order to apply the regulations and tackle speculation.184 In fact, 
regulations for the ban of the MTT also sparked conflict and disagreement among the administrators, 
who accused each other of not enforcing the decree adequately. For example, Commissioner 
Fioccardi, of the Kärän region, justified the lack of success of the regulations in the region he 
administered as a consequence of the bad management of the situation in the Bārkā region by 
Commissioner Pollera. Fioccardi wrote that “if the measures were to be relentlessly implemented the 
merchants of this town would have been in a position of inferiority compared to those of other 
places”.185 
Towards the end of the World War, in order to deal with the rising prices, the Government fixed a 
cap for the price of the most important staple goods, such as flour, bread and sugar, through the 
introduction of a vigilance committee.186 These measures were implemented to mitigate the 
consequences produced by (among the other things) those wholesale operators with a greater access 
to MTT, that could easily stockpile grains and resell them in times of shortage at a premium, thus 
 
182  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Direzioni Affari civili e Reggente del Governo 
della Colonia Eritrea a Commissario regionale dell’Hamasien, Asmara’, 25 August 1916. 
183  Zaccaria, ‘Feeding the War’, 207. 
184  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Reggente del Governo a Commissario Regionale 
Asmara’, 25 August 1916.  
185  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 51, Industria commercio moneta 1886-1924, ‘Commissario regionale di Cheren a Governo 
(Direzione Affari Civili), Cheren’, 16 September 1916.  
186  Zaccaria, ‘Feeding the War’, 208.  
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pushing the prices higher.187 In fact, the price of grain was not only affected by the shortage of supply 
and the rising prices during the War. When Giuseppe De Rossi went back to Asmara as Commissioner 
of Ḥamasen in 1919, the special commissioner of Asmara, Paolo Teodorani, wrote a report about the 
misbehaviour of the former regional commissioner of Ḥamasen, Enrico Macchia. According to 
Teodorani, in order to avoid control in the Asmara market, new markets appeared along the road to 
the town. Moreover, Eritreans disguised as members of the local banda, supported by stockpilers, 
used to stop caravans on the road, buy goods outside the market, and store the grains in the stockpilers’ 
storages in Asmara during the night. According to Teodorani, among the “stockpilers” there was also 
the former Commissioner Macchia, who allegedly sent a member of the local banda, Omar Addù, to 
stop a caravan and buy “eleven locotà of taf and one of legumes”.188   
In the end, the government had to find a different solution to the problem of the declining 
purchasing power of wage labourers. From May 1918, the MTT started being exchanged at a special 
rate for the ascaris by the offices of the Bank of Italy, and the difference for every exchange was paid 
by the treasury of the government of the colony.189 The price of the MTT continued to rise for the 
entire period of the First World War, going from the pre-War value of about 2.50 lire to 6 lire per 
MTT (see Figure 8).  
 
 
187  ASDME, AE, pacco 859, ‘Limitazione della compravendita su pubblico mercato, Commissario del Barca a Direzione 
Affari Civili, Agordat’, 19 November 1919. 
188  I was not able to identify the unit of measurment; ASDMAE, AE, pacco 859, fascicolo 72, Commercio, mercati, 
informazioni commerciali, ‘Incetta di Granaglie, Commissario Speciale della Città di Asmara a Direzione degli Affari 
Civili, Asmara’, 5 March 1919.  
189  ASBI, ‘Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo banca, 137, Gestione talleri 1916 – 1918, ‘Governo dell’Eritrea, Affari 




Figure 8. Quotation of the MTT in lire in Eritrea for the period 1913 -1921.190 Source: ASBI, Filiale Asmara, 
Pratiche – Ramo Banca 110, ‘Massaua, Talleri M.T. prezzo medio settimanale, 1913’; ‘Movimento Talleri 
M.T. 1914’; ASBI, ‘Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca 137, Gestione Talleri 1916–1918’.  
The rise of the internal price of the MTT was the result of a combination of internal and external 
factors. Besides the scarcity of MTT due to the halting of minting, speculation and hoarding, the value 
of the coin itself increased due to a significant rise of the price of silver on the international markets.191  
A 1917 report by the American consul Southard in Aden clearly described how the rise of the price 
of silver made it extremely profitable to buying Maria Theresa thalers and then selling them in 
Bombay, where they were melted into bullion bars.192 
 
3.3.1 The tallero d’Italia 
At the end of the War, the government of Eritrea tried to take advantage of the lack of silver coins 
in the colony by attempting another substitution of the MTT with an Italian coin with free-floating 
value, the tallero d’Italia.193 The Italians not only tried to replicate the same physical attributes of the 
 
190 There are no data available for the period September 1918-August 1919, see note 195 in this chapter. 
191  The rise of the international price of silver was the consequence of several different factors, including a decrease in 
the supply of silver from Mexico following the Civil War, and the rise in demand due to the growth of global industrial 
activity in preparation for the First World War. See Dickson H. Leavens, Silver Money (Bloomington, Ind.: Principia 
Press, 1939), 136–39. 
192 Addison E. Southard, ‘Circulation of the Austrian Maria Teresa Dollar in the Aden-Red Sea District’, Annual Report 
of the Director of the United States Mint, 1918. 
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Maria Theresa thaler coin, but also its issuing rules. The coin could be issued upon request of private 
companies, paying a 1.5 per cent tax and supplying the necessary silver.194 The free exchange of the 
MTT on the market, together with its use in negotiations, were only allowed again in October 1918.195 
However, this news was received with scepticism and suspicion, as the people in the market thought 
it was a strategy of the Italian government to force them to release hoarded MTTs.196 On 25 August 
1919, the colonial government issued a decree which extended the regulations in force for the MTT 
to the tallero d’Italia. These regulations allowed the use of both the MTT and the tallero d’Italia 
(whose value was officially equalised) for negotiations and transactions in the markets. Like the MTT, 
the tallero d’Italia was sold and exchanged by the agencies of the Bank of Italy, and the colonial 
government established a commission that had to revise and fix the official value for both the silver 
coins weekly. Initially, this value was fixed at 6 lire per tallero d’Italia (or MTT). However, at that 
time, only the tallero d’Italia could be used to pay tributes, customs fees and fines at the official rate. 
Finally, money orders in talleri d’Italia could be sent, within the limits of 10 to 500 talleri d’Italia.197 
The fact that the tallero d’Italia value was officially fixed for the government’s payments did not 
mean that its value on the market was imposed by the government too. Therefore, the value of the 
tallero d’Italia (as well as that of the MTT) was free to float on the market.  
 Once again, the ascaris were disadvantaged because they were paid in lire and talleri d’Italia. For 
example, in the sources consulted here, a case was found in which the talleri d’Italia of the ascaris 
were not accepted in the market. This was after that a seller in the market of ‘Addi Kwala, in the Ṣəra‘ 
region at the border of the Təgray region of Ethiopia, refused to receive the ascari’s talleri d’Italia 
for his teff. A report was subsequently written by the commander of the 10th Battalion, Francesco 
 
194  Lucio Mariani, Il nuovo tallero italiano, Tipografia dell’Unione Editrice (Rome, 1918), 25–26. 
195  The Gestione Talleri office of the bank of Italy was temporarily closed on 15 October 1918 (“being the free circulation 
of the MT thaler restored”) only to be reopened on 25 August 1919, in order to manage the buying and selling of MTTs 
and Italian thalers on behalf of the colonial government. See ASBI, Affari coloniali – Pratiche 305, Relazioni Asmara, 
‘Relazione Annuale 1918’, 26; ‘Decreto governatoriale 25 agosto 1919 n. 3363’, Bullettino Ufficiale della Colonia 
Eritrea, Supplemento al n. 20, Asmara, 25 August 1919.   
196  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 827, fascicolo 164, Calmiere tallero di Maria Teresa, ‘Pro-memoria sul decreto che riguarda 
la trattazione in talleri, Asmara’, 14 October 1918.  




Damiano. The report stated that the ascaris of the battalion could not spend the lire and the talleri 
d’Italia on the market, because the sellers were not accepting them. Moreover, they could not find 
any MTT, not even at an exchange rate of 10 lire per MTT, the official rate being 6 lire (this is 
evidence that the MTT was not equal to the tallero d’Italia in the market). The situation in the market 
of ‘Addi Ḵwala was complicated by its geographical position near the border with the Təgray. Some 
sellers arrived directly from Təgray, where the tallero d’Italia was not circulating.198 The regent of 
the government, De Camillis, responding on the issue confirmed that both the MTT and the tallero 
d’Italia were free to float on the market: “neither for Adi Quala nor for any other market is any 
coercive measure possible to impose the use of one money instead of another; the negotiations should 
proceed freely […] and with the payment methods established by mutual agreement. […] They are 
contracts [...], the necessary elements for their validity […] are determined by the classical demand 
and supply factors»”199 The free fluctuation of the tallero d’Italia on the market of the colony may 
have been one of the reasons for its failure. Only 510,000 talleri d’Italia were issued by the Italian 
mint, and the price of the MTT continued to rise because the demand for inter-regional commerce 
was high. After one year, the price of MTT in the markets of Asmara, Massawa and ‘Addi Qäyyəḥ 
reached 13.80 to 14.00 lire. In ‘Addi Qäyyəḥ, one of the most important border markets of the colony 
at that time, and where an agency of the Bank of Italy opened in 1917, the tallero d’Italia was always 
valued at 2.00 lire less than the MTT.200 For this reason, according to Alberto Pollera, the jewellers 
preferred to buy talleri d’Italia to melt them, as they were less expensive than the MTT and contained 
the same amount of silver (or even slightly more). Given the small quantity of talleri d’Italia issued, 
this practice made the Italian coin rapidly disappear.201  
 
 
198  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 876, fascicolo 72, ‘Incidente mercato di Adi Quala tra ascari e paesani, Comandante del 10° 
Battaglione Indigeni al Comandante Truppe, Adi Quala’, 4 October 1919.  
199  ASDMAE, AE, pacco 876, fascicolo 72, ‘Incidente mercato di Adi Quala tra ascari e paesani, Il Reggente del Governo 
al Comando Truppe’, 24 November 1919.  
200  The agent of the Bank of Italy calculated that an average of 30,000-40,000 MTT circulated in ʿAddi Qäyyəḥ. ASBI, 
Filiale Asmara, Pratiche – Ramo Banca, 138, Gestione Talleri, 1918 – 1922, ‘Agente filiale di Adi Caieh a Filiale 
Asmara’, 20 September 1920. 
201 Alberto Pollera, La vita commerciale etiopica e la circolazione monetaria Eritrea. (Tivoli: A. Chicca, 1926), 73. 
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3.3.2 The introduction of paper money 
The introduction of the tallero d’Italia was not the only solution attempted by the Italians to deal 
with the shortage of currency during the First World War. In order to support the local monetary 
system, banknotes were also sent to the colony. Not only state-issued notes and banknotes started to 
circulate, but also vouchers and token coins issued by private commercial companies. These vouchers 
were backed by deposits in the companies’ bank accounts held at the Eritrean agencies of the Bank 
of Italy.202 The free issuing of vouchers and paper notes by private companies was finally prohibited 
on 15 June 1918, as was their use in commercial transactions. These kinds of notes were considered 
“illegal” because they were not authorised by the Italian government and could hamper the process 
of building a colonial monetary system, based on a legal tender.203 In the end, an order was given to 
issuing companies to withdraw the circulating notes and exchange them according to their nominal 
value within two months.204  
However, the War period was not the first time that banknotes had been introduced into the colony. 
In 1886, banknotes to the value of 70,000 lire were issued by the Banca Nazionale nel Regno d’Italia 
(which will later become part of the Bank of Italy). These had been sent to the Military Treasury in 
Massawa.205 The banknotes were not, however, accepted locally. In 1890, a new attempt was made 
with the introduction of 600,000 lire in banknotes. One third of the notes had been issued by the 
Banco di Napoli, which, at that time, was an issuing body together with the Banca Nazionale.206 This 
issuing followed the complaints of the Banco di Napoli about the discrimination against its notes, 
which were not accepted by the treasury of the colony.207 Nevertheless, General Baldassarre Orero 
replied that “the issuing of banknotes of many different forms and [from different] issuing bodies can 
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generate confusion in these countries, where the paper money system is not known by the majority 
of people”.208 For this reason, the banknotes of the Banco di Napoli were sent back to Italy.209 In fact, 
banknotes did not circulate widely among the people of the colony at all. One of the explanations for 
this was that the banknotes were not suitable for the environmental conditions of the colony, nor for 
indigenous hoarding practices.210 The few examples of the use of banknotes by Eritrean people that I 
have found in the sources are quite exceptional, such as the case of Zego Berhané. In 1896, Zego 
Berhané, an interpreter of the Residenza211 of the Mareb region, gave Captain Arturo Mulazzani a 
broken 100 lire note, made up of two different 100 lire banknotes issued by the Banca Nazionale, in 
order to exchange it for a new one.212 As an agency of the Banca Nazionale had not been opened in 
the colony yet, the damaged banknote had to be sent back to the headquarters of the bank in Rome.213 
Once the banknote reached the Banca Nazionale, the board approved the change of the damaged 
banknote. However, in order to proceed with the issuing of a new note, it was required that the 
claimant deposit at least five lire into a bank account as a collateral.214 Zego Berhané agreed to deposit 
five lire through Mulazzani only after 6 years, in 1902. Given that no bank branch had been opened 
in the colony, Zego Berhané’s deposit was opened in Rome at a 5 per cent interest rate.215 In 1906, 
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when that specific kind of 100 lire note was withdrawn from circulation, Berhané had earned 9.75 
lire from interest, which was sent to him via a money transfer at the treasury of the colony, passing 
through two bank accounts.216  
Information about the use of banknotes by indigenous people in the first twenty years after the 
foundation of the colony are very rare. Moreover, Berhané’s story shows how the introduction of a 
European monetary device, like a banknote, came with a series of entailments that were not previously 
present in the colony, like an issuing body that was able to guarantee the value of the banknote. At 
the same time, it shows how new and original colonial relationships were created through the solution 
of practical problems.  
As for the other monetary policies implemented during the war, the available sources on the local 
use of banknotes mainly refer to the ascaris. Being wage labourers employed by the government, the 
ascaris were also the first to face the changes brought on by the new policies. An interesting case can 
be found in the records of the Military Court of the colony. Mohamed Mohamed Zien, a 24 year old 
ascari of the 5th Company of the 1st Battalion, born in Assahata (Ṣəra‘), was accused of stealing three 
two-lire notes from the wallet of his Captain, Aronne Franconieri on 20 January 1918. The captain 
realised that three notes out of a pack of fifty were missing and searched his attendants, finding one 
of the notes in Mohamed Mohamed Zien’s pocket. The ascari confessed and explained that he did 
not want to steal the banknotes, but just wanted to have a look, as he had never seen the newly issued 
banknotes before. The court finally acquitted the ascari, has he had hidden the notes (losing two of 
them) for fear when the captain arrived, and he could not put them back.217 Even though we cannot 
ascertain whether he spoke the truth, we can infer that it was still not common for an ascari to handle 
banknotes at that time. Moreover, as we have seen before, even after only one year it was very difficult 
for an ascari receiving Italian coins or paper money to buy goods in the market or exchange them 
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without incurring a loss.218 This was particularly true in the markets located along the borders of the 
colony. Italian paper money was issued to aid local circulation, but banknotes were not accepted in 
inter-regional commerce.219 On 2 September 1919, Abrahà Teferi, from Təgray, negotiated (in MTT) 
the sale of 19 head of cattle in the market of ‘Addi Wəgri. The buyers gave him a deposit consisting 
of one five-lire coin and some banknotes. On the occasion of the settlement of the purchase, Abrahà 
Teferi was first proposed to accept the settlement of the payment in talleri d’Italia (whose quotation 
in the market was 5.00 lire) instead of MTT (7.00 lire each), and then was forced to accept paper 
money.220 For this reason, he decided to complain to the government of the colony, as Italian paper 
money did not circulate in Ethiopia.221  
As is clear from the few examples reported here, banknotes were not readily accepted. For this 
reason, the colonial government had to force their use on the local people. An example of this 
occurred in April 1920, when a rise in the demand for cattle in the Gaš-Setit region allowed the Bǝni 
‘Amǝr to set the means of payment, preferring silver coins and refusing paper money. The regional 
commissioner fined them, because Italian colonial subjects were not allowed to refuse Italian paper 
money in transactions.222 
As we have already seen, the lack of MTT, together with the strict Italian control on its use in 
transactions, resulted in some impediments to inter-regional commerce. The Ethiopian näggade 
(Ethiopian caravan traders) did not like the idea of changing their thalers at the official rate of the 
government, so as to buy commodities in Eritrea. In fact, the official rate was always lower than the 
market one, as the Italians tried in this manner to keep the prices low.223 Moreover, the näggade 
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needed MTT for their return journeys, in order to pay tributes and fees in Ethiopia. They therefore 
tended to choose the markets where they could find more MTT to sell their products.224 When the 
MTT was not allowed to be freely exchanged in the market, they turned to the colonial administration 
to have their money changed into MTT, if they did not have enough for their journey. The 
administration, in turn, could not refuse to sell them MTT, because the Italian colony needed imported 
foodstuffs for the entire period of the War. Therefore the outflow of MTT continued.225  
 
3.3.3 The Maria Theresa thaler and regional trade 
In the previous sections we have seen some examples of how a combination of the shortage of 
MTT and Italian monetary policies influenced inter-regional commerce. The data about caravan trade 
during the War can better explain what the reasons for those policies were, and the effect of the War 
on the regional trade system.  
The first information that stands out from these data is the inversion of the direction of caravan 
trade towards Ethiopia. Before the War, according to the data collected by the agent of the Bank of 
Italy in Asmara available for the years 1911 and 1912, the export from Eritrea to Ethiopia exceeded 
the import, and the trade volume was growing.226 The main export items were cotton fabrics, silk 
waste, oil and Indian rice.227 This was also thanks to the improvement of the relationship of the Italian 
colony with Ethiopia, ratified by a treaty of commerce and friendship signed in 1906.228 The caravan 
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trade was further supported by the opening of three Italian commercial agencies in Gondär, ‘Adwa 
and Dessie in 1909.229 The official aim of these agencies was that of collecting commercial 
information and fostering Ethiopian-Eritrean trade relationships. However, Massimo Zaccaria has 
shown the important political function these agencies had for the Italian plan of building a larger area 
of influence, and for strengthening the role of Eritrea as a “transit region” between Ethiopia and the 
opposite shore of the Red Sea.230 These relationships became particularly important in supplying the 
needs of Italy at the outbreak of the First World War. The Italians had great expectations of the 
capacity of Ethiopia in supplying the cattle needed for the functioning of the new canned meat 
factory.231 However, from 1916 the situation became difficult. This is because a ban on the export of 
cattle to Eritrea was imposed by Ras Śəyyum Mängäša of Təgray.232 In the same year, Ethiopia also 
implemented a ban on the export of MTT to confront its over-valuation.233 These decisions came at 
the end of a troubled period for Ethiopia. Emperor Mənilək had died in 1913, and soon a war of 
succession broke out. Mənilək’s grandson, Ləǧ Iyasu, attracted suspicion from the Šäwan notables, 
as he tried to enlarge his entourage by building alliances with chiefs of other regions of the Empire 
(not only Təgreans and Oromos, but also the more peripheral Afars and Somalis).234 He was 
eventually excommunicated by Abunä Matéwos for his alleged sympathy toward Islam, and was 
defeated in battle in 1916.235 Mənilək’s daughter, Zäwditu, became the new Empress of Ethiopia and 
Ras Täfäri Mäkwännən (the future Ḫaylä Śəllase), son of Ras Mäkwännən of Harär’, was nominated 
as her regent and heir.236 Toward the end of 1917, the supply of cattle from Ethiopia commenced 
again.237 These events, together with the MTT ban and the Italian need for supplies to support the war 
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effort, had reversed the trade balance with Ethiopia.238 The imports from Ethiopia had reached the 
value of 22,020,299.33 lire.239 The most important items imported into the colony were hides and 
skins, due to the high demand for the manufacture of boots for the army.240 The value of the imported 
skins reached 14,601,325 lire in 1918, more than half of the total value of all imports. However, given 
these impressive figures, two points should be stressed. First of all, the huge rise in the value of 
imports also depended on the rise of the prices of commodities, that, as we have seen, was strictly 
correlated with the rise of the price of MTT.241 Secondly, these trade statistics did not include the 
import of cattle from Ethiopia for the canned meat factory, as well as all those commodities that did 
not reach the markets and the caravanserais because they were directly imported by private 
businesses. For example 2,784 head of cattle (with a 370,000 lire value) were imported for the 
Torrigiani factory in September and October 1918, without being included in the statistics. The reason 
for their exclusion was the total absence of customs offices at the border with Ethiopia. Thus, the 
statistics were compiled only when and if the commodities reached the markets and the 
caravanserais.242  
The trade statistics show us at least two ways in which Maria Theresa thalers continued their 
exodus from the colony during and after the War, notwithstanding Italian policies. The first way was 
through caravan commerce itself. The imports had to be paid for in MTT, which was the only currency 
accepted in Ethiopia. This problem was partly solved by the work of the Gestione Talleri, which 
issued thalers only with the permission of the regional commissioners. However, as we have seen, 
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not all the imports passed through markets and caravanserais, and some stockpilers could use their 
MTT reserves to bypass the government controls and import goods in exchange for silver. The need 
for MTTs in Ethiopia could also be used as a weapon to gain commercial and political advantage. In 
October 1917, the French embassy in Italy complained to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about 
the shortage of MTT in Ethiopia, allegedly the result of stocking-up operations conducted by the 
British (who, according to the French, had hoarded 200,000 MTTs), as well as the French and the 
Italians in Ethiopia.243 The Minister of the Colonies, Gaspare Colosimo, denied any Italian attempt 
to stockpile MTT in Ethiopia.244 However, in another letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sydney 
Sonnino, Colosimo suggested that the shortage of MTT in Ethiopia could be used to gain political 
influence, facilitating transactions in kind. Moreover, he suggested that the Ethiopian need for MTT 
could be used by the Società Commerciale Italo Abissina of Milan (SCIAM) to achieve a concession 
for the opening of a distillery in Təgray.245 SCIAM had been founded on 23 July 1915, and Giuseppe 
Ostini, who had been the first commercial agent for the colonial government in Gondär, was on the 
company board. The SCIAM represented one of the commercial companies that were economically 
and politically backed by the government of the colony and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to acquire 
political influence in the region and expand Italian trade.246 Since the year of its foundation, the 
company was used as a tool of the Italian government in obtaining the concession for the distillation 
of alcohol in Ethiopia “for political reasons”.247 The shortage of MTT could have been used as a 
means to achieve better terms for the paying of the requested annual fees (about 40,000 MTT).248  
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The other way Maria Theresa thalers left the borders of the colony was through smuggling. 
Looking at the same caravan trade statistics for the year 1918, another loophole stands out. The figures 
regarding caravan trade volumes with Sudan recorded in Eritrea did not match with the ones recorded 
by the British authorities on the other side of the border in Sudan. According to a convention signed 
on 26 November 1901, four customs offices had been established on the border, and a 5 per cent ad 
valorem tax was established on the imports.249 However, the value of the exports recorded in Eritrea 
for the year 1918 was 157,575 lire, while in Sudan 306,840 lire of imports from Eritrea had been 
recorded. Clearly this means that it was not possible to exercise an efficient customs control at the 
border. In fact, as is evident from an accurate report by the Bank of Italy, the border with Sudan was 
the route preferred by Indian merchants to export MTT. A report by the Bank of Italy prepared in 
Kärän describes the route that Indian merchants took to reach and pass the Sudanese borders 
(sometimes even bribing the customs officers) in order to get to Port Sudan and send the smuggled 
thalers to Aden and Bombay.250  
The shipment of MTT to the Arabian Peninsula was allowed again starting from August 1920. 
However, only MTT coming from the Gestione Talleri could be sent. For this reason, all those who 
wanted to ship their own thalers had to first sell them to the Gestione Talleri, then buy them back at 
the price of 15 lire per thaler, so as to get the required authorisation to ship them.251 The ban on the 
export of MTT from Ethiopia was removed in May 1921, after European traders had put pressure on 
Ras Täfäri through the legations of their countries in Addis Abäba.252 Some rumours about the 
Austrian government wanting to restore the shipment of MTT to Addis Abäba started spreading 
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around 1920.253 Another very detailed report, written in October 1921, sheds light on the circulation 
of MTT once they had left the colony. According to the report, only a small quantity of MTT that the 
“banyans” were able to export to Aden and Bombay were melted and re-coined. Most of them were 
absorbed by the market in Yemen. MTTs were exchanged in Aden with Arab merchants for coffee, 
hides and dates. When the dura harvest was good, the Arabs used to hoard MTTs as they did not need 
them to import the dura from the western shore of the Red Sea. On the contrary, during bad harvests, 
the thalers used to go west, back to the port of Massawa. Those MTTs that reached Bombay were 
traded with merchants from the Persian Gulf in exchange for pearls and dates.254 This report 
anticipated the growing attention of the Italian colonial government to the regional role of the Eritrean 
colony as a “transit region”. After the War, a brief economic boom was followed by a slump as the 
global economy struggled to reallocate resources and adjust production to the demands of a peacetime 
economy.255 Italy limited imports in order to reduce its trade deficit, and all the effort to adapt colonial 
trade to the pressing demands of Italy during the War were frustrated. For example, in 1918 there 
were ongoing attempts by traders in Eritrea to attract quality hides (the most important export item) 
through the assignment of prizes to the näggade, and the dispatch of specialised indigenous labourers 
to introduce skin-processing techniques in Ethiopia.256 The fall in demand paralysed the caravan trade, 
as the prices of the goods in the market were too low to support transportation costs.257 Doum nuts, 
another important export product during the War, used to produce buttons for the troop uniforms, 
were no longer requested by Italian factories.258 Moreover, a series of other factors further crippled 
the economy of Eritrea. A swarm of locusts in 1918 and scarce rains produced poor harvests until 
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1925.259 A devastating series of earthquakes hit Massawa from January to September 1921, 
destroying the town and making the European buildings in the area not fit to live in.260 Finally, the 
colony went through a serious credit crunch. The Banca per l’Africa Orientale, which was already 
suffering due to the collapse of international trade, had its coup de grâce with the bust of the Banca 
Italiana di Sconto, its majority shareholder.261 The official interest rate in the colony skyrocketed to 
15%, while usury dominated among indigenous economic operators.262 The collapse of Eritrean 
economy halted only in the second half of 1922, but the recovery was far from complete. The 
construction industry gained momentum from 1923, with the starting of demolition and 
reconstruction works in Massawa, boosted by a change in the government of the colony.263 But it was 
only from 1924 that the situation of the economy started to improve again. Trade between the ports 
of the Red Sea recovered, harvests improved, and the price of goods started to rise again, incentivising 
caravan trade. Even doum nuts exports resumed in 1924, while only 18,000 quintals of nuts had been 
harvested out of the 40,000 that were produced in 1923.264 However, monetary instability still 
characterised Eritrean economy, as available MTTs were not enough to fuel it and the supply of new 
thalers from Vienna was slow. The value of the MTT fluctuated from 13 to 16.5 to the lira in one 
year, reaching the quotation of 18 lire in January 1925.265 Meanwhile, in Italian Somalia (which had 
recently acquired the Trans-Juba territory from Britain as a war reward), the new Fascist governor 
Cesare Maria De Vecchi decided to deal with the monetary problem by extending the Italian monetary 
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system to the colony.266 Unlike Eritrea, Somalia had not experienced a trade growth during the War, 
being instead almost completely cut off from Europe.267 On the contrary, it was involved in the post-
War crisis of the rupee which affected East Africa and led to the constitution of the British East 
African Currency Board.268 The shortage of currency, the rise of the international price of silver, and 
the devaluation of the lira provoked a spike in the intrinsic value of the rupee compared to its nominal 
value, while keeping a fixed exchange rate with the lira until 1919.269 As had already happened in 
Eritrea, the Bank of Italy was called on to manage the monetary crisis, by issuing vouchers in rupee, 
guaranteed by the deposits of the bank in Somalia.270 
In the following years, the actions of the colonial government aimed at the expansion of the political 
and commercial influence in Ethiopia and on the other shore of the Red Sea.271 In Eritrea, the new 
Italian colonial strategy was personified by the first fascist governor of the colony, Jacopo Gasparini, 
who from 1923 to 1928 conducted a successful diplomatic and commercial action in Yemen and 
Ethiopia.272 This trend was abruptly interrupted by the Great Depression at the end of the 1920s, and 
a subsequent fragmentation of the world economy, with the creation of different trading areas and 
lack of international cooperation.273 From that time on, the attention of the new governors of the 
colony focused on strengthening the influence in Ethiopia, and preparing for its invasion.274 The 
office of the Gestione Talleri had been closed on 31 December 1921, “considering the reasons that 
led to [its] foundation ceased [to exist]”.275 A multiple currency system continued to fuel the 
economic life of the Italian colony of Eritrea, and it was only in 1936, when the monetary system of 
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the homeland was imposed in the newly founded Italian East African Empire, that the office of the 
Gestione Talleri of the Bank of Italy resumed its operations.276  
In this chapter we have seen that, even without being directly involved in war operation, Eritrea 
too experienced the consequences of the First World War. The exceptional currency crisis that 
engulfed the region during the War, along with the greater attention the colonial government paid 
towards currency circulation, provides us with more documentation to rely on, so as to better 
understand how the local monetary system worked. In agreement with the views of Akinobu Kuroda, 
we have seen that the Maria Theresa thaler was essential for the steady functioning of regional trade. 
The fact that local prices were calculated in MTT highlights the degree of dependence of the Eritrean 
market on the connection with other regional markets. At the same time, we have seen how the MTT 
was necessary in allowing the transportation of goods between these markets. The Italians were aware 
of the crucial importance of the MTT for local markets, and this is the reason why they tried to avoid 
the outflow of silver coins from the beginning. However, in order to protect the value of the lira on 
local markets, they banned the use of the MTT; but in doing so they inadvertently risked isolating 
local markets even more. Those who still retained the ability to exploit regional connections by 
positioning themselves at the borders of these networks, were in a better position than those who 
received salaries in lire. Finally, new “devices” were introduced to face the monetary crisis, through 
the issuing of banknotes and, at the end of the War, a new silver thaler. While these instruments 
brought some relief to internal circulation, they were useless for the fuelling of inter-regional trade. 
At the same time, the opening of the agencies of the Bank of Italy offered the government of the 
colony new tools for attempting the regulation of the colonial monetary system. The political 
importance of the MTT was acknowledged by the Italians and used to acquire commercial and 
political influence in Ethiopia. Finally, the analysis of the reports of the agents of the Bank of Italy 
offers a better understanding of the broader circulation of the MTT, and of the role of Eritrea in the 
broader Red Sea economy.
 









As we saw at the end of chapter 3, after the First World War a global economic crisis hit the 
countries that had struggled to readapt their productive systems from a war economy to a peacetime 
economy. At the outbreak of the War, the state expenditures of the belligerent countries were 
reallocated to military spending, subsidising those sectors that were necessary for the war effort, such 
as armament factories and chemical industries.1 Labour, as well as capital, was shifted to military 
production. This provoked a reduction in trade and production of consumer goods. Countries like 
France, Belgium, Italy and Poland struggled to adjust their economies to the decrease of trade 
demand, as a result of the war effort.2  
The end of the War was also characterised by the outbreak of a global influenza pandemic, which 
killed 2.4 million people in Africa.3 From 1924 to 1926 the world economy slowly recovered, and 
the gold standard was restored for most of the countries which had previously adopted it.4  
Italy was back on the gold standard at the end of 1927, after the implementation of the monetary 
reform conceived by Minister Giuseppe Volpi and strongly desired by Mussolini; the aim was to get 
the lira at the price of 90 pounds.5 Previously, the lira’s fluctuation exposed the Italian currency to 
speculation by Italian traders, who began to invest in imported goods.6 The Italian economy started 
to grow again between 1928 and 1929, but the 1929 global depression abruptly halted further 
recovery.7 In order to kick-start its economy after the depression, the United Kingdom left the gold 
standard and intervened with a devaluation policy that lowered interest rates and stimulated 
 
1  Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin, and Gianni Toniolo, The World Economy between the World Wars (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 23. 
2  Ibid., 25. 
3  According to Richard Pankhurst, the influenza hit Ethiopia in two waves, as was the case in the rest of the world. 
Massimo Zaccaria gives an account of the impact of the influenza on the production of the Torrigiani factory in Asmara. 
See Richard Pankhurst, ‘The Hedar Bäseta of 1918’, Journal of Ethiopian Studies 13, no. 2 (1975): 103–31; Massimo 
Zaccaria, ‘Feeding the War: Canned Meat Production in the Horn of Africa and the Italian Front’, in The First World War 
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6  Ibid., 250. 
7  Ibid., 257–58. 
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investment.8 The pound started floating and the high rate of the lira turned out to be an overvaluation 
with respect to the pound and the other currencies on the gold standard.9 Instead of pursuing the 
devaluation of the lira, Mussolini tried to keep it on the gold standard by first lowering wages, and 
then introducing controls on capital movement to stop the outflow of gold. However, a recovery of 
the Italian economy after the 1929 crisis arrived only with the decision to invade Ethiopia, stimulating 
the economy through the war-related demand.10 Meanwhile, in Eritrea, the lira continued to 
depreciate against the MTT. The quotation of the silver coin expressed in lire on the market rose from 
6.50 lire in April 1935 to 9.00 lire in August of the same year.11 Finally, just before the start of the 
war operations in Ethiopia, after two failed attempts to introduce a “new” thaler in the colonies and 
three failed attempts to obtain a permit to mint the MTT in Italy, the Italian government had finally 
got a 25 year monopoly on the minting of the coin on 7 July 1935.12 The acquisition of the monopoly 
for the minting of the MTT from Austria gave Mussolini some hope for controlling the price of the 
MTT. Between 1935 and 1939, the Mint of Rome produced 19,446,729 Maria Theresa thalers.13 
During the invasion of Ethiopia, MTTs were used once again, in both funding the purchase of supplies 
for the troops, and financing a local uprising against the Emperor.14   
After the end of the military operation for the invasion of Ethiopia and the proclamation of the 
Italian East African Empire (9 May 193615), the Italians had to face the same problems regarding the 
local monetary circulation that they had tried to solve during their fifty years of rule in Eritrea. Using 
the MTT to finance their war operations, they had contributed to the already widespread circulation 
of the MTT in Ethiopia. Together with the MTT, subsidiary banknotes and coins in nickel and bronze 
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issued by the Bank of Ethiopia also circulated.16 In order to try to control the monetary situation in 
the new territories, a decree was issued on 2 July 1936, extending the Italian monetary system to all 
the territories controlled by the Italians in Africa.17 The lira became the only legal tender, even though 
only the silver 10 lire and 20 lire coin were widely accepted.18 A decree issued by the General 
Governor of the Italian East Africa, Rodolfo Graziani, ordered that the Ethiopian banknotes should 
be exchanged before 31 October 1936, while the coins could circulate until 31 December 1936. The 
new regulations were also enforced with fines and detention.19 However, it soon became evident that 
it was not possible to get rid of the Ethiopian currencies quickly. Consequently, the date for 
demonetisation of the banknotes was extended until 31 December.20  
In order to assist the government in these tasks, the Bank of Italy started assuming the same role 
it had during the First World War.21 Only the Bank of Italy was authorised to exchange the Ethiopian 
banknotes and currencies, at a rate of 5 lire per thaler. While incentivising the exchange of the 
banknotes, this extremely low rate encouraged the smuggling of MTT out of Ethiopia to be sold in 
other markets, such as Aden, at better prices (the free exchange rate in Eritrea was at that time 11.5 
lire).22  
The Italians soon surrendered to the necessity of keeping the parallel circulation of the MTT, as it 
was the only accepted currency in local trade. This was especially true in Ethiopia’s remote areas, 
where the Italians did not exert a real military or political control. Given the necessity of the MTT for 
the local commerce, the Bank of Italy was also authorised to “sell” thalers for lire, up to a maximum 
number of 50 thalers at a time.23 The thaler’s official exchange rate had to be periodically fixed by 
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the regional governments that composed the Italian East African Empire.24 Thus, until February 1937 
when a unique price was fixed, there was a different exchange rate for the MMT to the lira in every 
different region of the empire.25 However, this quotation was always at least 20% lower than the 
actual MTT value on the market.26 The Italian regulations provoked the diversion of some trade 
sources, as had already happened during the First World War. Some peasants stopped to bring 
products to the markets controlled by the Italians, where they could only get MTT through incurring 
high financial losses.27  
As had already happened during the First World War, Italian monetary policies somehow aided 
speculative operations. As we have seen, the devalued official quotation of the MTT fostered the 
smuggling of silver thalers over the borders, in order to sell them at the market of Aden. According 
to Pankhurst, the export of lire banknotes was also operated by big European firms, on behalf of 
Yemenite and Hadrami labourers wishing to send remittances and exchange the lire for MTT in the 
Arabic Peninsula.28 From the study of the proceedings of the trials for currency offences, held at the 
archive of the Bank of Italy, it is possible to assess the existence of complex networks of smugglers 
and money-changers connecting the two shores of the Red Sea, and dealing in MTT, lire and pounds 
sterling.29   
In order to avoid this form of smuggling, some measures were undertaken by the Italian authorities. 
A fund at the bank branch of Massawa was established for the exchange in MTT of the Yemenite and 
Hadrami labourers’ earnings in lire, in order to allow them to bring the MTT to their countries of 
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origin.30 Italian firms operating in Italian East Africa, as well as the Italian Government, needed a 
steady supply of labourers, the latter for the ongoing infrastructural works in the empire’s newly 
acquired territories. The possibility of earning wages in MTT was also an incentive for the recruitment 
of labour force from the Arabic Peninsula. For these reasons, the same measures were also taken for 
the Yemenite ascaris. Before obtaining the authorisation to export MTT, they had to present the 
records of the earned sums.31 
As the MTT continued to appreciate with respect to the lira, especially after its devaluation in 
October 1936, it proved once again to be more stable than the European currencies. This allowed 
those who were saving in MTT to increase their wealth.32 At that time, some people also described 
the situation as if there were two different markets, one where the prices were fixed in lira and the 
other in MTT, with the price of the goods fluctuating without any relationship.33  
In order to try to solve this situation, the Italians finally decided to demonetise the MTT, 
suspending the exchange rate of the MTT with the lira, and leaving the thaler free to float, on 5 
January 1938.34 Regional commissions continued to regulate the price of the MTT according to that 
of the international price of silver, to allow commercial companies to use thalers to buy goods in the 
inland.35  
Finally, as we have seen, also lire banknotes were smuggled across the borders in order to 
exchange them for thalers in Aden. A solution to this problem was sought in the issuing of special 
banknotes for the African territories, in order to uncouple the local circulation with that of the 
homeland, and to try and control it. However, this solution was never applied in Ethiopia, because of 
the outbreak of the Second World War and, according to some authors, to not provoke discontent 
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among the traders in Ethiopia.36  
Another form of speculation was represented by the import of MTT coined in other European 
mints. These mints were able to produce thalers at a lower price, allowing some traders to buy goods 
on the Ethiopian markets with less expensive thalers.37 France, Belgium and Great Britain started 
producing their own thalers because they could not buy them from Austria anymore (as a consequence 
of the agreement between Austria and Italy), and they did not want to buy them from Italy. According 
to these countries, Austria’s exclusive right to mint the MTT had been surrendered with the transfer 
of the issuing rights to Italy.38 The Brussels mint produced about 10 million thalers in order to trade 
with the Arabic Peninsula.39 However, it was Britain that produced the highest number of MTT. After 
the outbreak of the Second World War, MTTs were strategically employed by Britain to finance the 
war efforts in Ethiopia and local resistance against the Italians.40 The bulk of the production came 
from the Calcutta and Bombay mints, which produced 16,344,523 MTT in 1941 alone. The 
production of the MTT in India guaranteed a steadier and safer supply of the currency to Aden, as the 
route from England through the Suez Canal was impracticable due to war operations.41   
When the Italians were defeated, the British had to face similar monetary problems. On 7 April 
1941, after the British entered Addis Abäba, they issued a decree declaring that the MTT, the Egyptian 
pound and the East African shilling were the only legal tender in the former Italian territories. The 
circulation of the lira was not accepted for official payments, but fixed exchange rates with the other 
currencies were set on 24 April 1941, and the British soon realised that they could not get rid of Italian 
lira soon, especially in Eritrea, where the circulation of Italian small change took hold after more than 
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fifty-six years of Italian colonial occupation.42 Even if the circulating currencies changed, a multiple 
currency system persisted. 
Despite the defeat in East Africa in 1941, the Italian government was still involved in the monetary 
issues of the Horn of Africa. During the Italian administration of the Trust Territory of Somaliland 
(Amministrazione fiduciaria italiana della Somalia, AFIS), started in 1950, the Bank of Italy took 
part in a feasibility study for the introduction of the “Somalo”, a new currency which replaced (at 
par) the East African Shilling which had been introduced with the British occupation. After the end 
of the AFIS in 1962, the Somalo was finally replaced with the Somali shilling, the official currency 
of Somalia.43   
 
At the end of the 1950s, the Maria Theresa thaler suddenly reappeared in Italian official 
correspondence.44 Some specimens of counterfeit thalers had been found, bringing back to the 
memory the agreement that Austria and Italy had signed for the concession of the minting rights 
twenty years before.45 Since Italy had lost its empire, the Italians did not need its most widespread 
silver coin anymore, and the Austrian government asked for the restitution of the dies.46 As a result 
of this event, the agents of the branches of the Bank of Italy in Asmara and Mogadishu wrote reports 
and memoranda to revive the lost memory of these institutions, stating that the silver coin of the Red 
Sea had not yet completely disappeared. The local jewellers in Eritrea still managed to buy thalers at 
1.70 to 2.00 Ethiopian bərr; in Yemen, MTT remained legal tender; and the fact that it was still 
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accepted as a means of exchange in Ethiopia’s inland could not be ruled out.47  “Scrapping the 
anachronism” of the Maria Theresa thaler, as envisioned by the British Secretary of the Treasury 
Ernest Rowe-Dutton in 1941, proved to be difficult for the British too.48  As long as a particular kind 
of money played its complementary role in a multiple currency system, its replacement could not be 
fulfilled by the simple imposition of a rule. This was especially true if this money, as we have seen, 
did not have any issuing ruler.  
The aim of this thesis was to give a compositional picture of the Eritrean monetary system during 
the period of Italian colonialism. My analysis has gone in two directions. On the one hand, money 
became an analytical tool through which one could analyse different aspects of Italian colonialism in 
Eritrea, such as the construction of “colonial knowledge”, the introduction of military wage labour, 
the opening of European credit institutions, and the implementation of new monetary policies during 
the First World War. On the other hand, this approach has allowed for the answering of more general 
questions about the impact of colonial monetary policies on Eritrean society.  
This analysis painted a picture of a monetary system that went through different “transitional” 
phases, without losing its features of multiplicity and complementarity among the different monetary 
devices, and its connectedness with a regional dimension beyond colonial political borders. This 
approach allowed me to highlight the complexity at work in the history of the Eritrean monetary 
system, showing that it was not the result of a mere imposition of a colonial order on a blank space.  
In the first chapter, I analysed the models and discourses circulating among the colonial 
administrators and “experts” working on the “monetary problem”. This unveiled the process of 
construction of a “colonial knowledge”, as well as the policies that this knowledge was meant to 
inform. Also highlighted was how these policies were simultaneously influenced by historical events, 
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the personal background experiences of the administrators, and the adoption of widely circulating 
ideas. For example, we have seen how Giovanni Carboneri, in his essay on the “monetary problem” 
in Eritrea, referred to the ideas circulating among the experts of the Institut Colonial Internationale, 
that in turn had used the Italian colony of Eritrea as a case study for the design of the right “monetary 
system” for the colonies. Carboneri’s proposal of a “mixed” monetary system, where a “commodity 
currency” circulated together with other fiduciary currencies to facilitate the transition to a fiat 
monetary system, was finally adopted for the project of the tallero d’Italia. In designing the new 
silver coin, the archaeologist Lucio Mariani drew on the ancient Roman tradition of the 
personification of the “nation” on the coin, with the intent “to claim […] respect for [Italy’s] financial 
and moral power in the Red Sea”, after the “mutilated victory” of the First World War.49 
We have seen how the primary aim to preserve the prosperity of trade with the maintenance of a 
multiple currency system, gave way to the growing necessity for the Italians to reduce transaction 
costs by issuing their own currency. When their first attempt failed, a growing body of cultural 
analysis started to fill the pages of colonial publications, ascribing the failure not only to “technical” 
mistakes (like the quantity of fine silver contained in a coin, or the assignment of a fixed value) but 
also to cultural reasons. Subsequent analyses focused on the “cultural level of the colony”50 and the 
necessity to develop new tools, more suited for monetary systems of “old civilisations”.51 The First 
World War finally contributed to stressing the political importance of issuing a currency for the 
colonies, especially when the Maria Teresa thaler was a currency issued by the former enemy. In both 
official reports and publications of the time, the idea was spread that money could be a “spring for 
political influence”,52 and the building of a colonial monetary system “an act of true and final colonial 
conquest”.53 
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In the second chapter, we investigated those cultural prejudices about the indigenous people’s 
supposed ineptitude in managing money, as they emerged from discussions about introducing some 
kind of subsidies and other limited social welfare measures for the indigenous veterans of the Italian 
colonial corps. According to the then-Italian Minister of War, Luigi Pelloux, the issuing of a 
“pension” would have served to attract more youths to enrol in the colonial army, who would be 
further convinced by the good standard of living of the veterans once they returned to their villages. 
However, according to General Oreste Baratieri, it would have also incentivised idleness, because the 
retired soldiers would not invest a steady income in productive activities like building a tucul and 
buying livestock. The personal experiences of the veterans injured during the First Italo-Ethiopian 
War show instead that they preferred to refuse the pension and convert their bonuses into land and 
cattle. Environmental crises would push them to resort to the colonial government to find a temporary 
source of income. However, when conditions improved, they then decided to store their wealth 
through more convenient instruments according to the local regime of value. Clearly, the local regime 
of value was not automatically changed by colonial monetary policies, and the former ascaris 
expressed their preference for different ways of storing value by converting their bonuses into cattle 
and land investments as soon as they could. Overall, this meant that the introduction of wage labour 
and monetary subsidies did not produce a swift change in prevalent local labour relations and in local 
strategies to store wealth.  
Chapter 3 dealt with the existence of credit instruments preceding the Italian occupation, and the 
first Italian bank branch’s opening. These systems did not only facilitate local commerce, as we have 
seen in the case of the debt disputes in the market of Asmara, but also European agents who needed 
liquidity to trade in the colony. Indian merchants, through their family and commercial relationships 
and the deep knowledge of the functioning of the Indian Ocean currency system, took advantage of 
the supply of credit to European firms and local pearl fishing enterprises, working as agents of Indian 
companies and British banks. New devices introduced by the colonial administration allowed a more 
rapid transfer of money (as in the case of money orders), or the supply of a means of exchange in 
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times of shortage, like banknotes. However, these new monetary tools did not have the same degree 
of flexibility as the “local” monetary system. European firms continued to use the financial services 
of the Indian merchants until the opening of the banks and other European credit institutions. The 
banknotes and Italian coins were not backed by those guarantees that characterised financial devices 
in the homeland, such as issuing bodies guaranteeing their exchangeability. The Eritrean monetary 
system’s functioning and its resilience became clearer to the Italians from the First World War. Even 
if the territory of Eritrea was not directly involved in fighting during the War, local monetary 
circulation was seriously hit by a currency shortage produced by a combination of multiple local and 
global factors. The need for precious metals for the war effort produced a rise in the international 
price of silver, the Vienna mint stopped producing new thalers, and blockades prevented the 
shipments of new supply. At the same time, the scarcity of MTT induced the government to 
implement strict control measures on local monetary circulation, which pushed Eritreans to hoard 
MTTs, thus accelerating their disappearance from circulation. The high price of silver, on the other 
hand, allowed Indian merchants to exploit once again their networks to smuggle thalers out of the 
colony and send them to Bombay, where they could be sold at a good profit margin. The worst hit by 
the situation were those who were bound to the Italian monetary system, such as wage labourers and, 
especially, indigenous soldiers who were paid in lire. As it was the means of exchange for the inter-
regional caravan trade, goods in Eritrean markets continued to be valued in MTT, whose exchange 
rate continued to rise compared to the lira. In turn, the purchasing power of the lira became lower and 
lower. The new tools implemented by the Italian government to attempt controlling the local 
monetary system, such as the opening of the Gestione Talleri office, served to produce a broader view 
of the circulation of the MTT, and acknowledgement of its capacity to connect local markets to 
transnational networks. The monopoly of the Gestione Talleri in the exchange of MTT during the 
War allowed the office of the Bank of Italy to trace a portion of the thalers circulating in the colony 
and in its inter-regional trade. For example, the caravan traders (näggade) bringing foodstuffs from 
Ethiopia needed to be paid in MTT in order to pay fees on their way back to their homeland. Reports 
were produced by the agents of the bank, showing how the MTT was necessary for the purchase of 
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specific products such as dura, on both shores of the Red Sea. These reports also showed how a short 
supply of grains in the Arabic Peninsula could be at the base of a surge of thalers reaching the western 
coast of the Red Sea, in order to procure foodstuffs. At the same time, due to the international price 
of silver, Indian merchants could export MTT to Bombay either to sell them to the mints, or to take 
part in the pearl trade in the Persian Gulf.  
The thematic approach adopted in this thesis has left some questions out of the picture. A part of 
the story that has not been fully covered by this work regards the decision to extend the Italian 
monetary system to the whole empire after 1936, and the impact of this decision on local trade, 
mobility and currency circulation in a regional perspective. A topic that deserves to be explored is 
the increase of wage labour in the colony during the fascist period, even beyond the ascaris, 
investigating other categories of labourer working for the colonial administration and private 
companies. Taxation during the Italian colonial period in Eritrea and the other colonies is also a 
relevant theme in relation to its influence on the local acceptance of colonial currencies. Taken 
alongside local cycles of production, this aspect would allow us to better assess the degree of regional 
integration of local Eritrean economy, despite and because of the Italian colonial policies, through 
the analysis of seasonality in the supply and quotation of the Maria Teresa thalers. The qualitative 
and quantitative data collected by the agents of the Bank of Italy are a source that can be further 
exploited to carry out these analyses. 
Still, the findings presented in this dissertation allow for more general considerations. The 
evidence provided here confirms Akinobu Kuroda’s proposal about the complementarity of 
currencies in a multiple-currency system.54 While the introduction of banknotes and small 
denomination lira coins may have supported local circulation during the First World War, the MTT 
was necessary to allow the transregional trade system to keep functioning. For this reason, any 
attempted substitution of the MTT by a single European power in the Red Sea was bound to fail. As 
 
54  Kuroda, ‘The Maria Theresa Dollar in the Early Twentieth-Century Red Sea Region: A Complementary Interface 
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stressed by Kuroda,55 and previously showed by Eric Helleiner,56 the idea of a single “national” (or 
colonial) currency is a “recent” historical product. The success of a monetary system depends on 
different external and internal factors that are historically determined and that are strictly related to 
local practices and regimes of value. Natalie Swanepoel showed that the success of a new currency 
in colonial Ghana depended on a “positive network effect”.57 In the case of Eritrea during Italian 
colonial period, the success of the MTT was guaranteed by a series of “network externalities” that 
made the silver coin an essential device for the functioning of inter-regional and transregional trade. 
At the same time, in order to guarantee the success of a new currency, local factors should also be 
taken into account. One of the reasons that led to the failure of the tallero eritreo was the fact that 
there was no way for Eritreans to “officially” exchange that coin with the lira. Therefore, there was 
no way to “connect” its circulation to that of an international “trade money” based on the gold 
standard, such as the British pound. While artificially pegging it to the lira, the Italians were 
delegitimising the new coin by not facilitating this conversion. Hence, the Eritreans did not trust a 
coin that contained less silver than the MTT, being more expensive and not freely exchangeable. For 
a currency to be accepted locally, it should not only be recognised as a valid “means of exchange”, 
but it should also be a trustable store of value.58 All these factors made the colonial subjects distrust 
the new currency as a store of value. “Infrastructural support” was another element determining the 
success of a currency.59 Like the difficulties in converting the tallero eritreo in the Italian national 
currency, the lack of banks and credit institutions hampered the spreading of “alternative” monetary 
devices (such as banknotes). Instead, for the tallero d’Italia its scarcity was one of the elements that 
produced its failure.  
The circulation of the MTT still represents a rich subject for further analysis and even theoretical 
considerations. The history of its success proves to be problematic for a dualistic representation of 
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money, that Keith Hart calls “the two sides of the coin”: currency as both a device issued by a political 
power (such as the state), representing “a relation between persons in society”, and “a thing, capable 
of entering into definite relations with other things, as a quantitative ratio”.60  In the case of the Maria 
Theresa thaler, the issuing political power had become only the “producer” of a commodity, since it 
officially became a “trade currency” and continued to be sold to traders after the Empress Maria 
Theresa’s death in 1780.61 It is ironic that a coin that started circulating independently of its original 
issuer, first came about at a time when philosophical discussions around the concept of nation-state 
were spreading in Europe.62 At the same time, it is worth noting that Hart’s picture of the double-
sided coin was produced at a moment when most international currencies had abandoned any attempt 
to pursue a “logic setting of values”63, and started to be traded as commodities with a free-floating 
value. These few elements show that the Maria Theresa thaler is a significant tool in thinking about 
broader questions regarding the role of money in contemporary world, the idea of nation-state, and 
the concept of “modernity”.  
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